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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to offer a comprehensive account of the problem of
nihilism in Friedrich Nietzsche, both as a cognitive phenomenon involving a set of beliefs
about one’s world (as “European nihilism”) and as a feeling-based phenomenon (as
affective nihilism). After introducing these two varieties of nihilism, I look to potential
resources in Nietzsche’s thought for overcoming them. First, I argue that the European
nihilist can think truth, purpose, and value in new and life-affirming ways by coming to
understand Nietzsche’s account of the drives — as wills to power with affective, and
therefore evaluative, orientations — and by applying this account not only to human life,
but to non-human life and the inorganic world (as Nietzsche intended). For this reason, I
look to Nietzsche’s drive ontology as a resource for overcoming European nihilism,
while acknowledging that Nietzsche did not necessarily intend it for this use. Next, I
argue that personal narrative can serve as a Nietzschean resource for overcoming
affective nihilism. Since affective nihilism is a psycho-physiological condition —
consisting in a weakness of the will and a disruption of one’s end-directedness and
engagement in the world — this is a particularly difficult problem to overcome. By
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attending to Nietzsche’s own practices and recommendations, however, the development
of — and reflection upon — a personal narrative emerges as a promising treatment. As I
go on to argue, this process of self-narration not only offers the potential for personal
transformation; it also enables one to recognize the importance of an attitude of openness
— or affirmative receptivity — for the authentic creation of new values. Although
Nietzsche does not explicitly say that self-narration can be used to overcome nihilism as a
feeling-based phenomenon, and although there could be no guarantee that this treatment
would work for each individual nihilist, the transformative power of self-narration offers
one a potential means to “feel differently” about oneself and about the world to which
one belongs.
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Introduction
0.1 Nihilism and Its Overcoming
Philosophers have long acknowledged that the problem of nihilism is an issue with which
Nietzsche is, at least in his later works and notebooks, supremely concerned. Yet Bernard
Reginster’s recent treatment of the problem in nihilism in Nietzsche — found in The
Affirmation of Life — both re-ignited and re-focused contemporary engagements with
Nietzsche’s thoughts about nihilism. In this work, Reginster investigates a variety of
Nietzsche’s “philosophical doctrines” with an eye to the role they play in affirming life
and overcoming nihilism, arguing that readers of Nietzsche ought to “regard Nietzsche’s
philosophy as a systematic response to the problem of nihilism.” 1 This work has inspired
a number of critical responses from contemporary scholars. 2 In critical responses from
Ken Gemes and John Richardson, both scholars point out that while Reginster presents
nihilism as a purely cognitive issue, involving a variety of beliefs about meaning and
value, it is just as frequently (and perhaps, Gemes suggests, more significantly) presented
by Nietzsche as a feeling-based phenomenon, a weariness with one’s world which
comports one negatively towards the world of which one is a part. How, then, should
Nietzsche’s reader understand the problem of nihilism in his thought?
This dissertation aims to show that a satisfactory account of the problem of
nihilism in Nietzsche will not only recognize European nihilism as a cultural
1

Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life. (Boston. MA: Harvard UP, 2006), 4.
Ken Gemes, “Nihilism and the Affirmation of Life: A Review of and Dialogue with Bernard
Reginster.” European Journal of Philosophy. 16:3 (2008). Maudemarie Clark, “Suffering and the
Affirmation of Life.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies. 43:1 (2012). Nadeem J.Z. Hussain,
“Metaethics and Nihilism in Reginster’s The Affirmation of Life.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies.
43: 1 (2012). Ivan Soll, “Nietzsche’s Will to Power as a Psychological Thesis: Reactions to
Bernard Reginster.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies. 43: 1 (2012). John Richardson, Nietzsche
Values, forthcoming.
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phenomenon, but will also acknowledge that which Gemes and Richardson call an
“affective nihilism,” or nihilism as a feeling-based phenomenon. In this project, I
especially utilize Nietzsche’s account of drives, affects, and the relations he establishes
between them to show that affective nihilism should be interpreted as a psychophysiological condition, originating in the nihilistic individual’s drives and affects. This
dissertation thus benefits from Gemes and Richardson’s critique of Reginster’s “overly
cognitive” account, yet goes beyond their brief critical remarks to outline in what
affective nihilism consists for Nietzsche. 3
This project, while responding to issues in contemporary Nietzsche scholarship, is
also influenced by my engagement with Martin Heidegger’s account of Nietzsche’s own
nihilism, especially as treated in the work of Iain Thomson. In his Nietzsche lectures,
given between 1936 and 1939, Heidegger conducts an in-depth investigation into
Nietzsche’s thought in order to identify and discern the significance of some of
Nietzsche’s most well-known ideas. In the final volume of this lecture series, Heidegger
argues that Nietzsche’s metaphysics — which understands the world and its constituents
as empty force, recurring eternally — is profoundly nihilistic and traps Nietzsche in the
very problem which he aims to overcome. For Heidegger, the nihilism in which
Nietzsche remains ensnared results from thinking and experiencing all being as
nothing, as he claims Nietzsche’s metaphysics encourages his reader to do. 4
Insofar as Heidegger uses his reading of Nietzsche’s metaphysics to demonstrate
that Nietzsche’s thought traps him in the very problem he diagnoses and seeks to
3

Richardson, Nietzsche Values, forthcoming. Also: Ken Gemes, “Nihilism and the Affirmation of
Life: A Review of and Dialogue with Bernard Reginster.”
4
See especially Iain Thomson, “Understanding Ontotheology as the Basis for Heidegger’s
Critique of Technology” in Heidegger on Ontotheology. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005).
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overcome — nihilism — this dissertation can be understood as engaged in quite the
opposite endeavor. In this project, I utilize Nietzsche’s metaphysics — a metaphysics of
drives as wills to power, understood quite differently from Heidegger’s world of empty
force, eternally recurring — to demonstrate that there are resources in Nietzsche’s
metaphysical thought and elsewhere for addressing and potentially overcoming the
problem of nihilism, both as a cognitive and affective phenomenon. It is important, of
course, to recognize differences between Nietzsche and Heidegger’s conceptions of
nihilism: overcoming nihilism for Heidegger will look different than overcoming nihilism
for Nietzsche. In this dissertation, I present an historical-interpretive account of
Nietzschean nihilism, and then look to his metaphysics and other aspects of his thought
as resources for overcoming nihilism as Nietzsche characterizes it. In the course of this
investigation, however, those familiar with Heidegger’s Nietzsche will come to recognize
Heidegger’s answer to the problem of nihilism— a world of “inexhaustible richness”
which exceeds and informs the machinations, values, and purposes of human life— as a
profoundly Nietzschean account of the world which serves as a resource for the
overcoming of nihilism in Nietzsche. 5
0.2 Chapter Outline
In the first chapter, “The Problem of Nihilism,” I orient the problem of nihilism in
Nietzsche by arguing for nihilism [Nihilismus] in Nietzsche as both an affective condition
and an historical phenomenon of which Nietzsche offers his reader a developmental
account. After a summary of the historical development of European nihilism according
to Nietzsche, I summarize his accounts of two nihilistic tendencies of Western
5

Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Off the Beaten Track. Translated by
Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 25.

3

philosophy: 1) the tendency which Western philosophy has to accord a higher value to a
stable world of being than to an ever-changing world of becoming and 2) Western
culture’s belief in a “true” world, separate from and superior to the world of earthly
existence. Finally, I introduce both affective nihilism and three different facets of
European nihilism as a cognitive, cultural phenomenon: epistemological nihilism,
nihilism of purposelessness, and ethical nihilism. On my account, affective nihilism for
Nietzsche (as a psycho-physiological condition) both motivates the development of
nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value and is alleviated in part by these
conceptions. The moment of European nihilism, on the other hand, results when such
nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value become unbelievable, leaving man in a
vacuum of meaning upon their collapse. With the advent of European nihilism comes the
return of that affective nihilism which nihilistic conceptions of the world had temporarily
eased.
In the second chapter, “Affective Nihilism and European Nihilism,” I utilize both
Nietzsche’s published works and his unpublished notes to argue for the existence of these
fundamentally different kinds of nihilism in Nietzsche: affective nihilism and European
nihilism. In this section of the project, I both locate textual bases for these varieties of
nihilism and offer detailed accounts of these kinds of nihilism. While affective nihilism is
a psycho-physiological condition which consists in will-weakness and disrupts both one’s
end-directness and engagement with one’s world, European nihilism involves three
different kinds of cognitive nihilism: epistemological nihilism, nihilism of
purposelessness, and ethical nihilism. After offering an account of affective nihilism, I go
on in this chapter to describe the three kinds of nihilism comprising European nihilism

4

and situate them in the landscape of Nietzsche scholarship, with an eye especially to
points of difference with other scholars’ characterizations of nihilism.
In this dissertation, however, I aim not only to explicate the problem of nihilism
in its affective and cognitive/cultural components; I also hope to demonstrate that
Nietzsche’s thought offers resources for overcoming these kinds of nihilism. In my
analysis of Nietzsche’s ontology in the third chapter of this project, “Nietzsche’s
Metaphysics and The Problem of Nihilism,” I demonstrate the importance of a largely
untreated and thoroughly under-appreciated aspect of Nietzsche’s thought — a critically
affirmative openness or receptivity to sources of value external to the self — which
comes to light as we recognize how a permeability between individuals and the world of
which they are a part comprises an essential component of Nietzsche’s metaphysics.
Here, I present Nietzsche’s positive metaphysical vision after I detail his critiques of
conventional metaphysics. In this chapter I utilize John Richardson’s seminal account of
drives as wills to power, while also including Katsafanas’s more recent treatment of
Nietzschean drives, their role in human behavior, and their tendency to induce both
evaluative and affective orientations. Since I read Nietzsche’s account of the drives as a
metaphysics and not merely as a “philosophical psychology,” my account goes on to
explain how even the drives comprising non-human life and inorganic objects have
certain evaluative and affective orientations.
In the fourth and final chapter of this project, “Overcoming Nihilism: Radical
Openness and Personal Transformation,” I identify resources in Nietzsche’s thought for
responding both to the problem of European nihilism and the problem of affective
nihilism. For responding to European nihilism as a set of beliefs about a lack of truth,

5

purpose, and value in the world, I look to Nietzsche’s ontology and the potential it holds
for founding new conceptions of truth, purpose, and value in this-worldly existence. In
this chapter, I argue that Nietzsche’s metaphysics of drives in particular allows for his
readers to recognize their participation in this-worldly sources of value, the creation and
disclosure of truth (as perspectival), and immanent purposiveness. In this way,
Nietzsche’s metaphysics allows one to recognize that one is embedded in a meaningful
world.
In the final sections of the fourth chapter, I look to Nietzsche’s accounts of selfknowledge and personal transformation as resources for treating — and perhaps
overcoming — affective nihilism as a psycho-physiological condition. Given the
previous chapter’s explication of the details of Nietzsche’s metaphysics and the various
features of Nietzschean drives, I am able to go into more detail about affective nihilism
here. Given that affective nihilism is a condition which results in the inefficacy of one’s
end-directedness and a lack of engagement in the world, the overcoming of this condition
must involve both the exercise of agency (as the abilities to have goals, increase one’s
activity, and play a part in one’s own transformation) and an affirmation of the world in
all its complexity.
Since the overcoming of affective nihilism requires the affective nihilist to
undergo a profound personal transformation which enacts fundamental changes in their
constitution as a complex of drives, affective nihilism is a difficult problem to solve. My
goal in the last section of the fourth chapter, then, is to envision one potential treatment,
rooted in Nietzsche’s thought and practices, for the problem of affective nihilism: the
development and reflection upon a personal narrative in Nietzsche as a practice of self-

6

knowledge. Self-narration of this kind can be understood as one potential treatment
which might function to re-engage the affective nihilist with herself and her values, to
facilitate a strengthening or growth in the activity of her drives, and thus to allow her to
regain some measure of agency. Importantly, however, this practice of self-knowledge
also allows an individual to recognize her fundamentally receptive nature, as a complex
of drives embedded in a driven world. When this happens, the individual is no longer
“estranged” from her receptive nature and becomes able to recognize her participation in
a value-laden world of immanent purposiveness which allows for a new, perspectival
conception of truth. This way of thinking differently about oneself and one’s world —
thinking the world as a condition of purpose, value, and truth and oneself as inseparable
from this meaningful world — allows one to re-engage in one’s world and affirm thisworldly existence as a condition of her positive transformation.

7

Chapter One: The Problem of Nihilism
1.1 Introducing Nihilism in Nietzsche
An incredibly large number of themes fall under the purview of Nietzsche’s body of
work; his insights are far-reaching and the topics he treats are enormously varied. In
Nietzsche’s work, one can locate philological insights about the ancient world just as
easily as a recommendation for uplifting music. Reading Nietzsche can be a disorienting
experience for the reader in part because of this breadth of his thought. His work jumps
from topic to topic, and the relations among these topics often appear opaque. Rather than
constructing comprehensive treatises like philosophers before him, in which a grand
philosophical system unfolds, Nietzsche often writes in a short, aphoristic style. Scholarly
attempts to understand “what Nietzsche really thinks” are plagued with the task of
untangling his (often explicitly) contradictory propositions.
Nevertheless, there is one theme around which one may orient many seemingly
divergent threads of Nietzsche’s thought: nihilism and the problem of meaninglessness in
modern Europe. 6 Nietzsche’s discussion of the problem of nihilism is rich, complex, and
surprisingly difficult to pinpoint. Though one happens upon possible symptoms or
consequences of this problem in nearly every one of Nietzsche’s works — one senses the
specter of nihilism at every turn — there are very few comprehensive accounts of the
problem of nihilism in Nietzsche. This is almost certainly because, while the problem of
nihilism permeates so many of Nietzsche’s most critical works, he rarely calls it by name
[Nihilismus].

6

It seems particularly significant that this is the unifying topic selected for Nietzsche’s proposed
text, The Will to Power. See “Book I” of Will to Power, a compilation of Nietzsche’s unpublished
notes.

8

Although there is mention of nihilism [Nihilismus] in Nietzsche’s earliest
published work, The Birth of Tragedy, as well as in an early notebook written at the same
time as the first four books of The Gay Science (in which Nietzsche explicitly but briefly
problematizes nihilism in two consecutive aphorisms) and an early letter to a dear friend,
Nietzsche’s explicit mentions of nihilism occur with much more frequency in his private
notes from 1885 onwards. While he discusses the problem of nihilism in some of his late
published works including Beyond Good and Evil (1886), the fifth book of The Gay
Science (1887), The Genealogy of Morality (1887), and The Antichrist (1888), the
problem of nihilism in Nietzsche is one which he often examines and hashes out in
private spaces reserved for the working out of his thoughts.
These features of Nietzsche’s analysis of Nihilismus — its generally late
appearance, its relegation to personal notebooks — might lead one to believe that
Nietzsche deals with the problem of nihilism only in his philosophical maturity, and that
his thoughts on the matter were not considered by himself to be sufficiently mature as to
warrant publication or promotion. This is an interpretation which must be resisted. As
Charles Andler notes, the increase in explicit mentions of Nihilismus in Nietzsche’s late
work is less a sign of a new interest or emphasis, and more a result of Nietzsche’s
increased familiarity with the term following from his reading of Paul Bourget’s Essais
de psychologie contemporaine. 7 Indeed, Nietzsche’s adoption of Nihilismus in his later
works allows him to designate a particular set of phenomena which he has been attending
to all along. In other words, the problem of nihilism animates much of Nietzsche’s
philosophical work; even when Nihilismus is not explicitly mentioned, Nietzsche deals
7

Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions
of his Philosophy. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 41.

9

with it in his analyses of the struggle between life-denial and life-affirmation and the
world-denial implicit in what he calls (in a note written between 1885/6) the christlichmoral interpretation of the world. 8
Nihilismus in Nietzsche has many senses. As an historical phenomenon, nihilism
is “European nihilism [Der europäische Nihilismus]:” the historical denigration of earthly
or this-worldly existence by European culture, either explicitly stated or implicitly
represented by particular belief systems. 9 As we will see, European nihilism involves two
moments: 1) the development of a belief in a meaningful world which involves nihilistic
conceptions of truth, purpose, and value and 2) the collapse of these conceptions and,
therefore, the new belief in a world absent of meaning.
As an affective phenomenon, on the other hand, Nietzsche describes nihilism as
an instinct [Der nihilistische Instinkt] (in particular, an existence-failing instinct [eines
Instinktes für Mißrathen-sein]) and a “feeling of worthlessness” [das Gefühl der
Werthlosigkeit]. 10 It is from out of these feelings and instincts that those nihilistic
conceptions of truth, purpose, and value comprising the preliminary stage of European
nihilism develop. European nihilism, as a broad cultural phenomenon, has various
epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical manifestations; Nietzsche categorizes these
manifestations as nihilistic when they result from a more basic life-denial or facilitate the
continuation of life-denial.

8

KSA 12: 2 [27].
KSA 12: 2 [131] and elsewhere.
10
KSA 13:17 [7]; KSA 13:14 [29]; KSA 13:11 [99].
9
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In both of these senses, nihilism is characterized by what Nietzsche calls lifedenial, or a negation of life [die Verneinung des Lebens]. 11 As Richardson notes,
Nietzschean life-denial involves a negative judgment of the world based in one’s psychophysiological constitution (more specifically, based in one’s drives and affects). 12 A
principle, ideal, or concept is life-denying when it involves this sort of negative judgment
(either being generated from or leading to such a judgment). For Nietzsche, life-denial
can be expressed in implicitly or explicitly life-denying judgments of one’s world; these
judgments involve the “radical repudiation of value, meaning, and desirability.” 13 As
Nietzsche remarks, a nihilist “judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of
that the world as it ought to be that it does not exist.” 14 What Nietzsche here calls this
“radical repudiation” of meaning is what I refer to as European nihilism, a belief in the
meaninglessness of one’s world resulting from one’s disbelief in truth, purpose, and
value. 15 This set of beliefs about the meaninglessness of existence is problematic for
Nietzsche because it is life-denying: it denies and denigrates this-worldly existence.
Life-denial in Nietzsche also refers to the hindrance of the growth or advancement
of life in its higher forms. This occurs through the generation of conditions hostile to

11

BGE 4, 208, 259; A 7, 56; KSA 13:10 [137], 13:15 [13]; and elsewhere.
This is similar to what John Richardson calls “no-to-life nihilism,” or “a ‘bodily’ stance
occurring beneath the level of consciousness and language [in which] one’s ‘physiological’
condition rejects or disvalues life” (Richardson, Nietzsche Values, forthcoming). See also WP
586.
13
WP 1.
14
WP 585. Although Nietzsche alternates between describing life-denial as 1) an (implicit or
explicit) evaluative stance which denigrates this-worldly existence and 2) a psycho-physiological
condition, as we will see directly below, it is important to recognize that the negative evaluations
involved in a life-denying stance will necessarily have their basis in one’s psycho-physiological
constitution.
15
I refer to this as “European nihilism” to refer to this belief system, as Nietzsche does, but the
belief system need not be limited to continental Europe.
12
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life. 16 Importantly, it is often life-denying judgments of the type mentioned above —
negative evaluations (either explicit or implicit) of life and this-worldly existence — that
generate such hostile conditions. These hostile conditions serve to weaken once-strong
drives and complexes of drives. 17 We see this in Nietzsche’s notes, where he claims that
it is “The nihilistic instinct [Der nihilistische Instinkt] [which] says no; its mildest claim
is that it would be better not to exist than to exist; that the will to nothingness has more
value than the will to life; its more severe manifestation arises when nothingness is of the
most supreme desirability [and] this life, as its opposite… becomes objectionable.” 18 In
this sense, then, life-denial is also a condition of the drives and affects.
In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche calls the nihilistic instincts which
cause man to deny life and himself a “great danger to mankind” and notes that nihilism
marks “the beginning of the end, standstill, mankind looking back wearily, turning its
will against life.” 19 In On the Genealogy of Morality, life-denial is the “will to
nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions
of life.” 20 In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes it as the “degenerate instinct that turns
against against life with subterranean vindictiveness [den entartenden Instinkt, der sich
gegen das Leben mit unterirdischer Rachsucht wendet].” 21 This echoes his description of
the men of ressentiment from the Genealogy as “worm-eaten physiological casualties
[diese physiologisch Verunglückten und Wurmstichigen]” which serve as “a whole
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shivering soil of subterranean revenge” [ein ganzes zitterndes Erdreich unterirdischer
Rache]. 22
This degenerate instinct or “instinct of decadence” characterizes those pessimistic
individuals who suffer from a reduction of life [die an der Verarmung des Lebens
Leidenden], those poor in life [Lebensärmste]. 23 Nietzsche contrasts these individuals
with “those richest in vitality” [der Reichste an Lebensfülle]. 24 As an example of those
suffering from such a reduction in life, Nietzsche cites the skeptics; he describes their
“physiological condition” [physiologischen Beschaffenheit] as “weak nerves and ill
health” [Nervenschwäche und Kränklichkeit]. 25 This is the paralysis of the will
[Willenslähmung] and the “will to the actual, violent negation of life” [einem Willen zur
wirklichen thätlichen Verneinung des Lebens] which Nietzsche associates with the
nihilism of the skeptics in Beyond Good and Evil. 26 Affective nihilism is characterized by
these psycho-physiological kinds of life-denial.
As a drive-based illness of the will [Die Krankheit des Willens], affective nihilism

is that “European illness” [der europäischen Krankheit] diagnosed by Nietzsche. We see
Nietzsche propose this in his notes, when he asks whether nihilism is not “before all
physiological [Vor allem physiologisch?]” and asserts that the “unhealthiest man in
Europe (at all levels) is at the ground of this nihilism” [Die ungesundeste Art Mensch in
Europa (in allen Ständen) ist der Boden dieses Nihilismus].”27 While European nihilism
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as an historical phenomenon involves a series of life-denying beliefs, it originates in this
affective nihilism. This affective nihilism is fundamentally a bodily phenomenon,
situated in the drives and affects.
The relationship between affective nihilism and European nihilism, however, is
more complicated than this. On Nietzsche’s picture, European nihilism (as a series of
beliefs in meaninglessness) originates from out of affective nihilism (as a psychophysiological condition of will weakness). Yet insofar as the development of nihilistic
conceptions of truth, purpose, and value alleviated affective nihilism, their collapse in the
moment of European nihilism leads one back into affective nihilism.
On my account, the negative, life-denying evaluations involved in European
nihilism characterize both 1) the nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value
ascribed to by European culture when Nietzsche is writing and 2) a belief in a total lack
of meaning which results as nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value collapse.
In the first case, the negative evaluation of life is implicit, insofar as what is positively,
explicitly valued is some version of truth, purpose, or value which does not exist in
reality. In the case of these otherworldly focuses, one’s drives turn towards aims and
purposes which allow them to continue baseline activity but stultify life as growth and
development (as will to power). In the second case, the negative evaluation of life is
explicit. It is this explicit, conscious belief in the complete worthlessness of existence that
plunges one back into the affective nihilism from out of which nihilistic conceptions of
truth, purpose, and value originated. This explicit belief in the worthlessness of existence
leads to the weakening or inhibition of the drives’ activity. In either case, however, the
negative, nihilistic evaluations of life — manifest either in implicitly life-denying
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conceptions of meaning or in explicitly life-denying beliefs — are rooted in the workings
of the drives and affects, and thus in one’s psycho-physiological constitution.
On my account, the overcoming of nihilism in general requires one to first
overcome European nihilism as an historically developed series of beliefs which leave
humanity without value, purpose, or truth. Only when we come to recognize immanent
foundations for truth (as perspectival), value (as valuing drives and perspectives), and
purpose (as driven life) may we start to regain a sense of vitality which affirms the world
as it is. In Dawn, Nietzsche claims that in order to overcome nihilism, Europe must “learn
to think differently — in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel
differently.” 28 While overcoming European nihilism requires a shift in beliefs,
overcoming nihilism as an affective illness requires a transformation of the felt weariness
of nihilism into a strength and vitality which enables one to affirm this life and this
world.
1.2 An Abbreviated History of Nihilism
In unpublished reflections on the nature of nihilism, Nietzsche specifies that nihilism is
“rooted” in “one particular interpretation, the Christian-moral [christlich-moral<ischen>]
one.” 29 This picture, according to which there is an interpretation of the world
characteristic of Christianity and pejorative morality which dominates the cultural
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landscape of Europe at the time of Nietzsche’s life — and which is characterized by a
sense of the meaninglessness, worthlessness, and undesirability of the world — provides
us with our first glimpse into the cultural phenomenon which Nietzsche calls European
nihilism, here and elsewhere. As Nietzsche’s reflections demonstrate, this is a historical
phenomenon and, as such, it is historically contingent; its development depends on
certain sociocultural factors. Put simply, without the specific historical developments
which lead to the birth and eventual predominance of Christian-moral ways of
interpreting the world, nihilism as the particular manifestation of European nihilism [der
europäische Nihilismus] that Nietzsche treats at such length in his work might have been
avoided.
In the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morality and elsewhere in his work,
Nietzsche offers an account of the development of European nihilism and its historical
conditions. According to Nietzsche, this phenomenon of nihilism arises when Europe
becomes conscious of the implausibility of certain fundamental beliefs that have
historically provided extraordinary value to that society. Since a society’s fundamental
beliefs serve as foundations for its systems of valuation (what that society finds “good” or
“bad”), when these beliefs are undermined the society experiences a crisis of value. After
this moment of crisis, the society is left without new values, and a general sense of the
meaninglessness of existence and the worthlessness of the world permeates all areas of
culture. This turns individuals against the world in which they live, leading them to deny
the world.
Nietzsche’s analysis of European nihilism tells a very specific story of the crisis
that catalyzes it, beginning with Plato’s theory of the Forms and continuing through the
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emergence and expansion of Christianity in Europe. Plato’s theory of the Forms proposes
a transcendent world over and beyond the world of earthly experience. This theory claims
that this transcendent world is the only world of value, and that the immanent world has
value only insofar as it participates some way in the transcendent world. This
transcendent world — the world of the Forms — manifests eternal perfection.
In short, the world of the Forms is the “true” and “best” world; the immanent
world of earthly experience is inferior and gives rise to false and harmful beliefs and
behaviors. In this world of Platonic Forms, one lives a meaningful and good life when
one dedicates oneself to knowledge of the Forms, and knowledge of the Forms is a
necessary prerequisite for the living of a good life. The world of the Forms, in this sense,
is the “best” world. Furthermore, the immanent, sensible world of Becoming is a
misleading shadow-world; it is only “real” insofar as it participates in the world of the
Forms. 30 The world of the Forms — not the sensible world of earthly existence —
functions as the sole source of knowledge for mankind. In this sense, Plato denies the
reality of the world of Becoming. Thus, Plato’s worldview is life-denying insofar as it
both disvalues and denies the reality of the world of Becoming. (For Plato, this is the
sensible realm of earthly existence.)
According to Nietzsche, European Christianity develops from out of Plato’s
theory of the Forms. 31 Christianity re-inscribes the Platonic divide between a superior,
transcendent realm and an inferior, earthly realm which human beings must inhabit for a
time. The goal of Christianity is to reach this transcendent heavenly realm; one does so
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by living a meaningful and good life, which requires one to 1) acquire knowledge of good
and evil (according to Christian standards) and 2) live according to a particular moral
code. Christianity also adds an omnipotent and all-knowing creator-God to this picture;
this transcendent God creates a purposeful universe and has a plan for each individual.
The Christian claims that this picture of life is true and accurate; as such, he does not
think it to be “anti-life” in any sense.
In Nietzsche’s analysis of the problem of nihilism in Europe, the fundamental
beliefs which European societies took for granted involved the existence and nature of an
all-powerful and all-knowing Christian god, a transcendent and superior world (the
heavenly realm) beyond the world of everyday experience (life on Earth), the inherent
purposefulness of the universe and those in it, and the essence of good and evil. As
scientific developments began to offer humanity explanations for things which they could
previously only speculate about, and as rationalist philosophers such as René Descartes
and Immanuel Kant began to emphasize mankind’s extensive capacity for knowledge, the
need for a transcendent deity to explain earthly phenomena and bless human beings with
divine wisdom began to disappear. Eventually, according to Nietzsche’s picture,
Europe’s belief in the Christian God becomes unnecessary and unbelievable.
The death of God as the unbelievability of the Judeo-Christian God in the wake of
Enlightenment advancements has devastating consequences. According to Nietzsche, the
disbelief in the Christian God which spreads through Europe convinces the modern,
educated European that otherworldly aspirations are empty and hopes for a better realm
beyond this world are futile. Individuals continue to adopt Christian standards of good
and evil out of convention, but the foundations of these standards have been undermined
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and the educated individual recognizes the insignificance and meaninglessness of moral
action. The idea that there is a purpose to the universe or to human action is thrown into
doubt. Since the notion of a meaningful life in Christian Europe was formulated in
relation to some greater purpose of the universe beyond the individual and her individual
life, the death of Christianity in Europe leads many to reject the possibility of a
meaningful life. This leads man to despise his existence and to become sick of himself
and the world to which he belongs. Just as hoping for transcendence leads the European
Christian to denounce the immanent world of experience, so coping with the
impossibility of transcendence after the collapse of Christianity (Nietzsche’s famous
“death of God”) leads man to condemn the immanent world of existence. The former is
anti-life insofar as it affirms transcendent, otherworldly existence as “real life” instead of
this-worldly, earthly existence; the latter is anti-life insofar as it devalues this-worldly,
earthly existence after transcendent sources of value are pulled out of the world (after all,
these transcendent sources were understood as the only sources of value by preEnlightenment Europe). Nietzsche offers a rather concise summary of the latter
phenomenon in Beyond Good and Evil, where he describes nihilism as a cultural (and,
eventually, individual) attitude of “contempt for that existence which is knowable by us”
which results from Europe’s realization that “the world is not worth what we thought it
was.” 32 Insofar as humanity historically found justification and value for its existence in
transcendent sources of value, the death of God leaves humanity in a devalued world;
humanity is left with scorn for this apparently meaningless world.
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For Nietzsche, European nihilism results from a devaluation of the highest values.
When the Christian-moral longing for other possible worlds and for transcendental values
which justify this-worldly human existence is undermined, European humanity is thrown
into a crisis of meaning. Nietzsche describes nihilism in his notes as the conviction that
our highest values cannot be defended or justified, “plus the realization that we lack the
least right to posit a beyond or in-itself of things that might be divine.” 33 This latter
realization leads us to reject the Christian-moral hypothesis [christliche MoralHypothese] which “granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his smallness and
accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away,” “posited that man had
knowledge of absolute values,” and prevented man from “taking sides against life [and]
despairing of knowledge.” 34 As European nihilism, nihilism is 1) a crisis of knowledge
and our expectations for absolute, objective knowledge of our world, 2) a crisis of
meaning and purpose, and 3) a crisis of value. Insofar as Judeo-Christianity is invented
by the ascetic priest out of his own powerlessness as a proposed treatment to justify the
existence of the weak and suffering, this European nihilism is borne from out of affective
nihilism: a physiological life-denial and illness of the instincts and affects which gives
rise to harmful, life-denying behaviors and beliefs. 35
European nihilism results when post-Enlightenment Europe witnesses the collapse
of those absolute, otherworldly values in which its understanding of the world was
fundamentally rooted, and it continues because of humanity’s continued inability to
honestly confront and affirm this-worldly existence — and discover immanent values —
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in the face of this collapse. In large part, European nihilism as a cultural phenomenon
results when human beings realize the contingency of their most fundamental beliefs
about the world: the contingency of their belief in truth and drive towards knowledge, the
contingency of their belief in some ultimate telos or purpose of the universe, and the
contingency of traditional moral systems in the West. This leads humanity back into an
affective nihilism, in which humanity becomes weary of the world and desires revenge
against this world.
Humanity — once so sure of a necessary, absolute sources of meaning, value, and
truth and justification for existence — despairs of this contingency. All human pursuits of
knowledge and truth presupposed the existence of objective, non-contingent truth (first
Platonic truth, then scientific truth, initially thought to be non-contingent) which
Nietzsche believes European culture must come to reject (ironically, he comes to this
realization by way of his own will to truth as an “impulse to knowledge” or “knowledge
drive”). 36 The religious, philosophical, and scientific systems of thought which dominate
European culture are founded on a picture according to which the universe unfolds along
a specific trajectory, progressing towards some ultimate goal; yet human truthfulness
reveals no such trajectory and no such thing as progress. Various systems of morality
purport to represent universal and timeless values, but as we look back on society, we
notice that these values evolved out of a noxious combination of weakness and
cleverness: in fact, these values were invented by man and grew out of contingent
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historical circumstances. European culture at the time of Nietzsche locates the value of
everyday life and human purpose in humanity’s pursuits of truth, of progress, and of
morally correct action. Once the contingency of these various values is revealed,
humanity’s self-understanding is seriously compromised.
As these various schemas of truth, meaning, and value collapse, human beings
(who have by this point developed a certain psychological need for teleology) struggle to
locate other phenomena which enable us to understand ourselves as valuable, identify
values, and live accordingly. The transcendental unifying subject in philosophy and
objective, scientific truth in science are two examples of these. Since the original problem
of religion and morality is that it prioritizes and values the otherworldly (otherworldly
goals, aspirations, purposes) over the this-worldly (immanent life and the world of
experience), this is hardly a solution. Instead, it serves to defer nihilism’s affective
manifestations and merely manifests a new expression of the same fundamentally
dishonest, deluded, harmful, yet entirely human tendency to find ourselves the centers of
our universe and to search for value or meaning in our lives wherever possible. The
problem with our ways of doing this after Judeo-Christian (and Buddhist) religious
influences is that our valuations — which become unknowingly put in the service of the
preservation of declining life — deny and desecrate life, vitality, and immanence: in
short, all of the conditions of our existence.
According to Nietzsche, the history of man’s relation to meaning is a history of
misunderstandings which have yet to be identified and addressed in a deep way. In the
sections that follow, I will explain these various misunderstandings and elaborate on the
different types of nihilism which spring forth from them.
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1.3 Manifestations of Nihilism in European Culture
Nietzsche frequently introduces the concept of nihilism [Nihilismus], as the historical
denigration of earthly existence, in two contexts which make its structure clear: in the
denial of a world of flux ( the world of becoming) in favor of a world of stability (the
world of being) and in the opposition instituted by philosophers, religious figures, and
others between a “true world” and the (merely) apparent world. By examining these two
contexts, the reader is better able to understand the structure of nihilism.
In his work, Nietzsche persistently insists that the world is “not being, but
becoming.” According to Nietzsche, the Platonic picture of existence which understands
real entities and ideas as fixed or stable falsifies the world as it actually “is”: continually
in flux, continually transforming. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche notes that “all
[philosophers] believe, desperately even, in what is.” 37 By Nietzsche’s lights, however,
this stubborn belief in being and substance is a mere illusion and mistake of
interpretation: it is only our rational interpretation and simplification of empirical
experience which gives the appearance of permanence, stability, and being. Indeed,
“What we make of [the senses’] testimony is what first introduces the lie… of unity, of
thinghood, of substance, of duration… ‘Reason’ is what causes us to falsify the testimony
of the senses. Insofar as the senses display becoming, passing away, and change, they do
not lie.” 38 Differently put, “precisely insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit
unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we see ourselves…
compelled into error.” 39 Nietzsche makes a similar point in his 1887 notes, where he

37

TI, “Reason in Philosophy,” 1.
TI, “Reason in Philosophy,” 2.
39
TI, “Reason in Philosophy,” 5.
38

23

remarks that “in a world of becoming, ‘reality’ is always only a simplification for
practical ends, or a deception through the coarseness of organs, or a variation in the
tempo of becoming.” 40 He then goes on to tie this simplification and deception with
nihilism and world-denial: “Logical world-denial and nihilation follow from the fact that
we have to oppose non-being with being and that the concept ‘becoming' is denied.” 41
Over time, humanity has come to value the stability of being over becoming; becoming,
as being’s opposite, is implicitly devalued on this picture. On Nietzsche’s view, however,
the world is a world of becoming; the denial of becoming, then, is a denial and
denigration of this world and this-worldly existence.
In Plato’s invention of a world of being which transcends the world of experience
or “becoming,” he betrays his prejudice in favor of being by assigning the world of being
a higher value and presenting it as a “true” and nobler world. This prejudice is passed
along to from philosopher to philosopher in the West and taken up by Christianity;
according to Nietzsche’s analysis in Twilight of the Idols, we see this same prejudice in
Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. 42 In European
religions and philosophy, a “condemnation of and discontent with becoming” proceed
“from the values attributed to being… after such a world of being had first been
invented.” 43 Nonetheless, when Nietzsche writes, that nihilistic value system which
assigns being a positive value (while assigning becoming and flux a negative value) is
“on the point of changing suddenly into nihilism — into the belief in an absolute
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worthlessness, i.e., meaninglessness.” 44 When Nietzsche is writing, humanity
understands the world as valuable only insofar as it is a manifestation of being. Once this
conception of the world as pure being becomes unbelievable — as humanity comes to
realize both the contingent origin and falsity of this interpretation — the world appears
to be emptied of value and meaning, and nihilism follows.
The denial of the world of becoming and change — which, as Nietzsche makes
clear, is the only world there is — in favor of some higher world of being and stability
results in a nihilistic conception of the world. 45 Humanity’s yearning for permanence and
aversion to flux is life-denying and nihilistic because it causes human beings to feel as
though the world as it actually is — in flux — is of little to no value in comparison with
the unchanging world that philosophers and religious figures supposed it to be. In reality,
the world that human beings occupy is constantly in flux; it is composed only of
“dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta [and] their essence
lies in their relation to all other quanta.” 46 If we deny and condemn this flux, we deny and
condemn this world and this life. A non-nihilistic response instead would affirm this
world and this life as it is: as a world of ceaseless becoming.
The opposition drawn by Plato between a world of becoming and a world of being
relates closely to the opposition which philosophers such as Plato and Kant draw between
a “true” world and a merely apparent world. In the former case, nihilism manifests itself
as a denial of becoming; in the latter, it can manifest either in a belief and hope for an
44
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actually “true” world or a condemnation of the world humans occupy as merely apparent.
Still, there is an important difference here. While Nietzsche wants to affirm the world as
becoming and completely discard the world of being as a mere invention, he wants to
undermine the false opposition between a “true” and an “apparent” world and discard
both concepts. By Nietzsche’s lights, the true world is a myth: “Man projects his drive to
truth, his ‘goal’ in a certain sense, outside himself as a world that has being, as a
metaphysical world, as a ‘thing in itself,’ as a world already in existence. His needs as
creator invent the world upon which he works, anticipate it; this anticipation (this ‘belief’
in truth) is his support.” 47 Yet insofar as the possibility of a merely apparent world hinges
on the existence of a “true” world, the merely apparent world is a myth as well.
Perhaps the most succinct summary of the progression of nihilism in Nietzsche is
in “How the ‘True World’ Became a Fiction.” 48 In this section of Twilight of the Idols,
Nietzsche recounts the philosophical invention of the distinction between a true and
merely apparent world and its conceptual progress through developments in European
philosophy and religious interpretation. Nietzsche here recounts the development of an
idea; in the following section, I will elaborate on the development of nihilism as an
historical phenomenon. On my account, the first five stages represent stages in the
development of what Nietzsche calls European nihilism [der europäische Nihilismus],
while the last stage represents a stage beyond European nihilism.
1. The true world — attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives
in it, he is it. (The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and
persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")
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2. The true world — unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious,
the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents”). (Progress of the idea: it becomes
more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible — it becomes female, it becomes
Christian. )
3. The true world — unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very
thought of it — a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (At bottom, the old
sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale,
Nordic, Königsbergian.)
4. The true world — unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained,
also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could
something unknown obligate us? (Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The
cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The "true" world — an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even
obligating — an idea which has become useless and superfluous — consequently,
a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and
cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. The true world — we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent
one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent
one. (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of
humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.) 49
The opposition between the true world and the apparent world is invented in the first step
by Plato; according to this picture, the true world can be known and requires the
development of knowledge and virtue. This “true world” is Plato’s intelligible realm: the
realm of the Forms. In the second step, the true world is given a Christian interpretation.
The “true world” here is heaven, a divine afterlife promised either to those who live
virtuous, Christian lives or to those who profess faith in the Christian God. Kant’s
permutation of this Platonic/Christian ideal can be found in the third step: the “true
world” as the noumenal realm. Although human reason can not attain knowledge of this
49
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realm, it provides the largely Christian population of Europe with some measure of
comfort (what Nietzsche elsewhere calls “metaphysical consolation”) as they attempt to
square their faith with the values and discoveries of the Enlightenment.
In essence, Nietzsche claims, Kant’s Enlightenment response to skepticism a la
David Hume results in metaphysics of transcendence which secularizes Platonism and
Christianity. The fourth step represents the post-Enlightenment advancement of
positivism and scientific thought; European culture at this stage understands science as
the only means to attaining real knowledge. According to this paradigm, only that which
can be attained by the means of reason and scientific investigation is certain; since we
cannot attain knowledge of some “true world” separate from the world of empirical
experience, we cannot be certain of any such world. Since we cannot be certain of this
world, we ought not to feel comforted, redeemed, or obligated by any such world. This
stage is the first moment of nihilism: Here one sees the first glimmers of a skepticism
which supposes that ideal of the “true world” might be mere human invention. If it
were mere invention, then recommendations for human action could not be derived from
this world; in such a case, those in this cultural moment recognize, the ideal of a “true
world” could collapse.
Nietzsche is writing during a transitional period between the fourth and the fifth
step: during the time of the actual collapse of the “true world,” the death of God.
Scientifically-minded, educated men at this stage find no evidence of a “true world”; they
take this as evidence against a “true world” and laugh at the old ideal as an invention, a
comfort, and an embarrassment. The cultural moment represented by the fifth step is the
moment in which European nihilism proper emerges from out of the collapse of a
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nihilistic conception of the world: any notion of a true world is widely recognized as a
mere construct which, due to its falseness, must be abolished. 50 Any metaphysics of
transcendence must be rejected and the notion of a “true world” loses its supreme value.
This is the moment of European nihilism, in which humanity experiences a complete loss
of value and meaning.
In “‘Reason’ in Philosophy” from Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche notes that when
one “[invents] fables about a world ‘other’ than this one,” one “[avenges oneself] against
life with a phantasmagoria of ‘another,’ a ‘better’ life.” 51 Given both modern science’s
straightforward interest in acknowledging and exploring this world and its a rejection of
the “true world” as a false construct and mere human invention, one might think modern
science facilitates a movement away from world- and life-denying practices and instincts.
In fact, according to Nietzsche in the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, this is
hardly the case. In scientific assumptions of 1) completely objective knowledge, 2) the
effectiveness of human reason for coming to know objective truths about the universe,
and 3) the comprehensibility of reality, Nietzsche locates a lingering wish and hope for a
“true” world apart from the world we occupy. We see this, too, in Book Five of The Gay
Science:
those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by
the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and
history; and insofar as they affirm this “other-world” — look, must they not by
the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our world? — But you will have
gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith upon
which our faith in science rests — that even we seekers after knowledge today,
we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith
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that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of
Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine. 52
A nihilistic conception of the world, as both the source of previous ideals and the
celebration and hope for some higher world in the face of the collapse of these ideals, is
preserved in the assumptions of modern science. Remember Nietzsche’s claim that the
nihilist “judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be.” 53 Given the impossibility of
objective knowledge, the ineffectiveness of human rationality (both in general and for
accessing “objective” truths), and the incomprehensibility of the universe, both scientific
inquiry and the world it seeks are nihilistic. An objective and objectively ascertainable
world is simply a post-Enlightenment version of the “true world” — a world that does not
exist — and belief in this world still requires the faith of previous religious traditions. It
is, as Nietzsche puts it, “the faith with which so many materialistic natural-scientists rest
content nowadays, the faith in a world which is supposed to have its equivalent and
measure in human thinking and human valuations, a ‘world of truth’ at which we might
be able ultimately to arrive with the help of our insignificant, four-cornered human
reason!” 54 In fact, the world human beings occupy is known differently to different
individuals depending on the various perspectives occupied by the various drives of
which they are composed. 55 Insofar as the science insists on the existence of a “true
world” known only through scientific inquiry, the scientist is a nihilist who denies both
the perspectival nature of knowledge and the world of becoming in all of its variety and
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richness. 56 In short, the scientist degrades existence and “divest[s] existence of its rich
ambiguity [seines vieldeutigen Charakters].” 57 The subtle deception of modern scientific
nihilism makes this version of nihilism all the more dangerous, insofar as it is all the
more difficult to recognize for what it is.
As noted above, Nietzsche finds himself in the midst of this new incarnation of
nihilism; the post-Enlightenment culture he belongs to ascribes a high value to scientific
inquiry and seems to wholeheartedly accept the promise of science and human reason.
This is why readers can understand Nietzsche as writing between the fourth and fifth
steps of the excerpt above. Science both exposes the improbability of the “true world”
previously conceived and presents a new version of this ideal. The scientist faces up to
the collapse of the “true world” previously conceived as an obligating or redeeming ideal
(step four); he also understand the superfluity of the “true world” as its refutation (step
five). Yet the model of the world and knowledge presented by science, as another
instantiation of a “true world,” fails to provide post-Enlightenment Europe with a nonnihilistic alternative to the old conception. In other words, the crucial work of the fifth
step in Nietzsche’s progression - the abolition of the “true world” - is yet to come.
In the sixth step of the progression, at some future time beyond the cultural
moment occupied by Nietzsche, both explicit and implicit beliefs in any “true world”
above and beyond the world of human existence are rejected. With this rejection comes
the rejection of any merely apparent sector of reality. When European culture at large
comes to 1) recognize the nihilism inherent in scientific inquiry and reductive scientific
pictures of the world and 2) understands and affirms this world as a world of becoming,
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force, interpretation, and perspective, the distinction between a “true” and “apparent”
world will be undermined. Nietzsche’s solution to nihilism requires this, and we can see
Nietzsche as the first exemplar of this affirmation. Yet this must become a more
widespread affirmation in order to effect cultural change; it is only this “end of the
longest error” which brings about the “high point of humanity.” 58
1.4. Kinds of Nihilism
Now that we have understood the relationships between life-denial and nihilism, as well
as a variety of examples cited by Nietzsche as historical manifestations of nihilism, we
must investigate a number of different kinds of nihilism which are present in Nietzsche’s
thought. In his 1887/1888 notes, compiled into the Will to Power anthology, Nietzsche
offers a detailed account of nihilism according to which nihilism results from three
different ways of interpreting of the world and the eventual loss of faith in, and
devaluation of, these three categories. 59 Nietzsche explains: “the belief in the categories
of reason [die Vernunft-Kategorien] is the cause of nihilism [die Ursache des Nihilismus]
— we have measured the value of the world by these categories, which refer only to a
purely fictitious world [wir haben den Werth der Welt an Kategorien gemessen, welche
sich auf eine rein fingirte Welt beziehen].” 60
The concepts which Nietzsche names here are purpose [Zweck], unity [Einheit],
and truth [Wahrheit]. While the concept of purpose [Zweck] insists on some higher
purpose or telos towards which the world aims, the concept of truth invents a world of
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objective truth beyond the transitive and chaotic world of earthly existence. 61 The
concept of unity [Einheit], on the other hand, ascribes an underlying moral unity or
system to the world of earthly existence. 62 As one comes to understand that there is no
“infinitely valuable whole” [unendlich werthvolles Ganzes] which works through him,
he is no longer able to believe in his own value. All of these lead to nihilism as a
psychological condition [als psychologicher Zustand]; Nietzsche describes this later as
the “feeling of valuelessness” [Das Gefühl der Werthlosigkeit] which results from the
collapse of these dominant concepts and the interpretation of the world of earthly
existence according to these concepts. 63
In other words, over the course of history, humanity develops notions of
truthfulness, purposefulness, and absolute value which it projects onto the world.
Contemporary humanity forgets the origin of these human inventions, and it believes that
truth, purpose, and morality actually inhere in the world of earthly existence separate
from the perspectives of the drives and affects which are responsible for their inception. 64
Nihilism as a cultural phenomenon, or European nihilism [europäische Nihilismus],
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arises when contemporary culture comes to realize that the world is not inherently
truthful, purposeful, or moral. This crisis of meaning results because, over time, humanity
has acquired a need for certain kinds of truth, purpose, and value. 65 Once they realize that
these needs are not — and cannot — be met by the world they belong to, they rebuke this
world.
Yet nihilism in Nietzsche also has a psycho-physiological component: that which
I will call, after Gemes and Richardson, affective nihilism.66 As Nietzsche suggests here,
affective nihilism as a physiological condition manifests in part in a feeling of
valuelessness and results from the human projection of these categories of reason onto
the world and their subsequent implausibility. Yet, importantly, is also this affective
nihilism which motivates the development of nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and
value which become unbelievable in Nietzsche’s time (in the wake of scientific
developments and the primary role for human reason post-Enlightenment). 67
As an attempt to present a comprehensive account of nihilism in Nietzsche which
treats both nihilism as both an historical and psycho-physiological condition, my
interpretation is unique. Nietzsche characterizes the “problem of nihilism” as a cultural
and historical occurrence (this version of nihilism is Nietzsche’s European nihilism
which “stands at the door” [steht auf den Tur]), but he also refers with regularity to an
affective condition characteristic of nihilism, a “world-weariness” or “weakness of will”
rooted in one’s physiology which Müller-Lauter, Gemes, and Richardson all recognize,
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yet do not examine at sufficient length. 68 Nietzsche's account of this affective version of
nihilism is just as important as his account of the former, more popular understanding of
nihilism as a cultural phenomenon. This becomes especially evident as we see the ways
in which Nietzsche relates these two basic senses of nihilism.
On my account, the problem of European nihilism in Nietzsche results from the
collapse of particular widespread conceptions of purpose, truth, and value. These
nihilistic conceptions of purpose, truth, and value were invented by early humanity to
save man; with them, “man had saved himself, he had found a meaning for himself.” 69
Rather than remaining suffering, “diseased” animals lost in a “tremendous void” of
meaning, humankind found a way to justify its suffering and a source of meaning. This
development of these nihilistic conceptions of purpose, truth, and value as cultural
paradigms of meaning is an expression of the drives and affects of weak and suffering
individuals. Through such nihilistic conceptions preclude these drives from growing in
activity, it enables them preserve their weak activity.
Although these nihilistic conceptions are originally borne as expressions of a
particular set of affects and drives, the ascetic ideal (as it comes to be legislated generally
by the ascetic priest) “permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies,
affirms, and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.” 70 These
nihilistic interpretations of truth, value, and purpose, then, present themselves as the only
interpretations; it is a testament both to the power and cleverness of the priest and to the
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prevalence of weak, life-denying drives and affects that these nihilistic interpretations
come to dominate European culture. 71 This is the first stage of the problem of European
nihilism.
The second stage of European nihilism is the collapse of these interpretations, as
the will to truth uncovers their implausibility and, ultimately, their falsity: as I explained
earlier (and will include more detail on below), these nihilistic conceptions become
unbelievable after the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment developments of science
and reason. 72 At the point in time during which Nietzsche is writing, humanity is once
again left without a justification for itself and its suffering. Humanity acquires a new set
of beliefs about truth, purpose, and value: they do not exist. Since humanity’s previous
belief in truth, purpose, and value allowed them to find meaning in the world, their
disbelief in these leads them now to the conclusion that life is meaningless. Furthermore,
since the justification for their weak drives and ineffective wills (which also allowed
them to continue a baseline level of willing and a sense of engagement in the world) has
been removed, they are left once again with weak and ineffective wills, with suffering “in
vain.” This profound moment of meaninglessness which results from the collapse of
earlier paradigms of meaning is emblematic of European nihilism after the death of God.
This essential moment of nihilism shares similarities with Reginster’s nihilism of
despair, which results when humanity acquires the “conviction that [our highest values]
cannot be realized.” 73 Reginster characterizes nihilism as “an ethical claim about the
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world, and our existence in it: ‘it would be better if the world did not exist.’” 74 Although
the European nihilist holds certain beliefs about the world, and might make ethical claims
about this world, nihilism itself does not wholly consist in the ethical content of claims
about the world and earthly existence. What makes this moment of European nihilism
properly nihilistic is not the content of any claim, but the response — a life-denying,
negative evaluation of life which facilitates the stagnation of weak life and a
disengagement from the world — to the absence of meaning and justification for human
existence in light of the dearth of purpose, truth, and value. 75 As we see in Nietzsche’s
notes from 1888, the nihilistic instinct first says no to life [Der nihilistische Instinkt sagt
Nein]. From out of this nay-saying affective condition, the nihilist makes certain claims
about the world: her “mildest claim [mildeste Behauptung] is that it would be better not
to exist than to exist; that the will to nothingness has more value than the will to life; [her
nihilism becomes] most severe when nothingness is of the most supreme desirability
[and] this life, as its opposite, is absolutely valueless [and] becomes objectionable.” 76
European nihilism, then, results from mankind’s interpretations of the world as
aim-driven, absolutely valuable, and true. These interpretations arose from out of the
weak drives and life-denying affects of humanity as a means of facilitating the continued
activity of these drives: they enabled such weakened drives to continue willing, even
though this willing aimed at goals inconsistent with the drives’ growth in activity (thus
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remaining anti-life insofar as life is will to power). 77 Since these interpretations are
fundamentally life-denying, however, they serve as nihilistic conceptions of purpose,
value, and truth.
Yet such nihilistic interpretations “have been falsely projected into the essence of
things.” Nietzsche elaborates on this in his notes:
All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world
estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore
devaluated the world — all these values are, psychologically considered, the
results of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase human
constructs of domination — and they have been falsely projected into the essence
of things. What we find here is still the hyperbolic naiveté of man: positing
himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things. 78
As we will see in the following chapter, humanity’s recognition of the implausibility of
these nihilistic conceptions leads to the modern European’s denigration and
disparagement of this world. If the world is not valuable in the way humanity believed it
to be for much of human history, European culture assumes, then it must not be valuable
at all. This is what Nietzsche refers to when he claims that nihilism results when “[the]
highest values devalue themselves.” 79
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Below, we will examine three different kinds of European nihilism which parallel
the three different categories of reason and their interpretations of existence:
epistemological nihilism, ethical nihilism, and a nihilism of purposelessness. Although I
distinguish these types of nihilism by the beliefs they express, these three different kinds
of nihilism are rooted in the development of particular nihilistic conceptions of human
existence, which were developed as a means for treating affective nihilism. Insofar as the
collapse of these nihilistic conceptions leaves modern man without meaning, they leave
man without justification for his weak will and ineffective drives, which causes man to
suffer, disengage from the world of which he is a part, and deny life. The cognitive
components of nihilism that I discuss — in this case, those nihilistic beliefs about the
nature of purpose, truth, and value which collapse under the scrutiny of the will to truth
— are nihilistic insofar as they involve a negative, life-denying evaluation of life which
denigrates this-worldly existence and leads to a stagnation of life as the will to power.
A nihilism of purposelessness results when an individual or culture comes to
believe that there is no higher purpose or telos at which the world aims. 80 According to
Nietzsche’s analysis, a nihilism of purposelessness results when:
we have sought a "meaning" in all events that is not there: so the seeker
eventually becomes discouraged. Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long
waste of strength, the agony of the "in vain," insecurity, the lack of any
opportunity to recover and to regain composure — being ashamed in front of
oneself, as if one had deceived oneself all too long. — This meaning could have
been: the "fulfillment" of some highest ethical canon in all events, the moral
world order; or the growth of love and harmony in the intercourse of beings; or
the gradual approximation of a state of universal happiness; or even the
development toward a state of universal annihilation--any goal at least constitutes
80
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some meaning. What all these notions have in common is that something is to be
achieved through the process — and now one realizes that becoming aims at
nothing and achieves nothing.— Thus, disappointment regarding an alleged aim
of becoming as a cause of nihilism: whether regarding a specific aim or,
universalized, the realization that all previous hypotheses about aims that concern
the whole "evolution" are inadequate (man no longer the collaborator, let alone
the center, of becoming). 81
Any interpretation of the world which posits a higher telos and claims that earthly
existence advances towards this telos falsifies earthly existence as a world of becoming
which unfolds without an end goal in sight. As a culture comes to recognize this truth of
becoming, this telic conception of the universe is undermined.
Epistemological nihilism results when an individual or culture comes to believe
that there is no truth. Although Enlightenment Europe adopts the belief that the universe
is systematic and unified and that only man, in virtue of his reason, has access to such
objective truths about the universe (or “absolute knowledge” about the universe), in the
moment of epistemological nihilism he realizes that this is a misunderstanding. 82
Nietzsche describes how this kind of nihilism results:
Given these two insights, that becoming has no goal and that underneath all
becoming there is no grand unity in which the individual could immerse himself
completely as in an element of supreme value, an escape remains: to pass
sentence on this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world
beyond it, a true world. But as soon as man finds out how that world is fabricated
solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last
form of nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelief in any metaphysical world
and forbids itself any belief in a true world. 83
Mankind’s belief in a “true world” about which humanity may come to know objective
truths through the use of his reason is epitomized in Nietzsche’s time by mechanistic and
scientistic thinking. Yet eventually, Nietzsche believes, scientists will discover that this
81
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world of objective truth is not a “real” world, but a human fabrication, invented out of
psychological need.
Ethical nihilism results when an individual or culture comes to believe that there
is no value to the world. The ethical nihilist believes that there is no such thing as real,
absolute value in the world (this meta-ethical claim characterizes nihilism as value
privation):
when one has posited a totality, a systematization, indeed any organization in all
events, and underneath all events, and a soul that longs to admire and revere has
wallowed in the idea of some supreme form of domination and administration (—
if the soul be that of a logician, complete consistency and real dialectic are quite
sufficient to reconcile it to everything). Some sort of unity, some form of
"monism" : this faith suffices to give man a deep feeling of standing in the context
of, and being dependent on, some whole that is infinitely superior to him, and he
sees himself as a mode of the deity. —“The well-being of the universal demands
the devotion of the individual”— but behold, there is no such universal! At
bottom, man has lost the faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole
works through him [emphasis mine]. 84
As this belief combines with his deeply rooted need for absolute value in the world, the
ethical nihilist forms a normative judgment: the “world ought not to exist” (this ethical
claim characterizes nihilism of worthlessness). 85 Ethical nihilism is perhaps the most
familiar sense of nihilism in Nietzsche, though the other two kinds of nihilism play just as
important of a role.
In ethical nihilism, the nihilist comes to believe that her world is valueless. Since
she finds her value only as part of an inherently valuable world that works through her,
this realization that the world is valueless results in the feeling of worthlessness [Das
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Gefühl der Werthlosigkeit].86 On my reading, Nietzsche designates this as the “last” form
of nihilism because the affective experience of worthlessness follows the first three kinds
of nihilism: “The feeling of worthlessness is produced by the realization that the overall
character of human existence [Gesammtcharakter des Daseins] may not be interpreted
with the concepts “purpose,” “unity,” or “truth.’” 87 The feeling characteristic of affective
nihilism — a weariness and depression resulting from the ineffectiveness of one’s drives,
which disengages oneself from one’s world — returns as the concepts with which
humanity has interpreted the world are pulled out and the world seems meaningless.
Nietzsche explains the relation among European nihilism and affective nihilism in the
following way:
The feeling of valuelessness [is] reached with the realization that the overall
character of existence may not be interpreted by means of the concept of "aim,"
the concept of "unity," or the concept of "truth." Existence has no goal or end; any
comprehensive unity in the plurality of events is lacking: the character of
existence is not "true," is false. One simply lacks any reason for convincing
oneself that there is a true world. Briefly: the categories "aim," "unity," "being"
which we used to project some value into the world--we pull out again; so the
world looks valueless [emphasis mine]. 88
Affective nihilism — as a psycho-physiological condition of the drives and affects which
leads to a negative evaluation of (and disengagement from) one’s world, resulting in a
stagnation of life’s growth — returns as the significance of European nihilism for one’s
own situation comes to be understood.
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Most broadly, nihilism as both an historical condition (as European nihilism) and
as an affective condition (as a feeling of worthlessness) involves a denial of life. 89 While
European nihilism involves the adoption of certain life-denying beliefs (as either
implicitly or explicitly negative evaluations of this world and life), affective nihilism (as
an inefficacy of the drives and a sickness of the will) is life-denying insofar as it involves
the hindrance of life’s growth and advancement. The collapse of certain nihilistic
paradigms of meaning in the moment of European nihilism (objective truth, higher
purpose, and absolute value developments) returns humanity to a state of affective
nihilism in which the “nihilistic instinct” characteristic of affective nihilism — a feeling
of worthlessness which “says no” and contends that “it would be better not to exist than
to exist [das Nicht-sein besser ist als Sein]” — returns. 90
Although he identifies nihilism as a particularly onerous problem which
characterizes his age, Nietzsche also claims that nihilism “represents a pathological
transitional stage” [in which]… what is pathological is the tremendous generalization, the
inference that there is no meaning at all.” 91 He goes on to insist that “this extreme
nihilism in modern culture can still be overcome.” 92 Thus, although Nietzsche frequently
emphasizes the gravity of the problem of nihilism, the bleakness of the set of beliefs
comprising the outlook of the European nihilist, and the severity of the feelings which
result from this set of beliefs, Nietzsche’s suggestion that nihilism is merely a
“transitional stage” suggests that it is a problem which can eventually overcome. In order
to understand how it might be overcome, however, we must review Nietzsche’s analyses
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of the different kinds of nihilism and better come to understand the problem. Only after
doing so will we be able to look to Nietzsche’s thought for resources which facilitate a
potential overcoming of this problem.
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Chapter Two: Affective Nihilism and European Nihilism
2.1 Distinguishing Affective and Cognitive Nihilisms
In his text The Affirmation of Life, Bernard Reginster describes the problem of nihilism in
Nietzsche as the problem of a nihilism of despair, according to which nihilism involves
both “the recognition of a defect not in our values but in the world itself” and “the
conviction that our existence in this world cannot realize our ‘highest values and
ideals.’” 93 On Reginster’s view, as Gemes and Richardson point out, nihilism is a
cognitive phenomenon involving certain beliefs about the world and one’s values. One
finds support for this interpretation in Reginster’s claim that “we must treat nihilism as a
rational position.” 94
As demonstrated at the end of the previous chapter, Reginster has good reason to
ascribe a set of beliefs to Nietzschean nihilism; this is well-supported by Nietzsche’s own
descriptions of the phenomenon. Yet any account which asserts nihilism can be
characterized primarily as a rational position presents nihilism as an “overly cognitive”
crisis of belief. 95 Insofar as Nietzsche consistently describes nihilism [Nihilismus] as a
“disgust and weariness with life” which involves one’s “resistance to life” [voll
Widerstand gegen das Leben], Reginster’s picture of nihilism does not sufficiently
account for nihilism as an affective phenomenon, or what both Gemes and Richardson
call “affective nihilism.” 96
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In his response to The Affirmation of Life, Gemes indicates this disagreement with
Reginster’s account. 97 Nietzsche, according to Gemes, characterizes nihilism as the
hostility of the drives to their own expression: “the most profound nihilism” is “affective
nihilism” as a “disorder of drive suppression.” 98 Nihilism here has more to do with the
interaction of one’s embodied drives than the adoption of particular beliefs. According to
Gemes’s account, affective nihilism is a “wholesale repression of the drives:” a condition
in which the activity of the drives is suppressed or eliminated. 99 Other formations of
nihilism — including “more cognitive nihilisms” such as Reginster’s — grow out of this
kind of nihilism.100 Although Gemes acknowledges Pippin’s influential definition of
nihilism as an affective phenomenon, as a “failure of desire, the flickering out of some
erotic flame,” he rejects Pippin’s account as one which eschews erotic desire altogether, a
condition which Gemes convincingly argues is impossible to square easily with
Nietzsche’s notion that human beings, as driven animals, are always willing. 101
Richardson agrees with Gemes’s characterization of nihilism as an affective
disorder, but offers a more nuanced account. Richardson treats the affective component
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of nihilism as a contracted illness of feeling, the “feeling that ‘life is too much.’” 102 This
is what Richardson characterizes as “no-to-life nihilism.” In Richardson’s words, this
“affective response” is a “bodily judgment regarding the inefficacy of one’s drives.” 103
On this picture, then, Nietzsche does not characterize the general ineffectiveness of one’s
drives as nihilism, but a negative evaluation of this ineffectiveness on the behalf of one or
more of one’s drives. It is a “despair [and] disgruntlement” with life due to the inefficacy
of the drives; it is not this inefficacy in itself. 104
Importantly, the critiques and alternatives which Gemes and Richardson pose in
response to Reginster’s conception of nihilism are preceded in certain aspects by the
interpretation of Müller-Lauter, who interprets nihilism as a “disease” with a
physiological basis. 105 According to Müller-Lauter, the “‘weak, delicate, and morbid
effects of the spirit’ are for [Nietzsche] ultimately merely the symptoms of physiological
processes.” 106 In particular, as Nietzsche notes, “the nihilistic movement is merely the
expression of physiological decadence.” 107 Insofar as affective nihilism for both Gemes
and Richardson is based in the psycho-physiological constitution of the affective
nihilist— her drives — this can be read as a predecessor to their views. In Müller-Lauter,
we even see the critique of overly cognitive interpretations of nihilism which precedes
Gemes and Richardson’s accounts of nihilism as a psycho-physiological phenomenon. As
Müller-Lauter notes, “Nihilism [is] detectable even prior to all reflection and speculation
102
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[and] cannot be refuted by merely rational arguments.” 108 In support of his claim here,
Müller-Lauter quotes Nietzsche’s assertion that “The real refutations are physiological
[Die richtigen Widerlegungen sind physiologische].” 109 Müller-Lauter utilitizes the
influence of Paul Bourget on Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism to make the case for
Nietzschean nihilism as physiological decadence, emphasizing especially Bourget’s
introduction of a “spirit of the negation of life, which darkens Western civilization more
and more each day.” 110
In what follows, I offer a complementary account to those of Müller-Lauter,
Reginster, Gemes, and Richardson. With Reginster, I agree that there is plentiful
evidence in Nietzsche for the existence of nihilistic conceptions of, or beliefs about, one’s
world. Insofar as human beings are cognitive beings, nihilism will involve a cognitive
stance which involves certain beliefs or theses about one’s world. Yet the full story of
Nietzschean nihilism is not captured merely by cognitive features of the nihilistic
individual, as the life-denying beliefs and worldview of the nihilist. Rather, as MüllerLauter, Richardson, and Gemes point out in different ways, nihilism also involves lifedenying configurations of one’s drives and affects.
2.2 Affective Nihilism
Although Gemes and Richardson explicitly make the case for an affective component to
Nietzschean nihilism in response to Reginster’s cognitive understanding, many other
contemporary scholars characterize nihilism as either a will-based or affective
phenomenon: either a faulty condition of one’s will or the manifestation of particular
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negative affects. In a co-authored chapter, Christopher Janaway and Gemes insist that
“Nihilism for Nietzsche is fundamentally an affective disorder involving what he calls the
‘the will turning against life’ (GM, Preface, §5).” 111 In her discussion of the ways in
which political engagements destroy opportunities for the manifestation of individual
talents, Babette Babich characterizes “spiritual impoverishment [as]… the wastage of
nihilism.” 112 Tracy Strong calls “a situation where persons would rather ‘will the void
than be void of will,’ the condition of nihilism.” 113 As we saw earlier, Robert Pippin
characterizes nihilism as a “failure of desire.” Furthermore, in “Nihilism and the Free
Self,” Simon May presents presents Nietzschean nihilism as a particular directedness of
the will: “full-blooded nihilism is to will — often passionately — what is nothing.” 114
This “all-consuming will…repudiates what is constitutive of living.” 115 Thus, while a
number of scholars recognize that nihilism in Nietzsche is characterized by a set of
affects and some condition of the will, an extended treatment of the affective nihilism in
Nietzsche is lacking.
On my account, affective nihilism involves a world-denying and life-denying
evaluative stance rooted in one’s drives and affects: that of the “Nay-saying
[neinsagenden] spirit.” 116 In the Nachlass, Nietzsche refers to “the nihilistic instinct [Der
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nihilistische Instinkt] [which] says No [sagt Nein].” 117 For Nietzsche, such a nihilistic
instinct is 1) expressed in particular negative affective responses. Yet these negative
affective responses are 2) rooted in an underlying psycho-physiological condition — a
condition of one’s drives — which Nietzsche characterizes as “weakness of the will
[Willensschwäche] and as life turned “against itself and deny[ing] itself.” 118
In order to understand in what affective nihilism consists and how it involves both
affective responses and one’s physiological constitution as a complex of drives, it is
important to see what Nietzsche means by affects and the connection he establishes
between drives and affects. In his notes, Nietzsche describes the activity of those drives
and affects which make up the physiological constitution of the individual as those
“actual happenings” operating “underneath our consciousness… [and] the occurring
series and succession of feelings, thoughts, and so forth are symptoms of [these]!” 119
Nietzsche goes on:
Under every thought there is an affect [Affekt]. Every thought, every feeling,
every will is not born from ONE particular drive, but an overall condition… and it
results from the momentary determinations of power of all the constituting drives
— that is, the ruling instinct as well as those obedient or resistant ones. 120
Although human beings are fundamentally composed of Nietzsche calls drives [Triebe],
affects for Nietzsche operate alongside these drives, interacting with the drives to
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produce feelings, thoughts, desires, actions, and beliefs. 121 We also see this elsewhere,
where Nietzsche characterizes affects as “reactions of the will,” 122 as “inclinations and
aversions” which play a “powerful” role in producing one’s actions 123 and coloring or
“painting” the world of experience. 124 In referring to affects [Affekte], then, Nietzsche
refers to particular feelings, emotions, or orientations — most basically described as
inclinations and aversions — which shape experience and constitute the individual
through their interactions with Nietzschean drives.
What, then, constitutes a nihilistic affective response of the kind we find in
affective nihilism? Let us look more closely both at the features of affects in Nietzsche
and specific examples of nihilistic affects. In “Nietzsche on Taste: Epistemic Privilege
and Anti-Realism,” Jonathan Mitchell helpfully characterizes affects in Nietzsche as
“evaluative sensibilities” involving both “a first-person qualitative character” and “an
intentional object at which they are directed (‘aboutness’).” 125 Furthermore, Mitchell
points out, “affective experience is typically pre-reflective, since although I can reflect on
my affects, reflection is not an essential part of affective experience.” 126 On this picture,
inspired by Peter Poellner, an affect has a first-personal character: there is “something it
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is like” to be an individual having a particular affective experience. 127 Furthermore,
affects for Nietzsche have representational content: as Poellner persuasively argues in
“Nietzschean Freedom,” affects for Nietzsche are “co-constituted in their phenomenal,
experienced character by representations of the world or aspects of it.” 128 Importantly,
this does not mean that the representation of the world to oneself through the lens of
one’s affects corresponds with the world as it actually is; just that there is something at
which an affect is directed which necessarily shapes the content of that affect. 129 Finally,
although one can become conscious of one’s affects through reflection, affects often
remain beneath one’s consciousness, yet still shape one’s comportment. This is a preconscious feature of affects in which Nietzsche is particularly interested.
Although there are a number of affects which occur in affective nihilism,
Nietzsche never attempts or intends to provide a full taxonomy of these. Furthermore,
although my analysis of affective nihilism will investigate certain affects in particular
which Nietzsche conceives of as features of a nihilistic or world-denying stance, I will
first aim to characterize these affects more broadly. On my account, the affects
comprising the first-personal character of Nietzsche’s affective nihilism are comprised of
a variety of broad, generalized negative responses to and evaluations of a number of
phenomena.
As mentioned above, on Nietzsche’s picture, affective nihilism involves a firstpersonal character. As first-personal experience, nihilism for Nietzsche is characterized
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by exhaustion [Ermüdung] and disgust [Ekel] and said to involve feelings of weariness or
fatigue [Müdigkeit], disappointment with one’s self [Verdruss an sich selbst], 130 and a
great nausea with man [der grosse Ekel vor dem Menschen]. 131 Later in the Genealogy,
Nietzsche describes the first-personal character of nihilism as a “dull, debilitating, longdrawn-out painfulness [die dumpfe lähmende lange Schmerzhaftigkeit].” 132 Not only is
nihilism a “lethargy, heaviness, and depression [Depression, Schwere und Müdigkeit];” it
is a “slow sadness [der langsamen Traurigkeit],” a “dull pain” [dumpfen Schmerz], and a
“lingering misery [zögerndes Elend für Zeiten].” 133 In Twilight of the Idols, it is
experienced as a “resistance to life” [voll Widerstand gegen das Leben]. 134 In this range
of affects, we notice an overwhelmingly negative valence — sadness, heaviness, and
misery dominate here — coupled with a feeling of impediment, obstruction, inhibition, or
motion arrested. This is felt as exhaustion, heaviness, debilitation, and depression. 135
Nietzsche does not merely describe the qualitative, first-personal character of
these nihilistic affects. There is also a clear sense that these affects are directed towards a
relatively limited range of phenomena (all-encompassing as these phenomena might be):
there is a particular intentionality of those affects which characterize affective nihilism.
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Such affects are directed towards a telling set of intentional objects: life, human existence
or humanity, and the world of earthly existence.
Life, as one intentional object of those responses characteristic of affective
nihilism, recurs throughout Nietzsche’s body of work. 136 In his “Attempt at a SelfCriticism” which precedes The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche describes a nihilistic attitude
of “disgust and weariness with life;” 137 this is echoed in the Genealogy, where Nietzsche
describes nihilistic man’s “disgust at life.” 138 In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche describes
a pessimistic, nihilistic stance “full of weariness with life, full of resistance to life” [voll
Müdigkeit am Leben, voll Widerstand gegen das Leben].” 139
In the Genealogy of Morality, both the individual and humanity as a whole are
identified as intentional objects of nihilistic affects. Nietzsche speaks of man’s “disgust
with himself” 140 and a “great nausea of man” which leads to “‘last will’ of man, his will
to nothingness, nihilism.” 141 We see Nietzsche speak of a nihilism which denies and
degrades human existence, 142 including one’s own existence, both in the body of the
work and in the Preface to the Genealogy. 143 In this Preface, Nietzsche also ascribes this
direction of the passions to Schopenhauer, finding it in his praise of the “‘unegoistic’…
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instincts of compassion, self-denial, [and] self-sacrifice [der Mitleids-,
Selbstverleugnungs-, Selbstopferungs-Instinkte].” 144
Finally, Nietzsche also identifies the world of earthly existence as an intentional
object of those nihilistic affective responses. Negative affects, on this picture, function as
negative evaluations of this world. In a discussion from Dawn on the harmfulness of
spiritual intoxication — a close cousin of the excess of feeling the ascetic priest utilizes
in the third essay of the Genealogy — Nietzsche remarks that those who utilize such
intoxication are “insatiable sowers of the weeds of dissatisfaction with oneself and one
neighbor, of contempt for the age and the world [Weltverachtung], and especially of
world-weariness [Weltmüdigkeit].” 145 In “On the Otherworldly,” Zarathustra describes
how the invention of an eternal afterlife as a justification of suffering arose from
weariness with one’s own world, a “weariness that wants to reach the ultimate with one
leap, with one fatal leap, a poor ignorant weariness that does not want to will any longer:
this created all gods and afterworlds…. it was the body that despaired of the earth — it
heard the bowels of existence speaking unto it.” 146 This describes those “world-weary
ones” of “On Old and New Tablets:” “Out of weariness he yawns at the path and the
earth and the goal and himself: not one step further will he go.” 147 Later, in the Fourth
Book, Nietzsche identifies the teaching of “the proclaimer of the great weariness” as the
belief that “All is alike, nothing is worthwhile, the world is without meaning, knowledge
144
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strangles.” 148 This weariness towards the world of earthly existence is manifest in
humanity’s invention of “afterworlds,” of worlds beyond the world of earthly existence
and eternal life beyond this life, 149 such as Christian-moral interpretations of the world.
(We see this, for example, when Nietzsche notes that “The moral world interpretation
ends in world negation (criticism of Christianity) [Die moralische Welt-ausdeutung endet
in Weltverneinung (Kritik des Christenthums)].” 150 This is the closest to what MüllerLauter calls nihilism as the “total denial of the world.” 151
These intentional objects of affective nihilism — life, human existence, and the
world of earthly existence — are used fairly interchangeably by Nietzsche. The key in
these cases is that affective nihilism manifests a host of negative affects directed towards
this-worldly human existence, which is, for Nietzsche, all that we know of life. In short,
affective nihilism is an illness which comports one unfavorably towards the world of
which one is a part. In his analysis of affects and emotions, Poellner notes that “what is
characteristic of the emotions we are inclined to describe as love, admiration, or
contempt, is that they are normally experienced not merely as caused by their objects, but
as merited by them.” 152 In the case of affective nihilism, the weariness or disgust that the
suffering individual experiences towards life, the world, and human existence appears to
this individual not only as caused by the world, but as a justified response to an unjust
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world. 153 Since the world is understood by those “weary ones” as the cause of their
suffering — yet these individuals find nothing in the world to provide them with a
justification or meaning for this suffering — the disgust and weariness with the world felt
by these suffering individuals is experienced as warranted by the world. Thus, the world
is understood as inherently weary-making, nauseating, and meaningless. This comprises
the nihilistic interpretation of the world from the affective stance of the Nietzschean
nihilist. In this way, affective nihilism manifests a world-denying or life-denying
stance. 154
2.3 The Psycho-Physiology of Affective Nihilism and End-Directedness
In reflecting upon the range of nihilistic affective responses which are detailed by
Nietzsche, one notices a striking, though not surprising, similarity among such responses:
the negative responses characteristic of the affective nihilist function as inhibitory,
obstructive, depressive, and debilitating. By looking more closely at the physiology of
affective nihilism — and especially the way in which nihilistic affective responses
involve disruptions in the activity of one’s drives and affects with one another (thus, a
disruption in one’s physiological constitution which Nietzsche calls “weakness of the
153
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will”) — we are better able to see why affective nihilism may be characterized as a
problem of “suicidal nihilism,” why Nietzsche insists that suicide is “the deed of
nihilism.” 155 I will also argue that affective nihilism must be characterized as a protracted
mood characterized by a cluster of affects, not merely the momentary experience of a
will-weakening affect: in short, the affective nihilist for Nietzsche is “infected” by
affective nihilism at the level of her psycho-physiological constitution. 156
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche characterizes individuals suffering from affective
nihilism as “physiological casualties.” 157 Later in this work, Nietzsche describes “the
feeling of the sick [as] a ‘physiological feeling of obstruction’” 158 and a “deep
physiological depression.” 159 Affective nihilism, then, is a condition marked by
“physiological inhibition and exhaustion [physiologische Hemmung und Ermüdung],” 160
in which life “turn[s] against itself and den[ies] itself.” This physiological condition
manifests in sick individuals as a “deep disgust for themselves, for the world, for all
155
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life.” 161 In other words, affective nihilism is a physiological condition which weakens life
through the obstruction or inhibition of one’s end-directedness. Insofar as this disruption
of one’s end-directedness must be explain in terms of one’s drives and oneself as a
complex of drives (since drives dictates those ends towards which human beings propel
themselves for Nietzsche), affective nihilism is an affliction of the will, based in the
activity of the drives and affects.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche identifies the source of a life-denying stance in a
“degenerative instinct [entartenden Instinkt], which turns itself against life with a
subterranean vengefulness.” 162 For a form of life suffering from affective nihilism, this
“turn[ing] against itself and [denying] itself” 163 is a “sickliness” described by Nietzsche
as “the physiological struggle of man with death (to be more exact: with disgust at life,
with exhaustion and the wish for the ‘end’);” 164 here, “man [is] suffering from himself in
some way, at all events physiologically.” 165 Nietzsche remarks upon the case of an “illbred instinct” which serves as the source of the affective nihilist’s world- and lifedenying evaluative stance, identifying a “value judgment [which] most basically says
here: ‘I’m not worth much’” and describing this as “a merely physiological value
judgment, even explicitly: the feeling of powerlessness, the lack of great affirmative
feelings of power (in muscles, nerves, motor centers).” 166 As we see, then, those negative
valuations characteristic of affective nihilism — as evaluations which emerge from out
certain kinds and configurations of one’s drives and affects — are fundamentally rooted
161
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in a physiological affliction of the will, a powerlessness and inefficacy of the will which
Nietzsche characterizes as will-weakness [Willensschwache]. 167 We see further evidence
for the physiological basis of affective nihilism in Nietzsche’s critique of Herbert
Spencer’s notion of the organism in the second essay of the Genealogy, where Nietzsche
characterizes Spencer’s denial of the organism as a being in which “the life will is active
and manifests itself” as an example of nihilism.168
Once we understand the psycho-physiology of affective nihilism in Nietzsche, it
is clear that this condition is inextricably tied to his discussion of active and reactive
individuals from the Genealogy. After all, the distinction between active and reactive
individuals necessarily involves a difference in the efficacy and directedness of the will.
In Nietzsche’s System, Richardson notes that the active “drive wills power itself, whereas
the reactive has somehow turned aside from its essential end.” 169 This same idea is
present in Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, wherein Deleuze claims that the
reactivity of man limits man because it diminishes his power to act. 170 Such reactivity is a
manifestation of a stunted or paralyzed will; this weakness of will results in world
weariness and that life-denying attitude towards this-worldly existence characteristic of
those suffering from affective nihilism. On my account, the reactivity of drives, as a
turning away from their essential end, must be a results of their interactions with
particular depressive affects: affects which weaken the drives with which they interact.
We see evidence for this in the second essay of the Genealogy, where Nietzsche notes
that reactive affects and the evaluative frameworks which arise from out of them (here,
167
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Nietzsche critiques notions of “justice as such”) are “hostile to life, an attempt to
assassinate the future of man, a sign of fatigue and a secret path to nothingness.” 171 This
is contrasted with the “true will to life” facilitated by active affects. As Nietzsche is at
pains to demonstrate in the Genealogy, the man of his time has become infected with
ressentiment as a result of his being reactive and weak instead of active and powerful. 172
As an example of how depressive affects disrupt the function of an individual’s
drives, one need only look to the case of the criminal from Twilight of the Idols. In the
case of the criminal “made sick” and “anemic” by society, Nietzsche finds “almost the
recipe for physiological degeneration [physiologischen Entartung]”: his “most lively
drives [Triebe], which he has brought with him, soon grow together with depressive
affects [Affekte], with suspicion, fear, and dishonor… [thus,] his feelings turn against his
instincts.” 173 In this case of the physiological degeneration of the criminal — as an
individual who has lost her vitality and finds her most lively drives to be inefficacious,
dampened by her depressive affects — Nietzsche provides one of the clearest cases of
how depressive affects disrupt the function of one’s drives. In this example, Nietzsche
describes how the bringing together of “lively, strong” drives with depressive affects
leads to a war waged on one’s drives by one’s affects. With this in mind, we can
understand the negative affective responses to one’s world which characterize affective
nihilism as leading to a weakness of the will insofar as they produce oppressive affects
which dampen or weaken the activity of the drives.
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One example of this mechanism — the obstruction or depression of a drive by an
affect which turns it away from its end — can be found in Nietzsche’s characterization of
pity [Mitleid] as a “depressive” affect. In Dawn, Nietzsche calls pity “a weakness, like
every loss of oneself through a damaging [schädigenden] affect.” In Ecce Homo, we see
why pity, as a “loss of oneself,” is damaging: it is a “particular case of being unable to
withstand stimuli.”174 Insofar as compassion weakens one’s ability to act — for
Nietzsche, an ability which is inseparable from the efficacy of one’s drives — it damages
the “compassionate” individual by lessening their vitality and turning them away from
their ends. This same picture of pity appears in The Antichrist, where Nietzsche remarks
that “pity stands in opposition to… emotions which augment the energy of the feeling of
life [die Energie des Lebensgefühls erhöhn]: it has a depressive effect. One loses force
[verliert Kraft] when one pities.” 175 Here, Nietzsche remarks that there are emotions
which “augment” one’s energy and feeling of life and emotions “in opposition to” those,
which function to depress one’s activity and inhibit one’s feeling of life. The affects
which dominate the individual suffering from affective nihilism, and which I detail at
length above, are examples of the latter kind.
Affective nihilism is characterized by negative, depressive affects which weaken
life and either obstruct or hinder its growth. Such affective responses to the world
comprise essentially physiological judgments (what Richardson calls those “values…
built into our bodies” 176), made on the behalf of one’s drives and affects. As we saw
above in our discussion of the intentional objects of nihilistic affects, such physiological
174
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judgments are judgments made against life, existence, and the world of which we are a
part. Yet since human beings — as complexes of drives in constant struggle, interacting
with affects — experience a range of affects in any given day which depress certain
drives and excite others, it is important to remark upon the difference between a fleeting
negative affect or temporary bad mood and affective nihilism.
On my account, affective nihilism is an exceptional case of a very particular kind
of drive suppression and will-weakness, involving both 1) the domination of a nihilist’s
psycho-physiological constitution by depressive affects (those which have life, existence,
or humanity as the object of their (supposedly justified) negative assessment) and 2) the
relative stability of this domination, resulting in the continuous inhabitation of a lifedenying stance and experience of depressive affects. In R. Lanier Anderson’s account of
moods from his article “What is a Nietzschean Self?” Anderson distinguishes between
simple affects in Nietzsche — feelings and emotions — and certain “higher order affects”
which he calls “global moods.” While affects can be fleeting, changing moment to
moment, global moods are “standing dispositions for some first-order affect (or
characteristic range of affects), to be activated.” 177 A global mood, then, disposes one to a
particular range of affects. Such a mood, according to Anderson, pervades one’s
existence and necessarily shapes the way one experiences oneself and one’s world:
indeed, a global mood “operates as a kind of collective condition within which my other
attitudes have to operate and with which they have to contend — a kind of ‘weather
system’ influencing my other attitudes.” 178 Thus, while one might experience nihilistic
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affects (unreflective emotions with a particular first-personal character and set of
intentional objects) in a particularly bad mood without being characterized as an affective
nihilist, affective nihilism is a protracted mood or “higher-order affect” which holds sway
over the range of affects available to the individual, leading to the perpetuation of
negative, depressive affects and the continuation of the will-weakness characteristic of
the affective nihilist.
It is particularly relevant for my case here that Anderson cites depression as an
example of such a global mood, since a parallel between major depressive disorder and
affective nihilism is particular apt. As we saw above, the affective nihilist is characterized
by exhaustion and disgust; she experiences feelings of weariness or fatigue,
disappointment with herself, and a great nausea with humanity. 179 Nietzsche describes
affective nihilism as “lethargy, heaviness, and depression:” it is a “slow sadness” and
“dull pain,” experienced as a “resistance to life.” 180 These descriptions, as well as
Nietzsche’s description of the will-weakness characteristic of the affective nihilist, square
with a number of the characteristics required for a diagnosis of major depressive disorder:
1) a “depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by… subjective
report (e.g., feels sad, empty, hopeless [emphasis mine]); 2) “markedly diminished
interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day;” 3)
“fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day;” 4) “feelings of worthlessness or excessive or
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inappropriate guilt (which may be delusional) nearly every day;” and 5) a “diminished
ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day.” 181
It is not hard to see a parallel here between depression and the condition
experienced by the affective nihilist: after all, affective nihilism is a condition which
involves the ineffectiveness of one’s drives, or an inability of one’s drives to achieve
their ends. Just as the depressed individual feels worthless, so too does the affective
nihilist manifest consistently negative evaluations of herself and humanity. Just as one's
goals and purposes are unclear, unattainable, unachieved, undervalued, or absent when
one is in a depressed state, so too does the affective nihilist find herself unable to act,
accomplish goals, or affect the world around herself. Just as the symptoms experienced
by the depressed individual prevent her from staying engaged and interested in her world
— depression consists not only in the inability to effect action, but an inability to be
moved by one’s world or surroundings — so too, I argue, will those depressive and
obstructionist affects experienced by the affective nihilist lead to a disruption in one’s
potential both 1) to stay engaged in her world (in a way which would enable the
affirmation and appreciation of existence) and 2) to be inspired by the world around her
(in the sort of way which would allow for the overcoming of her condition and the
development of a truly creative spirit). Insofar as affective nihilism is a global mood
which weakens one’s will and disposes an individual negatively towards life, the world,
and existence in general, it narrowly circumscribes the ways in which the world can
inspire, stimulate, or energize the affective nihilist.
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This comparison allows us to more concretely understand why affective nihilism,
as with major depressive disorder, should be characterized as a disorder of enddirectedness. Furthermore, this parallel between the depressed individual and the
affective nihilist allows us to understand the connection between a drive-based account of
the nihilist’s condition and Nietzsche’s descriptions of its outward manifestations.
2.4 Intersections between Affective and European Nihilism
Although affective nihilism and European nihilism (comprised of nihilism of
purposelessness, epistemological nihilism, and ethical nihilism) are separate phenomena,
in Nietzsche’s account, they are entangled with one another insofar as nihilistic
conceptions of truth, purpose, and value (the collapse of which leads to European
nihilism) arise from out of a more basic affective nihilism. In other words, affective
nihilism — as a physiological affliction of the will which leads to the will’s inefficacy
and manifests as a felt weariness and nausea with humanity, existence, and the world —
leads to the creation of notions of absolute truth, transcendental purpose, and real, higher
values. 182 These notions alleviate humanity from the suffering and weariness of affective
nihilism either by encouraging humanity to suspend their will or through anesthetizing
and distracting humanity with an excess of feeling. 183 Although these conceptions of the
world are fundamentally life-denying, they deferred a contemporary crisis of affective
nihilism for as long as they “[offered] man a meaning…[and] the door was [thereby] shut
on all suicidal nihilism.” 184
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Yet as individuals — and eventually, European culture at large — begin to realize
that these nihilistic conceptions of the world are false, these conceptions become
unbelievable. With this collapse of man’s main sources of meaning, the problem of a
“suicidal nihilism” returns. We find evidence for this in Nietzsche’s characterization of a
“weary nihilism that no longer attacks…[as] a sign of weakness” and his speculation that
in this kind of nihilism, “The strength of the spirit may be worn out, exhausted, so that
previous goals and values have become incommensurate and no longer are believed.” 185
When dominant theories of meaning no longer provide meaning to either the individual
or humanity, both the individual and humanity at large are confronted with an experience
of suicidal nihilism. This experience of suicidal nihilism is the experience of affective
nihilism. 186
The relationship between these three kinds of nihilism and an affective nihilism
which proves both more basic and more significant for Nietzsche is roughly the same in
each case. Nietzsche traces the source of the nihilistic conceptions of life offered by each
kind of cognitive nihilism to an original affective nihilism.187 For example, the nihilistic
conception of real, higher values invented by the ascetic priest, according to which good
and evil exist independently of the valuing perspectives of various life-forms’ drives and
affects, is a manifestation of the powerless ascetic priest’s attempt to gain power over the
noble and strong warrior caste. With this nihilistic conception of value, the priest’s weak
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will takes revenge on higher forms of life by assigning a negative value to their form of
life and actions; his clever invention, as an attempt to preserve his own weak form of life,
is a nihilistic conception of life with its origin in his largely impotent and ineffective
will. 188 In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche attributes the development of a belief in
absolute truth to those who experience “fatigue with life” and “hostility to life.” 189 We
see this same pattern with the development of a notion of some higher purpose to
existence, which Nietzsche attributes to a physiological weakness and a “psychology of
error” later in the Twilight of the Idols. As Nietzsche goes on to note, “we have invented
the concept of ‘end’… [when] in reality there is no end.” 190
According to Nietzsche, however, there is a cleverness to the development of
these various conceptions of truth, purpose, and value: they allow the individual
struggling from the weariness, nausea, fatigue, and powerlessness of affective nihilism to
preserve her life. 191 In essence, nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and values —
these ascetic ideals — are methods which humanity has used in an attempt to treat the
illness of affective nihilism. These conceptions not only give a meaning to a humanity
suffering from its own meaninglessness; they are also utilized to anesthetize one’s
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suffering via the excessive incitement of emotion. 192 While affective nihilism involves a
psycho-physiological life-denial which threatens to destroy life (as “suicidal nihilism”),
nihilistic conceptions facilitate the preservation of declining forms of life.
Nietzsche connects the anesthetic function of nihilistic conceptions of truth,
purpose, and value with the first-personal character of affective nihilism in the
Genealogy. In the third essay, Nietzsche claims that in attempts to “anesthetize pain
through emotion,” one find the “actual physiological causation of ressentiment, revenge,
and their ilk…. [to] anesthetize a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unbearable
with a more violent emotion of any sort, and at least rid the consciousness of it for the
moment.” 193 The tormenting pain characteristic of affective nihilism and caused by a
physiological condition of the will which also gives rise to feelings of ressentiment and a
desire for revenge is alleviated by the ascetic priest first when one is excited to an “excess
of feeling” in fanaticism. 194 As Brian Leiter mentions in his “Commentary on the Third
Essay” in Nietzsche on Morality, “the crucial premise here is that the discharge of
strong emotion has an anesthetic effect” on the pain and suffering felt by the suffering
individual. 195 In the fifth book of The Gay Science, in his suggestion that Buddhism and
Christianity originate in something close to what I am here calling affective nihilism,
Nietzsche again describes religious fanaticism as a treatment for a diseased will:
the two world religions, Buddhism and Christianity, may have owed their origin
and above all their sudden spread to a tremendous collapse and disease of the will.
And that is what actually happened: both religions encountered a situation in
which the will had become diseased, giving rise to a demand that had become
utterly desperate for some "thou shalt." Both religions taught fanaticism in ages in
192
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which the will had become exhausted, and thus they offered innumerable people
some support, a new possibility of willing, some delight in willing. For fanaticism
is the only "strength of the will" that even the weak and insecure can be brought
to attain, being a sort of hypnotism of the whole system of the senses and the
intellect for the benefit of an excessive nourishment (hypertrophy) of a single
point of view and feeling that henceforth becomes dominant—which the Christian
calls his faith. 196
Here, we see religious fanaticism — an excess of feeling made possible only as the will
(turned away from its original ends) can be re-directed towards a new end — as that
which allows weak, suffering humanity to experience some minimal amount of strength
of will and enables the preservation of declining life by providing the will with a new
object.
Although nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value offered by science
and world religions such as Buddhism and Christianity temporarily preserve life, they are
no cure for affective nihilism. We see this in the third essay of the Genealogy:
you can now guess what… the healing instinct of life has at least tried to do
through the ascetic priest… to make the sick harmless to a certain degree.. to
exploit the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, selfsurveillance, and self-medication. It goes without saying that…mere affectmedication… cannot possibly yield a real cure of the sick in the physiological
sense [emphasis mine]. 197
If all sources of meaning in the world henceforth known to Europe — absolute, objective
truths, higher purposes, and absolute values — are withdrawn, yet these sources of
meaning allowed for man to experience the alleviation of affective nihilism by offering a
justification for existence and anesthetizing suffering, the withdrawal of these leads
humanity without alternative sources of meaning back into the original illness: affective
nihilism. We see this in Nietzsche’s assessment of the ascetic priest as the potential
196
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doctor, with his various Judeo-Christian methods, for existential suffering: “is he really a
doctor, this ascetic priest? … it is only suffering itself, the discomfort of the sufferer, that
he combats, not its cause, not the actual state of being ill — this must constitute our most
fundamental objection to priestly medication.” 198 As mentioned earlier, this illness is the
affective component of nihilism in Nietzsche, a psycho-physiological condition known as
a “physiological inhibition and exhaustion [physiologische Hemmung und Ermüdung]” 199
in which life “turn[s] against itself and den[ies] itself” and manifests in sick individuals
as a “deep disgust for themselves, for the world, for all life.” 200 This illness is a sign of
“degenerating life.”
Although nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value provide man with a
justification for existence in the short term, with the development of the will to truth postEnlightenment, they must collapse. In this way, the treatment of the ascetic priest
ultimately makes man sicker: as attempts to “alleviate and anesthetize” affective nihilism
by offering man a justification, Nietzsche believes ascetic ideals (which, importantly,
include particular nihilistic conceptions of purpose, value, and truth from Judeo-Christian
systems of thought as well as nihilistic conceptions of purpose, truth, and value from
scientistic approaches to the world) ultimately make man sicker by turning him against
himself and making himself guilty for the gift of divine purpose and value which
transcendental sources have bestowed upon him:
…man, suffering from himself in some way, at all events physiologically, rather
like an animal imprisoned in a cage, unclear as to why? what for? and yearning
for reasons — reasons bring relief — yearning for cures and narcotics…. and lo
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and behold! from this magician, the ascetic priest, he receives the first tip as to the
‘cause’ of his suffering: he should look for it within himself. 201
In short, although the development of nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value
allow for relief of the symptoms of affective nihilism, they do not address the underlying
cause: such remedies do not treat the underlying condition, the psycho-physiological
sickness of the drives and affects. This is why we see Nietzsche questioning the status of
the ascetic priest as doctor in the third essay above.
2.5 Summary of Affective Nihilism
As mentioned in the first chapter, with the forward march of the will to truth and its
advanced manifestation in the contemporary science of Nietzsche’s day, those
conceptions of objective truth, higher purpose, and absolute values which offer humanity
relief from the suffering of affective nihilism become unbelievable. 202 Yet it is these very
frameworks for understanding which had anchored European humanity in a meaningful
world. 203 The collapse of these “[wipes] away the entire horizon” of meaning and leaves
humanity “wandering through an infinite nothing [irren wir… wie durch ein unendliches
Nichts].” The advent of European nihilism thus plunges Europe back into nihilism as a
psychological state [Der Nihilism als psychologischer Zustand]; this is the long-delayed
return of a life-denying affective nihilism. Although nihilistic conceptions of purpose
value, and truth allowed those in Europe to preserve some limited amount of vitality as
willing beings over the course of much of European history, at the time during which
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Nietzsche is writing, these conceptions are undermined and this vitality is more seriously
compromised than ever before.
As argued above, affective nihilism is a life-denying psycho-physiological
condition, and may be characterized as a disorder of end-directedness. One might expect,
then, that in order to overcome affective nihilism, certain individuals will need to
overcome or alter their physiological condition. On Nietzsche’s view, this is the task of
those few noble individuals who experience this affective nihilism yet possess the ability
to move beyond it and affirm life even down to the evaluative stances of their drives and
affects. For this reason, overcoming affective nihilism will require a kind of deep
personal transformation. For Nietzsche, the affirmation of life is not a matter of merely
changing one’s belief about the world; it is about changing oneself.
We get a sense of what this life-affirming individual will look like in the second
essay of the Genealogy, where Nietzsche calls for strong, healthy, and powerful human
beings: individuals who are “strengthened by wars and victories, for whom conquest,
adventure, danger, and even pain have actually become a necessity” and who possess a
“very self-assured willfulness of insight which belongs to great health.” 204 Nietzsche goes
on to detail certain features of this redeeming individual. He is:
the redeeming man of great love and contempt, the creative spirit who is pushed
out of any position ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ by his surging strength again and again,
whose solitude will be misunderstood by the people as though it were flight from
reality —: whereas it is just his way of being absorbed, buried, and immersed in
reality so that from it, when he emerges into the light again, he can return with the
redemption of this reality: redeem it from the curse which its ideal has placed on
it up until now. This man of the future will redeem us, not just from the ideal held
up till now, but also from those things which had to arise from it, from the great
nausea, the will to nothingness, from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great
decision that makes the will free again, which gives earth its purpose and man his
204
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hope again, this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and of
nothingness — he must come one day. — 205
This excerpt equates nihilism with both a “great nausea” and “the will to nothingness”;
the individual who Nietzsche here hopes for the appearance of is the “anti-nihilist,”
which means, to Nietzsche, the “Antichrist,… the conqueror of God… [and the
conqueror] of nothingness.” The individual who overcomes nihilism overcomes her
sickness with herself and the accompanying world- and life-denial. It is a deep
engagement in earthly existence and celebration of her natural inclinations and instincts
which characterizes this strong and noble individual in Nietzsche. Mankind’s lifedenying, nihilistic tendency to view “natural inclinations with an ‘evil eye,’ so that they
finally came to be intertwined with ‘bad conscience’” calls for a response which involves
a “great health” which rejects “other-worldly aspirations, alien to the senses, the instincts,
to nature, to animals, in short all he ideals which have been hostile to life and have
defamed the world.” 206
Finding resources for this sort of personal transformation in Nietzsche’s thought
will be one orienting goal of the second half of this work. Before we get to that point,
however, we must also come to a deeper understanding of nihilism as a cognitive cultural
phenomenon involving a very particular set of beliefs. This will be the aim of the next
three sections.
2.6 Epistemological Nihilism
In this section, I will introduce epistemological nihilism as an element of European
nihilism. Unlike affective nihilism, European nihilism — and those elements of which it
205
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is composed — is a cognitive phenomenon, involving beliefs about the nature of truth,
purpose, and value. In particular, epistemological nihilism results from a loss of faith in
the human ability to know and comprehend the world. The “nihilistic belief” associated
with this manifestation of nihilism in Nietzsche is the “belief that there is no truth at
all.” 207 This type of nihilism results when the culturally dominant conception of truth and
what it means to know is rejected. This leaves a culture both skeptical about the existence
of truth and despairing as to the nature of truth and knowledge. This collapse of dominant
theories of truth renders “truth” and “knowledge” meaningless for a culture; thus, it
results in epistemological nihilism.
The dominant conception of truth which Nietzsche’s epistemological nihilist
rejects is objective truth: truth as something which 1) exists apart from or independently
of human attempts to ascertain it (apart from human attempts at knowing), 2) can be
apprehended in a disinterested way, without the interference of a knowing subject’s
interests or inclinations and thus is 3) identically intelligible to all (often through the use
of reason or via pure contemplation, although religious notions of objective truth may
also allow for divine revelation). 208
In the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche defines objectivity as “contemplation
without interest” involving a “pure… knowing subject” and aiming at “knowledge as
such.” 209 If that objectivity which the epistemological nihilist rejects aims at knowledge
as such, then the rejection of objectivity will also include a rejection of “knowledge as
such” or what I will henceforth refer to as absolute knowledge. Nietzsche explicitly
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connects a rejection of objective truth with his rejection of absolute knowledge in Beyond
Good and Evil, where he calls “absolute knowledge” a “contradiction in terms,” rejecting
accounts which talk about knowing “as though cognition here got hold of its object
purely and nakedly as ‘the thing in itself.’” 210 The alleged object of “absolute
knowledge,” in this case, is objective truth.
The collapse of a dominant conception of truth — objective truth — has
disastrous and nihilistic consequences for Western culture. 211 After all, as Nietzsche
describes in On the Genealogy of Morality, contemporary Western culture developed to
value objective truth and orients itself largely around various pursuits of absolute
knowledge. The story of this development is the story of the development of the will to
truth. 212
2.7 The Will to Truth
Nietzsche offers his reader two accounts of the origin of the will to truth: first, the
development of a will to truth from the conflict of drives and conceptions of utility in
“Origins of Knowledge” from The Gay Science, and second, the will to truth’s origin in
morality. According to the former account, in the beginning of Western culture,
something was considered true only insofar as it was useful for life. The critical moment
210
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for the will to truth’s development arrives when two different drives or complexes of
drives present contradictory notions of what is truly useful to life. Since both notions
appeared equally useful for life, it became “possible to argue about the higher or lower
degree of utility for life,” and these drives or complexes of drives came into conflict. 213
Although disagreements about notions of utility begin as “intellectual play,” the separate
drives or complexes of drives eventually recognize that only their conception of utility
has the value of potentially helping them to achieve their aims. Each baptizes its own
conception of utility as the only absolutely “good” and “true” conception. In essence, the
will to truth results from this becoming-absolute of these conflicting conceptions of
utility.
In short, the free intellectual play mentioned above turns into the struggle for
objective truth when each drive or complex of drives wills the domination of its own
conception, its own “truth,” over all others. As the needs of various drives (or complexes
of drives) conflict with the needs of other drives (or complexes of drives), each attempts
to employ its own “truth” to subjugate and dominate the other. 214 Eventually, Nietzsche
describes:
…the human brain became full of such judgments and convictions, and a ferment,
struggle, and lust for powers developed in this tangle. Not only utility and delight
but every kind of impulse took sides in this fight about “truths.” The intellectual
fight became an occupation, an attraction, a profession, a duty, something
dignified-and eventually knowledge and the striving for the true found their place
as a need among other needs [emphasis mine]. 215
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Although the will to truth begins as the mere instrument of other drives, it eventually
establishes itself as an independent drive: Nietzsche’s “drive to knowledge” or
“knowledge drive.” 216
Nietzsche’s account of the origin of the will to truth in morality from On the
Genealogy of Morality fits with this picture from The Gay Science: after all, it is when
the human brain develops certain convictions or value judgements that the power struggle
among the drives intensifies. In the Genealogy, as mankind begins to develop a need for
morality and moral understanding (from out of his need to give meaning to his suffering),
he also develops a drive to attain knowledge of objective truths qua facts about the world
around him. The will to truth first awakens as a desire to know moral facts; after all,
traditional morality and its enforcement requires knowledge of what counts as truly good
or bad. In this way, as Katrina Mitcheson notes, “our search for truth has been driven by
something other than a pure desire for the goal of truth.” 217
Nietzsche gives an example of this phenomenon in the ascetic priest from his
Genealogy, where Nietzsche explains the relation between the ascetic ideal held by weak,
declining humanity and a life-denying manifestation of the will to truth. The ascetic priest
exploits weak individuals’ need to understand their suffering: as Mitcheson explains, the
ascetic priest “presents God as truth and presses the ultimate asceticism in human guilt
and self-hatred towards our sinful nature, turning humanity against itself and against life.
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Truth in this sense… is willed by the priest’s sickly flock.” 218 Notice that in this example,
just as in the more abstract account from The Gay Science, there are two competing
conceptions of utility: one according to which it is useful to affirm humanity and this
world, and one according to which it is useful to deny or denigrate humanity and this
world. As morality comes to dominate Western culture, so too does the will to truth. 219
On my reading, there are two moments of epistemological nihilism in Nietzsche.
The first moment of epistemological nihilism is brought about by the age of the
Enlightenment and modern science during which Platonic idealism and Christian
morality are rejected. The second moment of epistemological nihilism is the present
moment, or our contemporary age: an age in which Nietzsche helps us to begin
rethinking scientific conceptions of objective truth (and knowledge as absolute, where to
have absolute knowledge of x is simply to ascertain the objective truth of x). In both of
these moments, Western culture’s rejection of a particular conception of truth is
understood broadly as a rejection of truth altogether. 220 This brings about the nihilistic
belief that “there is no truth.” Such a belief is nihilistic because it leads the individual
who holds this belief to devalue and denigrate the world to which she belongs: since
human beings have developed a need for truth (in the will to truth), the world as devoid
218
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of truthfulness is a devalued world. Such a belief results in a return to affective nihilism
because of a distinctly human need for truth which places a high value on truth and its
pursuit: that is, the will to truth. Below, we will see how this occurs in more detail.
Importantly, however, Western culture’s different conceptions of objective truth
— either as divine and transcendent (in the Platonic-Christian tradition) or as empirical
and this-worldly (in the scientific tradition)— are also nihilistic conceptions of truth. This
is because, as we will see, Nietzsche believes that both the Platonic-Christian conceptions
of truth and scientific conceptions of truth result fundamentally from a life-denial, or a
devaluation of this-worldly existence. The collapse of these conceptions of truth results in
the moment of epistemological nihilism, but any prior belief to either the PlatonicChristian or scientific conceptions of objective truth is still rightfully called a nihilistic
belief which implicitly devalued this life and this world by insisting upon an unattainable
notion of truth. 221 Getting beyond epistemological nihilism in the contemporary world
thus requires an overcoming of scientific truth through a new conception of truth which
acknowledges its perspectival nature. 222
2.8 Epistemological Nihilism after the Platonic-Christian Tradition
The first moment of epistemological nihilism is rooted in Platonic-Christian conceptions
of knowledge or truth and the alleged means by which one attains such knowledge. It is
critical for Nietzsche that the possibility of epistemological nihilism begins with Plato’s
Theory of the Forms and the primary role he assigns reason and rationality in the pursuit

221

See Iain Thomson’s connection between unattainability and otherworldliness in Nietzsche in
his article “Transcendence and the Problem of Otherworldly Nihilism" in Inquiry. Vol. 54, No. 2
(2011) 140–159.
222
Again, see the final chapter in Mitcheson’s Nietzsche, Truth, and Transformation for her
account of new “practices of truth.”

80

of truth and acquisition of knowledge. 223 According to Plato’s two-world view, reality is
composed of two separate, though related realms: the realm of empirical experience, or
the “world of becoming,” and the realm of intelligibility, or the “world of being.” The
world of empirical experience is not strictly “real”; it is a mere copy or imitation of a
separate, transcendent world: the world of the Forms, which is a world comprised of
paradigms for knowledge. It is this world of the Forms, according to Plato, which
constitutes reality proper, or the “true” world. 224 Mankind can only come to know reality
and objective truth by becoming familiarized with the world of the Forms,
a world entirely separate from his own. One comes to know the Forms in Plato so that
one may come to live a virtuous life. The transcendental goals and life-denying practices
of this Platonic system — the becoming-virtuous and potential apotheosis of the
individual through the quieting of the body and the acquisition of knowledge about the
world of being — requires the individual to rebuke this-worldly existence (the world of
becoming) in favor of a “true” world of being. In Plato, as in the ascetic priest, the will to
truth is used in the service of morality; it is a mere instrument for other drives.
Christianity borrows heavily from Plato, and Nietzsche has a specific
interpretation of this Platonic inheritance. The supposed innovations of the ascetic priest
from the Genealogy — especially God as divine truth and a divine realm of eternal life —
essentially parallel Plato’s metaphysical and epistemological framework. 225 According to
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Christianity, there is a divine, heavenly world above and beyond the world of earthly
existence; only those individuals who deny the pleasures of this world and profess faith in
God and divine truth have access to this world. 226 The morality of the ascetic priest thus
builds on Plato’s notion of virtue, as attainable only through knowledge of otherworldly
truths. The priest’s invention of a system of morality — which allows weak and suffering
individuals both to give meaning to their suffering and to revenge themselves on those
who are strong by labeling them “evil” — denies human life and this-worldly existence in
favor of some higher, nobler existence. The ascetic priest “juxtaposes [human life] (along
with what pertains to it: ‘nature,’ ‘world,’ the whole sphere of becoming and
transitoriness) with a quite different mode of existence which it opposes and excludes,
unless it turn against itself, deny itself: in that case, the case of the ascetic life, life counts
as a bridge to that other mode of existence.” 227 According to Nietzsche, both the Platonic
and Christian traditions advance nihilistic conceptions of truth insofar as their
interpretation of truth as transcendent, or existing outside of the world of human
experience, devalues and denigrates life and this-worldly existence. According to
Nietzsche, both the Christian and Platonic alternatives deny life by focusing human
pursuits of knowledge and truth on a transcendental realm, thus encouraging
226
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disengagement from this world in pursuit of knowledge about some world beyond our
own. According to these traditions, the mortal world is a false world in which one ought
not to base their beliefs; objective truth is acquired only through knowledge of some
world beyond our own (as in Plato) or through the transmission of such truth from a deity
(as in Christianity).
With Plato and early Christianity, however, the will to truth has not yet been
“translated and sublimated into scientific conscience, into intellectual rigor at any
price.” 228 With the scientific advancements of the Enlightenment, however, the will to
truth gains some independence from its origin in morality. Eventually, its new,
generalized aim leads it to undermine that from which it originates: Platonic idealism and
Judeo-Christian morality.
Nietzsche describes this process in the Genealogy, where he asks the reader:
“What, strictly speaking, has actually conquered the Christian God?…‘Christian morality
itself, the concept of truthfulness which was taken more and more seriously… translated
and sublimated into scientific conscience, into intellectual rigor at any price… All great
things bring about their own demise through an act of self-sublimation.’” 229 As Christian
morality continues to emphasize the importance of identifying truly moral actions, the
will to truth’s drive for knowledge intensifies. Eventually, the will to truth achieves a
certain independence from moral aims and manifests as the will to acquire all forms of
knowledge, including moral and nonmoral knowledge; in other words, the aim of the will
to truth becomes generalized from a striving after moral truths to a striving after truth in
general. By following its generalized aim of truth at any cost, however, the will to truth
228
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“ultimately begins to expose its own partial origins.” 230 In his notes, Nietzsche offers an
abbreviated history of this moment of epistemological nihilism and its resulting
disorientation:
…among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness: this eventually turned
against morality, discovered its teleology, its partial perspective… Now we
discover in ourselves needs implanted by centuries of moral interpretation —
needs that now appear to us as needs for untruth. 231
In its current permutation, the will to truth is a “will to stand still before the factual, the
factum brutum”: it no longer aims at the acquisition of moral facts, instead aiming at truth
in general. 232 This is the essential movement of the will to truth’s translation and
sublimation into “scientific conscience” and “intellectual rigor.”
This is also the first moment of epistemological nihilism during which Western
culture comes to the conclusion that there is no truth, for it is in this moment that
Western culture’s Platonic-Christian conception of truth becomes unbelievable. 233 The
collapse of this dominant Western conception of truth is a direct result of the “steady and
laborious process of science [which] will in the end decisively have done” with
otherworldly notions and conceptions of truth. 234 In light of these scientific
developments, Western culture denies the possibility of absolute knowledge qua
transcendent knowledge and halts its pursuit of objective truth qua transcendent truth.
With the domination of scientific conceptions of truth, the “nihilistic belief” that “there is
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no truth” becomes possible for the first time in the West. 235 In a culture which only
acknowledges absolute truth, a genuine and unresolved rivalry between different
conceptions of truth brings about epistemological nihilism.
2.9 Epistemological Nihilism after the Modern Scientific Tradition
Although Western culture’s loss of its dominant conception of truth results in a moment
of epistemological nihilism, the new conception of objective truth as scientific truth soon
comes to dominate and offers Western culture a new sense of truth. During the time at
which Nietzsche writes, the will to truth is stronger than ever, and this knowledge drive is
now aimed at scientific facts about our world.
One of Nietzsche’s most memorable early accounts of Western culture’s
increasing faith in science is his account of the theoretical man from The Birth of
Tragedy. 236 According to Nietzsche, modern culture is hyper-rational, and the “highest
ideal” of “our whole modern world” is that of the theoretical man, who makes the
acquisition of scientific knowledge his utmost priority. 237 This man wishes to “penetrate
to the ground of things and to separate true knowledge from illusion and error” and his
faith in the “highest powers of [human] understanding” ensure Western culture that such
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a pursuit is possible. 238 According to Nietzsche, modern Western humanity understands
scientific investigation and analysis as the only means by which one may acquire
knowledge. Truth, on this picture, is objective and non-perspectival. Western culture,
under the ideal of the theoretical man, makes “existence appear comprehensible
and thus justified” and “ascribes to [rational] knowledge and insight the power of a
panacea.” 239 Thus, in the eyes of modern Western culture, scientific analysis is the “only
truly human vocation” and the ultimate goal of education is the pursuit of scientific
knowledge (as the ascertainment of objective truth) and rational insight. 240 Western
culture aims to master the world through scientific reasoning and theorizing. 241 Modern
mankind attempts to fit the world into its categories of rational concepts and judgments
by insisting on the existence of objective truth and then employing empirical means in
order to discover such objective truth in the world. 242
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche specifically pinpoints the faith which underlies our
modern culture: “Nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything
else has only secondary value.’’ 243 This faith manifests the value of the most recent
development of the will to truth: as “the concept of truthfulness… was taken more and
more seriously” the knowledge drive is “translated and sublimated into scientific
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conscience, into intellectual rigor at any price.” 244 This manifestation of the will to truth
leads mankind to “[seek] ‘the truth’… a true world […] He does not doubt that a world as
it ought to be exists; he would like to seek out the road to it.” 245 The theoretical man in
the post-Enlightenment West assumes that the world is both comprehensible and
identically intelligible to all seekers of objective truth; he also assumes that human reason
is the tool by which one comprehends the world. The “objective spirit” is praised; along
with it, people celebrate “the desubjectivization and depersonification of spirit, as if this
were some sort of goal in itself, some sort of redemption or transfiguration.” 246
Western culture’s belief in the redemptive value of science and the objective spirit
is founded in its faith in the “true” world of scientific observation and analysis, of which
humanity can discover objective truths. Nietzsche’s groundbreaking insight in On the
Genealogy of Morality, as well as elsewhere, is that this conception of truth — as
objective and absolute — is just as nihilistic as Platonic-Christian conceptions of truth:
these pale atheists, Antichrists, immoralists, nihilists, these skeptics… these last
idealists of knowledge in whom, alone, intellectual conscience dwells and is
embodied these days — they believe they are all as liberated as possible from the
ascetic ideal, these “free, very free spirits”: and yet, I will tell them what they
themselves cannot see - because they are standing too close to themselves — this
ideal is quite simply their ideal as well, they themselves represent it nowadays,
and perhaps no one else, they themselves are its most intellectualized product, its
most insidious, delicate and elusive form of seduction… They are very far from
being free spirits: because they still believe in truth. 247
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Rather than offering a new, non-nihilistic, and life-affirming ideal, modern science
preserves ascetic, nihilistic ideals. 248 In “To What Extent Even We too are Still Pious,”
Nietzsche remarks that “those who are truthful in the audacious and ultimate sense that is
presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life,
nature, and history [emphasis mine].” 249 Modern culture’s scientific belief in a world of
objective truth — identically intelligible to all those who access it via disinterested
empirical observation and rational thought — denigrates this world just as much as the
Platonic/Christian belief in objective truth as transcendent truth: after all, Nietzsche
claims, there is no such thing as objective, extra-perspectival truth and no possibility that
the world could be identically intelligible to all of human life through disinterested
investigation or reason. 250 In short, scientific truth is a nihilistic, life-denying conception
of truth because such objective, extra-perspectival truth does not exist and thus can never
be apprehended; furthermore, there is no such thing as disinterested knowledge. Insofar
as science roots the value of human existence in the pursuit of absolute knowledge (as the
apprehension of objective truth), it roots the value of existence in something outside of
this world and unattainable within this life, thus devaluing this life and this-worldly
248
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existence. 251 Just as Plato’s realm of the forms and the Christian afterlife give mankind a
means of retreat from everyday existence, “science can act as a means of withdrawal
from the world.” 252 Thus, Nietzsche asks: “science [Wissenschaft] as a means of selfanesthetization: are you acquainted with that?” 253 This anesthetizing function served by
science is characteristic of those nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value which
both originate in a need to alleviate the suffering and despair characteristic of affective
nihilism and bring about a return of affective nihilism as they become unbelievable and
the anesthetic effect they provide wears off.
How then does this scientific conception of the world develop? The knowledge
drive, in its current strivings towards objective, non-perspectival truth, fails to recognize
that the conflict from out of which the will to truth originated generated a number of
errors which still underpin much of our scientific understanding. These errors include our
beliefs “that there are enduring things, that there are equal things, that there are things,
substances, and bodies, that a thing is what it appears, that our will is free [and] that what
is good for me is also good absolutely.” 254 Modern science claims to found the theoretical
man’s beliefs in duration, identity, and substance, but in fact these beliefs are the

251

In his article titled “Nietzsche’s Questions Concerning the Will to Truth,” Scott Jenkins gives
a detailed account of science’s otherworldly asceticism. (Scott Jenkins, “Nietzsche’s Questions
Concerning the Will to Truth.” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2012) 265–
289.
252
Gemes, “We Are of Necessity Strangers to Ourselves,” 194.
253
GM III:23. See also GS 344.
254
GS 110.

89

assumptions upon which science rests. 255 They are also the mere projections of modern
man onto the world around him. 256 Nietzsche elaborates on this notion in his 1887 notes:
Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of the false
character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings…. Logicizing, rationalizing,
systematizing [may be understood] as expedients of life. Man projects his drive to
truth, his “goal” in a certain sense, outside himself as a world that has being, as a
metaphysical world, as a “thing in itself,” as a world already in existence. His
needs as creator invent the world upon which he works, anticipate it; this
anticipation (this ‘belief’ in truth) is his support. 257
In order to gain absolute knowledge by staking out “objective truths” about the world,
human reason interprets the world as a world of stable, enduring substances; in short, it
interprets the world as a world of being rather than becoming. Yet, as Nietzsche claims,
both the world we occupy and our frameworks for understanding this world (which shape
our interpretations) are always and essentially in flux. In his discussion of human
knowledge as a holding-firm in one’s mind, Nietzsche emphasizes the transitional nature
both of human understanding and the world, insisting that: “A becoming cannot be
mirrored in [another] becoming as [something] firm and enduring, as a ‘that.’” 258 Insofar
as science aims to fix a world of enduring substances into absolute knowledge of
objective truth, it falsifies the world of becoming and aims at an ideal which is not of this
world. Scientific truth, Nietzsche claims, is simply not “true” in the way it believes itself
to be. It is not objectively, extra-perspectivally true: it is a mere perspective on the
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world. 259 Insofar as modern culture denies this and makes claims to objective truths on
the behalf of science, it is trapped with another nihilistic conception of truth and cannot
authentically participate in the critical second moment of epistemological nihilism, which
Nietzsche strives to bring about: the moment at which an attitude of scientific certitude as
to the nature and existence of objective truth and the means by which such truth is
acquired (empirical observation) is undermined, and culture can come to the realization
that there is no objective truth. 260
This is not to say that Nietzsche completely disavows science. Just as there are
active and passive forms of nihilism — nihilism, respectively, of “increasing strength or
of increasing weakness” — there are different kinds of scientific attitudes. 261 After
describing nihilism’s ambiguity as “a symptom of increasing strength or of increasing
weakness,” Nietzsche goes on to ask: “What does science mean in regard to both
259
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possibilities? 1. As a sign of strength and self-control, as being able to do without
healing, comforting worlds of illusion; 2. as undermining, dissecting, disappointing,
weakening.” 262 While the former interpretation acknowledges a critical role for scientific
honesty, the latter describes the troublesome potential of science as modern scientism.
Scientific honesty makes possible the first moment of epistemological nihilism and
allows modern culture both to get beyond old conceptions of truth and to see the value in
a this-worldly conception of truth. Scientism, on the other hand, reifies the world into a
realm of stable being in which objective truths can be ascertained by human rationality.
Insofar as such a world does not actually exist, Nietzsche interprets modern culture’s
scientistic conception of truth as a new manifestation of the same instinct of life-denial
inherent in old Platonic-Christian conceptions of truth. Although modern scientific
conceptions of knowledge and truth reject Platonic-Christian conceptions, they fail to
replace them with a meaningfully different option. Although modern science attempts to
overcome transcendent sources of justification, insofar as it orients itself completely
around objective truth and insists upon the importance of the tools of human reason for
knowing this truth, it remains fundamentally nihilistic and unable to do justice to the
richness of human experience. Indeed, Nietzsche insists that “it is still a metaphysical
faith upon which our faith in science rests — that even we knowers of today, we godless
anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the thousand-year-old
faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato's faith, that God is truth; that truth is
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divine.” 263 Thus, just as Christianity relied on a metaphysical faith in the existence and
divinity of a god, science relies on a metaphysical faith in the existence of objective truth.
This acknowledgement of science’s hidden foundation is that which Nietzsche
believes can usher in a second stage of epistemological nihilism: that stage at which
objective, extra-perspectival truth qua scientific truth becomes unbelievable and must be
rejected just as transcendental truth before it. The second moment of epistemological
nihilism only becomes possible when modern culture comes to recognize 1) the
continuity of Platonic, Christian, and scientific conceptions of truth and 2) the nihilistic
ramifications of these beliefs. 264
Although European culture more broadly has not adopted the belief characteristic
of epistemological nihilism post-Enlightenment — that there is no absolute truth —
Nietzsche harkens the impending onset of this belief. 265 As the will to truth presses
forward, so will the science-critical epistemological nihilist, in her denial of the existence
of objective truths, come to reject the viability of scientific conceptions of truth. To
explain why a disbelief in objective truth results in epistemological nihilism — and to
explain why there are psycho-physiological, affective effects of this nihilism —
Nietzsche appeals to the human need for knowledge. As we recall, Nietzsche describes
the will to truth as “[strife] for the true” and “a need among other needs.” 266 This human
need for knowledge and truth at the time during which Nietzsche writes is a will to
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objective truth. The pursuit of absolute knowledge and objective truth in science gives
humanity a meaning for its existence; for modern humanity, to be is to know. As
Nietzsche acknowledges, this makes a belief in objective truth a prerequisite for a
meaningful (or non-nihilistic) life. Any post-modern disbelief in absolute knowledge and
scientific objectivity would lead to a second nihilistic cultural impasse, in which a
widespread belief in the meaninglessness of modern pursuits takes hold. If modern
culture were to reject the viability of scientific conceptions of truth, its current pursuits
and values would show up as meaningless. The absence of objective truth as that which
serves to justify human pursuits and human existence, combined with a long-developed
need for objective truth, would plunge man back into the affective nihilism for which
scientistic conceptions of the world served as an anesthetic. 267
Although Nietzsche insists upon the necessity of this second moment of
epistemological nihilism, heralds its impending arrival in light of advances in the will to
truth, and attempts to think beyond nihilistic conceptions of truth in his work, modern
culture has not yet overcome its scientism. This is why epistemological nihilism remains
a cultural problem, even as Nietzsche is writing. In his notes, Nietzsche presents a
version of what the “most extreme” epistemological nihilism would look like:
267
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The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every
considering-something-true, is necessarily false because there simply is no true
world. Thus, a perspectival appearance whose origin lies in us (insofar as we
continually need a narrower, abbreviated, simplified world) — That it is the
measure of strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves, without perishing,
the merely apparent character, the necessity of lies. — To this extent, nihilism, as
the denial of a truthful world, of being, might be a divine way of thinking.
Indeed, this “most extreme form of nihilism” is that which Nietzsche encourages his
reader to think through. A scientific conception of truth is incompatible with the world as
becoming. It is also incompatible with Nietzsche’s perspectivism, which claims that
“There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; and the more affects
we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes we can use to observe
one thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity,’ be.” 268
Unlike a perspectival conception of truth, scientific truth is unable to do justice to the
various kinds of meaning one encounters in the course of human life. According to
Nietzsche, “‘Truth’ is… not something there, that might be found or discovered, but
something that gives a name to a process… [it is] an active determining — not a
becoming-conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the
‘will to power.’” 269 This is a radically different view of truth which Nietzsche presents as
a viable alternative to scientific truth. Although the rejection of objective truth which
must precede this alternative will plunge one first into epistemological nihilism, by
recognizing the perspectival nature of truth and its rootedness in the instincts and drives
of life, modern culture might become able to re-conceptualize truth, seeing it as a
perspectival projection rather than something inherent in the world independent of the
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evaluation and interpretation of life. In the final chapter of this project, we will envision
what this alternative to objective truth might look like for Nietzsche.
2.10 Nihilism of Purposelessness
In this section, I will introduce nihilism of purposelessness as an element of European
nihilism, as well as Nietzsche’s critique of certain conceptions of purpose as false and
nihilistic. When European culture comes to understand nihilistic conceptions of higher
purpose as unbelievable, the result is nihilism of purposelessness: the belief that there is
no purpose at which the world aims. The nihilistic belief in a higher purpose to which
Nietzsche refers is the belief in 1) a purpose (qua final cause or telos) to the world as a
whole, towards which the universe develops and 2) in which humanity participates, in
which seemingly divergent human pursuits are unified, and towards which human
pursuits either are or ought to be directed. 270 Thus, this belief in a higher purpose
involves a belief in a global or all-encompassing purpose which unifies human pursuits in
one goal. 271 A higher purpose also 3) conditions the value of human pursuits in the same
way: those who believe in a higher purpose understand their actions, thoughts, principles,
and purposes as valuable (or not) only with reference to this purpose, and one individual's
actions can be judged valuable (or not) by the same standard as another’s. 272 On my
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account of higher purpose, finally, 4) the ways in which individuals participate in this
higher purpose will often look the same. In many examples offered by Nietzsche, such
purposes are transcendent purposes (especially as in Plato or Christianity), projected
beyond the world of this-worldly existence. But a higher purpose of the kind the nihilist
of purposelessness comes to reject need not be transcendent; they need not involve the
projection of ideals into a world beyond our own, towards which we ought to be directed.
This alleged purposiveness of the universe retains the sense intended by
Aristotle’s notion of telos in the doctrine of the four causes from his Metaphysics. In
Metaphysics V, Aristotle defines a final cause, or telos, as “the end, i.e. that for the sake
of which a thing is done.” 273 Aristotle goes on to give health as an example of a final
cause or telos for walking:
For 'Why does one walk?' we say; 'that one may be healthy'; and in speaking thus
we think we have given the cause. The same is true of all the means that intervene
before the end, when something else has put the process in motion, as e.g.
thinning or purging or drugs or instruments intervene before health is reached; for
all these are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another in that
some are instruments and others are actions. 274
In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the telos or final cause of x is that at which x ultimately aims.
To say that there is a telos or final cause of the world is to say that there is something at
which the world ultimately aims. This teleological way of thinking about the world,
Nietzsche points out, enables man to find meaning both in the world and in himself. On
this picture, both the world and humanity are meaningful because they plays a functional
On such a picture of social progress, the purpose of society is ever greater civilization, and
societies are understood as more or less valuable with reference to this higher purpose: “more
civilized” societies are “better,” more valuable societies than “more primitive” ones. Furthermore,
civilization is the purpose at which these “more primitive” societies knowingly or unknowingly
aim.
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role in the higher purpose of the universe. Mankind has meaning insofar as it, too, can be
directed towards this purpose. 275
As Richardson points out in Nietzsche’s System and Hatab discusses in
Nietzsche’s Life Sentence, Nietzsche is a strong critic of teleological conceptions of the
universe which appeal to certain kinds of purposefulness to explain facts about the world
or humanity. 276 Although he most frequently critiques these teleological conceptions for
being false, we will see that he also decries them as nihilistic insofar as they find value in
our world only as a means to a higher world, thus leading to an implicit denial and
denigration of this-worldly existence. The projection of a higher purpose onto the world
— as a purpose in terms of which humanity understands its pursuits and their value, and
which orients their actions and strivings — allows humanity to engage and find meaning
in this world and themselves, insofar as they participate in a higher purpose. Yet the
falsity of this projection — the facts that higher purposes do not, in fact, exist for
Nietzsche — means in the pursuit of such higher purposes, one is in fact disengaged from
the world in which she lives and implicitly participating in a denigration of this-worldly
existence in favor of a “better” purpose which, as false, is unattainable. According to
Nietzsche, even accounts of the world which insist upon some global, this-worldly
purpose towards which the world aims — as in the progressivist accounts offered by
scientists in Nietzsche’s day — can be interpreted as examples of nihilistic conceptions
of the world, insofar as they posit a subsequent world outside and above of our own as a
higher stage of advancement, thereby drawing our attention and hopes towards that false
275
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ideal and away from our world. 277 Importantly, this interpretation of scientific notions of
progress as nihilistic hinges on Nietzsche’s understanding of a deeper problem with
notions of scientific progress: because scientific interpretations of progress necessarily
understand the value and purpose of this world and humanity in terms of a single
standard of progress — yet one such standard does not in fact exist — these
interpretations devalue this life and this world as they are in actuality. 278
So far, we have discussed what makes particular conceptions of higher purpose
nihilistic. Yet Nietzsche believes not only that humanity has historically subscribed to
nihilistic conceptions of higher purpose; he also describes a particular kind of nihilism —
which I here call a nihilism of purposelessness — in which the nihilist fails to believe in
any purpose whatsoever. According to Nietzsche, “the philosophical nihilist is convinced
that all that happens is meaningless and in vain; and that there ought not to be anything
meaningless and in vain” [daß alles Geschehen sinnlos und umsonstig ist; und es sollte
kein sinnloses und umsonstiges Sein geben]. 279 Elsewhere, Nietzsche notes that nihilism
arises “when we have sought a ‘meaning’ in that happens which is not there: so the
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seeker eventually becomes discouraged.” 280 The problem of nihilism as it relates to a
telos or purpose is the first kind of nihilism that Nietzsche discusses in KSA
13:11[99]/WP 12. The meaning [Sinn] which man seeks in everything that happens [alles
Geschehen] in the above excerpts is a single, animating purpose which drives the
universe and propels it forward towards some higher version of itself.
A lack of belief in higher purposes — the characteristic belief of the nihilist of
purposelessness — understands the world and humanity as devoid of purpose altogether.
This belief explicitly denies and denigrates this-worldly existence: a life without some
higher purpose is no longer seen as worth living, since higher purposes served to
condition the value of our lives (and individual purposes). Otherwise put, the belief in a
higher purpose understands the value of the world and human pursuits purely
instrumentally: as mere means for achieving a higher purpose. When one comes to reject
the existence of this higher purpose, one rejects the value of the world and human
pursuits. Thus, a nihilism of purposelessness follows when certain nihilistic conceptions
of higher purpose become unbelievable.
2.11 The Trouble with Teleological Thinking
2.11.1 It is false.
On Nietzsche’s view, the belief in an alleged higher purpose of the universe is
problematic firstly because the assumption that human life participates in some higher
purpose or telos fails to recognize that this conception of telos is a human invention and
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projection which falsifies reality. According to Nietzsche, there is no such telos, no
higher goal at which the universe as a whole aims or purpose towards which it advances.
As Arthur Danto notes in his famous monograph on Nietzsche, “the world must give lie
to the proposal that it had a goal or a purpose… or end-state of any kind… [as] there is no
ultimately higher condition for which we may hope or to which we may aspire.” 281
As Elaine Miller points out in her article “Nietzsche on Individuation and
Purposiveness in Nature,” Nietzsche’s critique of particular teleological pictures of the
universe begins early in his academic career. 282 Indeed, a dissertation draft contained in
Nietzsche’s notes between Fall 1864 and Spring 1868 which deals with Kant on teleology
and the organism calls belief in a higher purpose the “illusion” of “outer
purposiveness.” 283 In this same draft, Nietzsche notes that “the question ‘why is
[anything]’ … belongs to outer teleology.” 284 When one asks why the universe is as it is,
one essentially asks after a purpose or telos of the universe. The answer to this typically
human question, which is thought to imbue humanity with meaning, is all-too-often
thought to be found in some higher purpose of the universe to which humanity belongs.
On Nietzsche’s view, this search for the meaning of human life in some purpose over and
above human life is typical of modern Europe, due to the influence of Plato and
Christianity on Europe at the time during which Nietzsche writes. But it is, above all, a
misguided search, and one with nihilistic consequences.
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It is a misguided search because, according to Nietzsche, “We have invented the
concept ‘purpose:’ in reality, purpose is absent.” 285 By this, Nietzsche means that there is
no higher purpose or telos at which the world aims. 286 This theme recurs again and again
in Nietzsche’s early and late works, in both his published works and his notebooks. In
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche notes that “it is we alone who have devised cause,
sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose
[emphasis mine]; and when we interpret and intermix this symbol-world, as ‘being-initself,’ with things, we act once more as we have always acted— mythologically.” 287 On
this picture, any notion of some purposiveness which unifies the aims of all the world in a
single purpose posits a final cause to the universe and consists in mere human invention
and myth. This projection of a final cause onto the world is cited as an example of one of
the “four great errors” from the Twilight of the Idols: what Nietzsche calls the “error of
imaginary causes.” 288 In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche explains that
conceptions of God’s plan as a divine, higher purpose towards which the world was
directed — and eternal afterlife as a divine, higher purpose towards which human life
was directed — developed and flourished because humanity sought out an explanation
for suffering (an answer to “why” human beings suffer). This is but one example of an
erroneously posited imaginary cause. Nietzsche’s prolonged examination of this error is
worth examining here. He begins by investigating the explanatory force of human
projections of purpose onto their world:
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The whole realm of morality and religion belongs in this category of imaginary
causes or "explanations" for disagreeable feelings. These feelings are produced by
beings that are hostile to us (evil spirits: the most famous being the labeling of
hysterical women as witches). They are aroused by unacceptable acts (the feeling
of "sin" or "sinfulness" is slipped under a physiological discomfort; one always
finds reasons for feeling dissatisfied with oneself). They are produced as
punishments, as payment for something we should not have done, for something
we should not have desired… [On the other hand,] We explain agreeable general
feelings as produced by our trust in God, and by our consciousness of good
deeds…
In fact, all these supposed causes are actually effects, and as it were,
translate pleasant or unpleasant feelings into a misleading terminology. One is in
a state of hope because the basic physiological feeling is once again strong and
rich; one trusts in God because the feeling of fullness and strength gives a sense
of rest. Morality and religion belong entirely to the psychology of error: in every
single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of
believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its
physiological origins. 289
Nietzsche explains in this excerpt how human beings invent various causes in order to
give a sense to their actions, feelings, and lives. The invention of an “imaginary cause”
— and, in particular, higher purposes as final causes — answers the question “why” and
therefore provides humanity with a reason for their experiences. Yet this invention of
such causes misleads humanity. This is what qualifies it as an error.
Nietzsche’s remarks from Twilight of the Idols on the fatality of human existence
further indicate his rejection of this nihilistic conception of the world and his attempt to
redeem humanity by correcting such harmful errors about the world:
No one is responsible for a man's being here at all, for his being such-and-such, or
for his being in these circumstances or in this environment. The fatality of his
existence is not to be disentangled from the fatality of all that has been and will
be. Human beings are not the effect of some special purpose, or will, or end; nor
are they a medium through which society can realize an "ideal of humanity" or an
"ideal of happiness" or an "ideal of morality." It is absurd to wish to devolve one's
essence on some end or other. We have invented the concept of "end": in reality
there is no end.
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A man is necessary, a man is a piece of fatefulness, a man belongs to the
whole, a man is in the whole; there is nothing that could judge, measure, compare,
or sentence his being, for that would mean judging, measuring, comparing, or
sentencing the whole. But there is nothing besides the whole. That nobody is held
responsible any longer, that the mode of being may not be traced back to a
primary cause, that the world does not form a unity either as a sensorium or as
"spirit" — that alone is the great liberation.
On Nietzsche’s view, as we see here, any picture of the universe which includes a higher
purpose towards which the universe is directed is a confused picture of the universe.
Nietzsche’s “redemption” of the world rejects humanity’s role as a medium through
which eternal ideals might be achieved, thereby rejecting the Christian understanding of
humanity as participants in divine planning or purposiveness. Here, we can also hear
Nietzsche’s critique of a nihilistic Christian conception of this-worldly existence as a
means to a divine afterlife, as humanity’s only opportunity to repay the infinitely large
debt which its existence has incurred. For Nietzsche, there is no single justification for
human existence; there is no reason that explains either the existence of humanity or the
world in which we live. Mankind is embedded in his world and can be explained only in
the same terms as the world to which he belongs. There is no explanatory cause for
mankind, no will that willed man’s creation, no goal towards which mankind aims or
progresses.
According to Nietzsche, the human need for some justification for existence
historically results in a number of other metaphysical interpretations which falsify the
world by inventing or projecting a goal or purpose onto this world. Nietzsche explicitly
describes such interpretations as misleading in The Gay Science, where he derides 1)
interpretations of the world which “reinterpret the emphatically derivative, tardy, rare
and accidental, which we only perceive on the crust of the earth, into the essential,
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universal and eternal;” 2) those who believe in a goal towards which existence aims have
not yet realized that the world “is assuredly not constructed with a view to one end;” and
3) those who anthropomorphize in their justifications of the world by establishing some
commanding and law-giving entity which directs the workings of the world and thus can
be praised or blamed for the agreeable or disagreeable nature of these workings. 290 These
interpretations share the feature of providing a reason for human existence in the form of
a universally applicable justification for why things are the way they are. We see this
even in Nietzsche's critique of progress from his 1888 notes, where he rejects notions of
“progress” and “development” as illusions which assign a telos to the world and
humanity which simply is not there. Nietzsche’s interpretation of “progress” as an ideal
according to which “everything that is in [time]… marches forward” — elsewhere called
the “future as progress” — reveals that even in this supposedly immanent interpretation
of purpose, we fail to escape the nihilistic structure of a higher purpose: “progress,” after
all, posits a better, more advanced world beyond our own, towards which our world aims
and through which our existence is justified. 291
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In contrast to such teleological pictures of the world, Nietzsche characterizes
humanity — and the world which we occupy — as a “tremendous experimental
laboratory in which a few successes are scored, scattered throughout all ages, while there
are untold failures, and all order, logic, union, and obligingness are lacking.” 292 In short,
there is no unified purpose to the universe which humanity occupies and in which human
beings may participate; Nietzsche’s picture of the universe is neither progressive nor
purposive in the sense of there being one final cause or telos to the world. These
falsifying accounts of the world and of this-worldly existence ignore “the general
character of the world [as]… to all eternity chaos; not by the absence of necessity, but in
the sense of the absence of order, structure, form, beauty, wisdom.” 293 According to
Nietzsche’s mature view of the universe, as mentioned above, there is no transcendental
guiding purpose to the universe: the universe unfolds in chaos, as necessity. This picture
of the world as “nature… undeified” strips the world of any transcendental teleology and

more knowledge, etc.), Nietzsche’s vagueness about the content of the values the overman will
create allows for a multiplicity of realizations and standards, such that we cannot justify our
current actions with reference to any one or unify our pursuits in any one standard. Striving
toward the overman will never involve striving towards a pre-established standard, as it does in
the cases of higher purpose. We see this also when Nietzsche remarks in this same section of
Zarathustra that “my happiness should justify existence itself!” (TSZ, Prologue, 3). Here, one
understands existence as justified by standards and values which emerge from out of one’s own
engagement in the world, one’s own “happiness.” If we read idea together with Nietzsche’s
emphasis on the overman as the justification of existence, we see the importance of actively
justifying existence through the creation of new values situated in one’s own interests and
engagements. Yet on Nietzsche’s picture, this can only happen through this-worldly
engagements. On this picture, any future-oriented goal or purpose emerges from out of the
immanently grounded process of value creation; no one purpose can be firmly fixed as “the
purpose” which justifies all of existence. In short, Zarathustra’s teaching of the overman as the
“meaning of existence” does not involve the fixation of a pre-established and unchanging
standard for the justification of existence.
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strips humanity accordingly of traditional sources of justification for their existence and
their world. 294
2.11.2 Conceptions of purpose as higher purpose are nihilistic, and their collapse
characterizes European nihilism as a nihilism of purposelessness.
As described above, Nietzsche rejects a picture of the world which includes higher
purposes because he believes that such a picture is fundamentally misguided and falsifies
reality. Another way of putting this is that Nietzsche is opposed to teleology in the sense
of some “inevitable fulfillment of a plan or a ‘purpose’ in nature, history, or society”
because there is no plan or purpose in nature which corresponds to this notion. 295 But
Nietzsche also wants to problematize this picture as a nihilistic conception of the world
which understands the world we occupy as a mere means to some higher end — and,
upon its becoming unbelievable, plunges Europe into a nihilism of purposelessness.
In Nietzsche’s discussion of the bad conscience and its origin from the second
essay of the Genealogy, we see how this particular nihilistic conception of the world
comes about. Early man develops what Nietzsche calls the bad conscience first and
foremost when he is forced to live within a society and to maintain peaceful relations
with those around him. The limitations this new situation places on expressions of his
instincts and desires which might be potentially injurious to other in society, coupled with
his continued physiological need to discharge these instincts and desires, forces early
man to internalize his violence and turn against himself: “Lacking external enemies and
obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man
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impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself.” 296 With the advent of this bad
conscience comes a feeling of profound weariness and exhaustion: “the worst and most
insidious illness… [and] one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man’s sickness
of man, of himself.” 297 Otherwise put, man’s incorporation into society stunts his will and
leads to affective nihilism as a physiological condition.
This affective nihilism and the attendant suffering — characterized by Nietzsche
above as “man’s sickness with himself”— leads him to posit other worlds and purposes
as higher and nobler than his own, so that his newfound suffering can be justified and he
can be redeemed. It is perhaps unsurprising that this “fundamental change” in mankind’s
understanding of his existence and the world he occupies — this nihilistic conception of
man’s world — results from affective nihilism, or man’s sickness with himself:
…here was now an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself,
provided this earth with something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic,
contradictory, and portentous, that the picture of the earth was fundamentally
changed. In fact, it required divine spectators to approve the dramatic
performance which then began and whose conclusion is not yet in sight… In
himself he arouses a certain interest, tension, hope, almost a certainty, as if
something is announcing itself in him, is preparing itself, as if the human being
were not the goal but only the way, an episode, a great promise [emphasis
mine]... 298
This invention of gods in whose divine plan humanity participates understands human
existence as a mere means to some higher end; on this picture, humanity is justified only
as a means to a goal. 299 Christianity develops this notion and couples it together with an
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understanding of the Christian God as divine creditor and human beings as lowly debtors,
unable to repay the debt incurred by the fact of their existence alone. On this picture,
“existence in general… is left standing as inherently worthless (a nihilistic turning-away
from existence, the desire for nothingness)” and humanity seeks relief through the
promise of a higher existence after their death. 300
In a note from 1887, Nietzsche remarks that “the nihilistic question ‘for what?’ is
rooted in the old habit of supposing that the goal must be put up, given, demanded from
outside.” 301 According to Nietzsche, the asking of this “nihilistic question” need not only
involve humanity’s hope for a higher purpose to be established by some “superhuman
authority,” but also “the authority of reason… or the social instinct (the herd)… or
history with an immanent spirit and a goal within, so one can entrust oneself to it.” 302
Although humanity’s nihilistic ask after a transcendent justification for existence in
Christianity most obviously involves a devaluation of this-worldly existence as it is,
Nietzsche’s point here, however, is that any attempt to find a higher purpose which
justifies existence — a purpose in which human pursuits are unified and the value of
these pursuits conditioned in the same way — is an attempt to locate a purpose in
existence which does not exist in actuality. When we direct ourselves towards such a
purpose or understand our lives as meaningful with reference to such a purpose, we
implicitly denigrate the world as it actually is and fail to engage meaningfully with the
world to which we belong. The question “for what?” already supposes that some
involve an affirmation not only of future versions of humanity but also an affirmation of great
contemporary individuals.
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justification must come from outside our the individual purposes and goals of embodied,
this-worldly life; in short, this question belies a habitual and common understanding of a
“higher purpose” as that which is able to justify this-worldly existence. 303
We see Nietzsche's rejection of a higher purpose in his 1886 critique of his own
early work, The Birth of Tragedy. In this retrospective critique, Nietzsche recognizes The
Birth of Tragedy as a youthful attempt to present an amoral picture of the world which
still justifies humanity, or bestows humanity with a meaning, through a higher
purpose. 304 Nietzsche’s early notion that the “existence of the world is justified only as an
aesthetic phenomenon” presents the world as “at every moment the attained
manifestation of God, as the eternally changing, eternally new vision of the person who
suffers most, who is the most rent with contradictions.” 305 According to The Birth of
Tragedy, the world is an artistic creation of this “amoral artist-God” who creates world in
order to “[rid] himself of the strain of fullness and superfluity, from the suffering of
pressing internal contradictions.” 306 As an expression of the contradictions and chaos of
this artist-God, the suffering of humanity and the chaos of the world of earthly existence
is given some sense, and man can be consoled by this fact. Nietzsche’s late interpretation
of his attempt at metaphysical consolation in The Birth of Tragedy, which understands the
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artist’s metaphysics as an attempt to resist Christian interpretations of the purposefulness
of the universe, acknowledges that this attempt still results in a nihilistic conception of
the world (albeit an amoral one, distinguished from Judeo-Christian conceptions of
higher purpose). Nietzsche himself interprets his artist’s metaphysics as a system which
“would sooner believe in nothingness or the devil than in the here and now.” 307 This
nihilistic conception of the world is what Nietzsche ultimately rebukes in his “Attempt at
a Self-Criticism.” His early “artist’s metaphysics” both posited a higher purpose to the
universe that was not there, and found a justification for human existence in this purpose
alone. This worldview, like those Judeo-Christian worldviews which young Nietzsche
had hoped to supplant with The Birth of Tragedy, denigrates this worldly existence and
leaves man without immanent sources of meaning through which he might affirm his life.
In “On the Otherworldly” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche places thisworldly purposiveness and higher purposes (as sources of meaning) in beautiful
juxtaposition, as Zarathustra describes the way in which his rejection of higher purposes
as sources of meaning led him to find meaning in his “body and this earth.” Here, we get
our first hint at the possibility of a kind of immanent purposiveness which allows one to
find meaning in one’s world and oneself while avoiding the life-denying, nihilistic
pitfalls of higher purposes. In this section, Nietzsche describes how Zarathustra
unconsciously invented a divine creator and purpose for the world as a justification of his
existence in light of his suffering, weakness, and despair: “Once upon a time, Zarathustra
also cast his fancy beyond man, like all afterworldsmen. The work of a suffering and
tortured God, did the world then seem to me… [as] the eternally imperfect, an eternal
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contradiction's image and imperfect image.” 308 It is only after he recognizes the origin of
his invention (the backworld or afterworld [Hinterwelt] as a source of meaning founded
in a higher purpose) in his own bodily suffering and despair does Zarathustra recognize
himself (as body) and this-worldly existence (as earth) as full of immanent purposes
which affirm this life rather than implicitly deny or denigrate this life. According to
Nietzsche, in humanity’s invention of higher purposes:
It was the body which despaired of the body—it groped with the fingers of the
infatuated spirit at the ultimate walls… It was the body which despaired of the
earth—it heard the bowels of existence speaking unto it. And then it sought to get
through the ultimate walls with its head—and not with its head only—into "the
other world.” But that "other world" is well concealed from man, that dehumanized, inhuman world, which is a celestial naught; and the bowels of
existence do not speak unto man, except as man…. A new pride taught me mine
ego, and that teach I unto men: no longer to thrust one's head into the sand of
celestial things, but to carry it freely, a terrestrial head, which giveth meaning to
the earth!… More uprightly and purely speaketh the healthy body, perfect and
square-built; and it speaketh of the meaning of the earth.— 309
Nietzsche’s task, his proposal for a solution to the problem of nihilism, emphasizes the
importance of recovering immanent meaning, as Zarathustra’s “meaning of the earth,” in
the immanent purposiveness of embodied existence. Yet this recovery can only come
after a moment of profound nihilism of purposelessness. It is only when Zarathustra
“[carries his] own ashes to the mountain” of his solitude that he can identify the meaning
of the earth: after all, Zarathustra asks rhetorically, “how could you wish to become new
unless you had first become ashes?” 310 It is only after a period of convalescence — a
recovery from the affliction of nihilistic conceptions of the world — that one can return
to this world with a new understanding of meaning as immanent and of organic bodies as
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meaning-makers. In “On the Otherworldly,” Zarathustra goes on to explain that once one
rejects the metaphysical consolation of higher justifications of humanity, one lapses into
illness. 311
In other words, when one comes to realize that any picture which justifies
existence by appeal to higher purposes is an illusion, this leads to nihilistic consequences,
especially a return to affective nihilism. The nihilism of purposelessness which results
from this is characterized by the belief that there is no purpose at which the world aims.
This kind of nihilism involves a further assessment of the world as worthless, since the
various interpretations of higher purpose which humanity had projected onto the world to
give it a meaning are “pulled out” once they become unbelievable. In this way, a sense of
the worthlessness of humanity and thus of oneself grows out of the nihilism of
purposelessness which presents itself as the first source of meaning to absence itself after
the death of God.
Simply put, nihilistic teleological conceptions of the world imply that if we are to
find value in humanity, there must be a higher purpose — a final cause of existence in
which the multifarious purposes and pursuits of humanity are unified and with reference
to which such pursuits can be understood as more or less valuable — in which humanity
participates. Upon coming to the conclusion that there are no such higher purposes, the
nihilist of purposelessness concludes that we cannot find value in humanity. 312 Otherwise
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put, since Western thought has historically appealed to some higher purpose for the
justification of humanity and the provision of meaning, a culture or individual which
recognizes the falsity of this worldview also must come to terms with the lack of a
justification for existence and the lack of meaning. Thus Nietzsche describes “goallessness as such” as a “principle of [nihilists’] faith.” 313 In Nietzsche’s 1887 notes on
European nihilism, Nietzsche explicitly ties European nihilism to a lost belief in higher
purpose as a goal-directedness of the universe:
nihilism… must arrive first when we search for a meaning/sense [Sinn] in events
that is not there, so that the seeker finally loses his courage… This meaning/sense
[Sinn] could have been: the "fulfillment" of some highest ethical canon in all
events, the moral world order; or the growth of love and harmony in the
intercourse of beings; or the gradual approximation of a state of universal
happiness; or even the development toward a state of universal annihilation —
any goal at least constitutes some meaning. What all these notions have in
common is that something is to be achieved through the process — and now one
realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing. 314
In this excerpt, Nietzsche makes it clear that nihilism results from the collapse of a belief
in the directedness of the universe towards a higher purpose of the kind I identify above.
The nature or content of this purpose, for Nietzsche, is of no consequence; as he points
out, nihilism of purposelessness results when any notion of higher purpose is revealed to
be false. After all, all of the pictures of purposiveness presented here posit some ultimate
future fulfillment [Erfüllung], world order [Weltordnung], loving and harmonious
intercourse [Verkehr], or state [Zustand] — unknown and unknowable a priori, but
posited and believed nonetheless — as purposes which condition the value of human

to “nihilistic dissatisfaction with life on earth in general.” On my account, this unattainability can
be explained by Nietzsche’s claim that such goals or purposes do not, in fact, exist.
313
WP 25.
314
WP 12.

114

pursuits in the same way, in which the divergent end-directedness of human beings can
be unified. 315
Whether the end goal or final cause of the universe is understood as “the moral
world order” or “a state of universal annihilation,” any widespread realization that the
universe does not aim towards such a goal and possesses no such higher purpose could
have brought about that nihilism of purposelessness which characterizes European
nihilism. Nietzsche hints at the reason why in this excerpt: when a higher purpose is
posited towards which the world is directed, humanity is provided with a meaning by
which they can justify their existence. Otherwise put, higher purposes give a sense [Sinn]
to human existence as a means towards some future fulfillment. Since humankind has
long made sense of itself by appeal to such teleological pictures, the falsity and eventual
unbelievability of this teleological picture leaves humankind unable to make sense of
itself. In this nihilistic moment, humankind finds itself in a vacuum of meaninglessness.
European nihilism thus involves a widespread belief in the meaninglessness of
human existence, resulting not only from the absence of objective truth but also from the
unbelievability of teleological pictures of reality which project higher purposes onto this
world and human existence. We see more evidence for this in Nietzsche’s
characterization of nihilism as that which follows from the realization that “The aim is
lacking; “why?” finds no answer.” 316 In his plan for Will to Power — a book on the
problem of nihilism which he never published — Nietzsche notes that “What is dawning
is the opposition of the world we revere and the world we live and are. So we can abolish
315
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either our reverences or ourselves. The latter constitutes nihilism.”317 On my
interpretation, this world which we are and in which we live is the world of embodied
experience, while the world we revere is the world as guided by higher purposes. These
two pictures, Nietzsche suggests in the above excerpt, are incompatible, and if we are not
to abolish ourselves, we must abolish the world of our reverences and affirm the world
“we live and are.”
As I note above, scientific advancements in post-Enlightenment Europe reveal the
picture of the universe as directed towards some higher purpose as unbelievable, since
those aspects of existence which might have previously been attributed to a divine or
transcendent purpose can now be explained in empirical, this-worldly terms. The
unbelievability of any worldview which includes some transcendent purpose follows
from the widespread adoption of a scientific worldview; in this way, post-Enlightenment
Europeans experience the abolition of certain of their reverences. Even as this occurs,
however, these same individuals still remain attached to higher purposes such as
scientific progress and moral progress, understanding themselves and their pursuits as
justified through such purposes. Yet just as the will to truth which brought about
scientific advancements undermined transcendent purposes, so too will it undermine the
higher purposes and scientific values subscribed to by post-Enlightenment thinkers. Since
humankind has long identified itself as valuable insofar as it participates in some world
driven towards a higher purpose, the abolition of higher purposes is experienced as an
abolition of humanity’s value and results in a loss of identity.
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Thus, although nihilism of purposelessness necessarily involves a belief about the
world — that there is no purpose at which the world aims and thus it is meaningless —
the critical role it plays for Nietzsche lies in its conclusion that humanity is worthless.
This is why, in particular, the unbelievability of an end goal (qua higher purpose) to the
world — understood as a superfluous teleological principle of the kind Nietzsche warns
about — leads to affective nihilism. 318 We see further evidence of this picture in
Nietzsche’s discussion of the development of the ascetic ideal as a way to fill the void of
purposelessness from his Genealogy of Morality. On Nietzsche’s account, without man’s
fidelity to the ascetic ideal:
…then man, the animal man, has had no meaning up to this point. His existence
on earth has had no purpose. [Emphasis mine] "Why man at all?" was a question
without an answer. The will for man and earth was missing. Behind every great
human destiny echoes as refrain an even greater "in vain!" That's just what the
ascetic ideal means: that something is missing, that a huge hole surrounds man.
He did not know how to justify himself to himself, to explain, to affirm. He
suffered from the problem of his being. 319
Later in this same section, Nietzsche notes that it is not man’s pain or suffering which
leads him into despair, but the fact that such suffering was senseless, or meaningless
[Sinnlos]. To be left in a vacuum of meaninglessness is to have no reverences, but it also
risks one’s life: “the deed of nihilism… is suicide—.” 320 Without a sense that one’s
existence is meaningful, Nietzsche argues, there is a risk that one will not want to
continue living at all.
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But there is another option. We can come to realize, as Nietzsche hopes to show
his reader, that we are capable of revering that world which we are and in which we live
instead of some world justified only be appeal to a higher purpose. The abolition of our
reverences need not lead to nihilism in the long run, but it will take a revaluation of our
world and ourselves to get beyond a preliminary “moment” of nihilism. This is what
Nietzsche refers to when he suggests that “every fruitful and powerful movement of
humanity has also created at the same time a nihilistic movement. It could be the sign of a
crucial and most essential growth, of the transition to new conditions of existence, that
the most extreme form of pessimism, genuine nihilism, would come into the world.” 321
Although Nietzsche critiques scientism, he praises the honesty of science; this new
scientific honesty forces humanity to rethink its understanding of its world. As Babich
notes, Nietzsche praises science “not for the sake of its truths or facts, but rather for the
sake of its ‘honesty’… For Nietzsche this integrity constitutes the most redeeming legacy
of the scientific turn.” 322 The fruitful movement brought about by scientific honesty is a
sign of “a crucial and most essential growth,” and while it leads us into the realm of a
“genuine nihilism,” humanity need not remain stuck there. To get beyond the nihilism
associated with the dearth of any higher purpose, man must become able to affirm a
world in the absence of any such telos. In Zarathustra’s teaching of the eternal recurrence,
Nietzsche invites us to such an affirmation. In “The Convalescent,” Zarathustra remarks
that he returns “eternally to this identical and selfsame life, in its greatest and its smallest,
to teach again the eternal return of all things.” It is the teaching of the eternal return
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which allows Zarathustra to escape his convalescence; on my interpretation, it is also that
which allows those affirmative individuals the means by which to overcome nihilistic
teleological thinking and affirm a world without any purposiveness beyond the driven
purposes of the drives of life forms. 323
Any conception of the world which includes some higher purpose at which the
world aims relies on a global conception of purposiveness — which assigns one purpose
to the world and all of humanity — for the founding of a meaningful human life. On
Nietzsche’s view, this way of thinking about meaning and purpose blocks humanity from
recognizing a localized, immanent purposiveness which is present in all living beings,
and finding meaning and purpose therein. The global teleological interpretation
characteristic of the idea of a higher purpose understands all of the universe in terms of
one goal or purpose and implies that the aims and purposes of a variety of objects and
diversity of life forms can be understood only with reference to this one goal. Although it
provided human beings with a justification both for their existence and for the
constitution of the world, this was at the expense of eliding this-worldly purposiveness.
Insofar as such an interpretation of higher purposes blocks humanity from locating
localized, immanent purposes and thus discovering meaning in this world alone, the
collapse of such conceptions of higher purpose in the moment of nihilism of
purposelessness is necessary for re-thinking immanent purposiveness in a life-affirming
way.
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2.12 Ethical Nihilism
In this section, I will introduce ethical nihilism as an element of European nihilism,
involving both what I call a nihilism of value privation and a nihilism of worthlessness.
Nihilism of value privation consists in the meta-ethical claim that are no absolute values.
One who believes in the existence of absolute values believes that there are 1) real,
objective values (values which lie outside of the individual and do not depend on one’s
own subjective perspective) which 2) condition the value of human actions, principles,
and thoughts in the same way (we understand our action, thoughts, principles, and
purposes as valuable with reference to these values) and 3) are equally binding for all
human beings. Nihilism of worthlessness, on the other hand, makes an ethical claim: the
world, as worthless, ought not to exist. After I introduce these two aspects of ethical
nihilism, I will demonstrate differences between my account and Reginster’s account in
The Affirmation of Life.
In this section on ethical nihilism, as with the sections on epistemological nihilism
and nihilism of purposelessness, it is important to note that Nietzsche recognizes both
nihilistic conceptions of value (in absolute values) and a “moment” of nihilism in which
such nihilistic values collapse and leave humanity disbelieving in value altogether. In the
case of ethical nihilism, absolute values are nihilistic insofar as they find value in human
actions and principles only with reference to absolute, identically binding standards for
all. Nietzsche argues that a belief in absolute values (as values which prescribe one thing
for all) denies and denigrates this-worldly existence, since attempts to adhere to such
values (in the face of immense social pressure to do so) turn the individual against the
aims of her drives, instincts, and interests, in which what is actually valuable for her can
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be found. 324 The belief is absolute values is also life-denying or nihilistic in another way:
since such values do not actually exist, one’s belief in and pursuit of these values leads
one to find value outside of the world to which they belong.
2.12.1 Nihilism of value privation
Ethical nihilism results when an individual or culture comes to believe that there are no
absolute values in the world. 325 As Ken Gemes helpfully explains, and as we see above,
this version of nihilism first involves the “metaphysical claim that there are no objective
moral values.” 326 This is a metaphysical claim because it makes a claim about existence:
that existence is devoid of objective moral values. 327 Nietzsche’s ethical nihilist comes to
this broader conclusion after realizing that nothing is absolutely ethical or unethical. 328
Yet this claim — that “there are no objective moral values” — is also a meta-ethical
claim, since its denial of the existence of absolute values (what Gemes calls objective
moral values) is essentially a claim about the nature of values: as Gemes succinctly
remarks, “the will to truth…having destroyed the metaphysics that underpinned our
values, is slowly bringing belated recognition that those values themselves now lack any
coherent foundations. Thus we are inevitably led to a void of values.” 329 In other words,
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after the knowledge drive undermines the metaphysical foundations of our values,
humanity must come to terms with the groundlessness of their moral beliefs.
This meta-ethical aspect of ethical nihilism is nihilism as value privation. When
Nietzsche defines nihilism as “the belief in absolute worthlessness, i.e., meaninglessness
[an die absolute Werthlosigkeit das heißt Sinnlosigkeit]” which he calls “the annihilation
of ideals [Vernichtung der Ideale],” it is this version of nihilism — as a belief in the total
absence of value — to which he refers. 330 On my account, nihilism as value privation in
Nietzsche is the result of two historical moments: first, the loss of Judeo-Christian
standards of valuation with the death of God and then, more radically, the loss of
Enlightenment values and ideals as scientistic values are revealed to be a new form of
ascetic, or life-denying, values. 331 Although the dominance of Enlightenment values after
the death of God averts the first moment of the nihilistic crisis by replacing JudeoChristian values with scientific ones, these scientific values are eventually revealed as
human constructs without any metaphysical foundation. Gemes’s discussion of nihilism
as the “uncanniest of guests” illustrates this nicely:
…why does [Nietzsche] call nihilism an uncanny guest and the uncanniest of
monsters? Presumably because he realizes that for his audience nihilism is, on
first approach, rather different and unfamiliar, and yet in some deep, perhaps, as
yet, unarticulated sense, profoundly close and familiar. It is unfamiliar to his
audience because, valuing truth, objectivity, science, education, progress, and
other Enlightenment ideals, they would regard themselves as having firm, deeply
held values. It is somehow familiar because they would have an inchoate sense
that the demand central to the Enlightenment ideal, the demand that all
assumptions must face the test of reason, is a test that consistently applied would
put those values, indeed, all values, into question. 332

330

KSA 12:7[54]
On Nietzsche’s analysis, the first moment has already occurred when he writes, while the
beginnings of the second moment are only just arising.
332
Gemes, “We are of Necessity Strangers to Ourselves,” 203.
331

122

On this picture, although modern Europeans are not as aware of nihilism as the privation
of scientific or Enlightenment values, there is a sense that the full embrace of
Enlightenment values leads one to reject such values. This uncomfortable in-between is
where modern Europe finds itself when Nietzsche is writing. Those already rejecting
Enlightenment values, such as Nietzsche himself does in the third essay of the
Genealogy, are nihilists of value privation, consciously subscribing to the metaphysical,
meta-ethical claim that there are no absolute values. Yet even those who do not yet
subscribe to these claims explicitly might sense that the absolute values they espouse are
haunted by such claims. As Nietzsche argues, the development of the will to truth which
led to the rejection of Judeo-Christian values will also eventually reveal the absence of
scientific values as well. 333
2.12.2 Nihilism of worthlessness
Nihilism as value privation — that is, nihilism as a metaphysical or meta-ethical stance
which can be captured in the claim that there are no absolute values — results from a
rejection of previous systems of valuation on Nietzsche’s picture. Yet Nietzsche’s
account of ethical nihilism also involves a normative assessment, or an ethical claim
about the world: the world is worthless, devoid of all value, and as such, it “ought not to
exist.” 334 This second aspect of ethical nihilism is that which I will call nihilism of
worthlessness.
On Nietzsche’s account, this nihilism of worthlessness — as a “madness of the
will showing itself… [as a] will to set up an ideal” — is manifest in particular nihilistic
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system of thought, and the clearest exemplar of this nihilism is Christianity. 335 In
“Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” Nietzsche argues that:
Christianity was from the start essentially and thoroughly disgust and weariness
with life, which only dressed itself up, only hid itself in, only decorated itself with
the belief in an "other" or "better" life. The hatred of the “world”… a world
beyond created so that the world on this side might be more easily slandered, at
bottom a longing for nothingness, for extinction… all that, as well as the absolute
desire of Christianity to value only moral worth, has always seemed to me the
most dangerous and most eerie form of all possible manifestations of a "Will to
Destruction," at least a sign of the deepest illness, weariness, bad temper,
exhaustion, and impoverishment in living… in the eyes of morality (and
particularly Christian morality, that is, absolute morality) life must be seen as
constantly and inevitably wicked, because life is something essentially amoral…
[this leads life to finally] be experienced as something not worth desiring, as
something worthless. 336
We see this analysis of Christian morality’s suppressed or implicit belief in the
worthlessness of earthly existence also in Nietzsche’s discussion of the debtor-creditor
relation inherent to Christian thought in On the Genealogy of Morality. According to this
picture, since mankind was created by the Christian god, mankind incurs a debt to this
god simply by existing. This debt can never be repaid, especially after the creditor (the
Christian god) takes the debt upon himself. Nietzsche calls this “Christianity’s stroke of
genius… the creditor sacrificing himself for his debtor, out of love …. for his debtor.” 337
According to Nietzsche’s version of Christian doctrine, before this moment of sacrifice,
“existence in general… is left standing as inherently worthless” and humanity
experiences “a nihilistic turning-away from existence, the desire for nothingness or desire
for the anti-thesis, to be other.” 338 After the sacrifice of Christ on the cross, humanity is
made whole again and the world becomes valuable as a means to a higher end in heaven.
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Nietzsche’s key insight here is that on such a picture, earthly existence is understood as
valuable only insofar as it is a means to heaven. In heaven, Christianity posits an afterlife
as the goal of this life and as the goal of morality; heaven is the highest good, capable of
redeeming and justifying humanity and existence. On this picture, this-worldly existence
is devoid of inherent worth or value. Thus, Christianity morality denigrates the world. On
this picture, the normative claim of nihilism of worthlessness — the claim that the “world
ought not to exist” — is obscured, but not rejected.
Yet a more explicit nihilism of worthlessness follows historically from the
combination of a nihilism of value privation (following the death of God, or the rejection
of Christianity and Judeo-Christian values) with a deeply ingrained need for real, higher
values which manifestations of declining and decadent life forms have developed over
the course of time. 339 This deeply ingrained need for absolute values develops 1) out of
our nature as valuing beings and 2) out of long-established habits of valuation.
When Nietzsche establishes human beings as essentially valuing beings, he does
not mean that we are merely capable of valuing or that we do in fact value certain things.
Rather, human beings for Nietzsche are life forms essentially characterized by their
drivenness and this necessarily involves valuation. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche
establishes an identity between “living” and “evaluating.” 340 In Twilight of the Idols,
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Nietzsche notes that valuation is a symptom, a byproduct, of life itself, 341 and claims that
“When we speak of values, we speak with the inspiration, with the way of looking at
things, which is part of life: life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through
us when we posit values.” 342 In its essence, life as driven life posits values; as life forms
and embodied complexes of drives, human beings express values. Condemnations and
affirmations are “value judgments of life.” 343 As Richardson remarks, “the judging that
life constantly does [is] valuing.” 344
As Nietzsche points out in the third essay of the Genealogy, human beings have
long “suffered from the problem of what [they mean].” 345 In this essay and elsewhere in
the work, Nietzsche argues that human beings have a deep need to make sense of
themselves: to find a meaning for their life, and in particular, their suffering. 346
According to Nietzsche’s genealogical account, this search for meaning results in the
acquisition and establishment of certain habits of valuation: in particular, mankind
acquires a habit of locating absolute values (“absolute good” and “absolute evil”) in
reality. 347 As valuing beings historically situated in 19th century Europe, human beings
develop this habit due to the widespread influence of Christianity and the myriad JudeoChristian practices in which they engage. In short, European individuals have found
341

“…the value of life cannot be estimated. Not by the living, for they are an interested party.”
TI, “The Problem of Socrates,” 2.
342
TI, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” 5.
343
TI, “The Problem of Socrates,” 2.
344
John Richardson, “Nietzsche’s Value Monism” in Nietzsche on Mind and Nature. Edited by
Manuel Dries and P.J.E. Kail. (New York: Oxford UP: 2015), 93.
345
GM III:29.
346
See also GS 1: “…founders of moralities and religions… promote the interests of the species,
even if they should believe that they promote the interest of God or work as God’s emissaries.
They too, promote the life of the species, by promoting the faith in life. ‘Life is worth living!’
every one of them shouts: ‘there is something to life, there is something behind life, beneath it,
beware!”
347
See the account of the development of the will to truth below.

126

meaning in the establishment and adherence to Judeo-Christian values and other ascetic
ideals: put succinctly, “the ascetic ideal offered man a meaning.” 348 These ascetic ideals,
developed by the ascetic priest (and, as shown in the chapter on epistemological nihilism
above, manifest in the ideals of scientism) claim that life – with its sensory pleasures and
distractions – must be turned against itself. According to Nietzsche, ascetic ideals are the
defining features of Judeo-Christian morality.
Even post-Enlightenment and after the death of God, as human beings continue to
claim that absolute good and evil exist and that humans can “know ‘intuitively’ what is
good and evil” without the guidance of Christianity, in this phenomenon Nietzsche
believes that “we are merely witnessing the effects of the dominion of the Christian value
judgment and an expression of the strength and depth of this dominion.” 349 Indeed, even
when the Christian faith is rejected in favor of rational Enlightenment ideals after the
death of God, faith in a new ascetic ideal — truth — comes to dominate. Although
scientists renounce religious faith, they renounce religious faiths only in favor of a
different faith: the faith in truth qua objective truth. Science’s obsession with truth leads
it to only value facts and, in particular, “pure,” un-interpreted facts, the belief in which
results from a faith in objective truth. Science, just like the ascetic ideal, prescribes one
thing for all, but instead of repentance and belief in a divinity, it is a belief in objective
truth. This belief in objective truth is what Nietzsche characterizes as “immaculate
perception” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: it is a belief in the possibility of the world as
identically intelligible to all. 350 Thus although science appears to be opposed to religion,
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it simply replaces God with objective truth as an absolute ground that justifies and
explains existence. Science, like the ascetic ideal, interprets all reality with reference to
one goal: the goal of reaching objective truth. Thus, science is simply another version of
the ascetic ideal; it is a new manifestation of the same habits of absolute valuation which
the development of the ascetic ideal in the Judeo-Christian priest began.
As the source of a new ascetic ideal, scientism also offers humanity a meaning.
Yet as a perspective involving an absolute valuation which purports not only to have a
monopoly on truth but also unquestionable certainty in the absolute value of objective
truth, the scientific worldview becomes untenable post-Enlightenment with the forward
march of the will to truth. 351 During the time in which Nietzsche writes, human beings
still experience a need for a meaning as a need for absolute values which justify human
existence. While they originally attempted to fill the void of value left after the death of
God with scientific, Enlightenment values, this attempt, too, is bound to fail and
humanity is again left without scientific values as a source of meaning. 352
When long-standing foundations of meaning [Sinn] in particular historical
conceptions of truth, purpose, and value are undermined, humanity is left with the belief
that the world is meaningless. Given humanity’s continued need for meaning, the
apparent meaninglessness of the world indicates to humanity that the world ought not to
exist. In short, humanity’s need for meaning, combined both with its belief in the world
as devoid of value and its equation of meaning with absolute value, infects man with
nihilism of worthlessness. Thus, nihilism as worthlessness is that nihilism which
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Nietzsche calls “the necessary consequence of recent value estimates.” 353 Modern
Europe’s belief in the necessity of absolute good and evil for a meaningful life, coupled
with their discovery that this is not the case, leads humanity to the belief that the world is
meaningless and, therefore, worthless: it ought not to exist.
2.13 Reginster and The Affirmation of Life
Any account of ethical nihilism in Nietzsche would be remiss to exclude a discussion of
Reginster’s analysis of Nietzschean nihilism in The Affirmation of Life. Indeed, Reginster
offers certain resources for pulling apart the two aspects of ethical nihilism which I treat
above, although his account differs in important ways from my own. In this section, we
will look to Reginster to see similarities and differences between the two versions of
nihilism he identifies and the two versions of ethical nihilism (as value privation and
worthlessness) for which I argue. It is worth noting, as Gemes and Richardson point out
and as I mention above, that Reginster’s account treats nihilism mainly as a “cognitive
stance.” 354 By this point, it should already be obvious that any such treatment
oversimplifies Nietzsche's treatment of nihilism and, most importantly, misses out on the
psych-physiological features of nihilism which are so important for identifying nihilistic
attitudes and stances. 355 Yet insofar as ethical nihilism on my view is a version of
cognitive nihilism, my account must be brought into dialogue with Reginster’s account.
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In his work, Reginster distinguishes between what he calls nihilism of despair and
nihilism of disorientation. While nihilism of disorientation makes certain claims about
our values, nihilism of despair involves value judgements about our world. In some ways,
these two types of ethical nihilism parallel, respectively, nihilism as value privation and
nihilism as worthlessness. But there are important differences between Reginster’s
account and my own.
For Reginster, nihilism as disorientation “results from the endorsement of
normative objectivism (the normative authority of a value depends on its objective
standing) and the rejecting of descriptive objectivism (there are no objective values).” 356
Otherwise put, insofar as the highest values of European culture were understood to be
valuable insofar as they were objective and absolute standards of good and evil, the
notion that such objective and absolute standards of good and evil do not exist plunges
Europe into a nihilism of disorientation in which there is a “lack of normative
guidance.” 357 On such a view, “there is nothing wrong with the world and something
wrong with our values.” 358 This version of nihilism, as both Reginster and Hussain point
out, makes a meta-ethical claim about the nature of values. 359
In the case of Reginster’s nihilism of despair, on the other hand, “there is nothing
wrong with our values but something wrong with the world.” 360 According to Reginster,
the problem in this case is that the world is inhospitable to the realization of our highest
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values; 361 Nietzsche’s despairing nihilist supports “an ethical claim about the world, and
our existence in it: ‘it would be better if the world did not exist’ (WP 701).” 362 Thus, the
despairing nihilist advances a negative evaluative judgment about the world in which she
lives.
In the early chapters of Reginster’s monograph, he rejects an interpretation of
nihilism in Nietzsche as disorientation on the basis that it is incompatible with what
Reginster believes to be the real problem of nihilism in Nietzsche: nihilism as despair.
According to Reginster, nihilism as disorientation (as a claim about values) and nihilism
as despair (as a claim about the world) are incompatible because “the devaluation of
values appears to undermine despair, since we have no reason to trouble ourselves over
the world’s being inhospitable to the realization of values we consider devaluated.” 363 In
other words, one cannot be both a disoriented nihilist and a despairing nihilist. If one is a
despairing nihilist on Reginster’s view, one finds the world inhospitable to her values and
is thrown into despair by this fact. Yet if she also believed, as the disoriented nihilist
does, that her values are worthless, there would be no reason for her despair. As Gemes
neatly points out, nihilism as disorientation involves the belief that “there are no ultimate
values,” whereas nihilism as despair insists that “there are ultimate values” and that these
values are unattainable and unrealizable, given the constitution of the world. 364 Given this
incompatibility, Reginster ultimately settles on nihilism of despair as characteristic of
Nietzsche’s overarching project of overcoming nihilism and affirming life after
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demonstrating possible resources for overcoming nihilism as disorientation in Nietzsche.
On Reginster’s account, then, the “primary form of Nietzschean nihilism is despair over
the unrealizability of our highest values.” 365
Although the incompatibility of nihilisms of disorientation and despair described
above drives Reginster’s attempt to adjudicate and decide between two kinds of nihilism
— one which involves a claim about values, and one which involves a normative claim
about the world — it seems that this forced choice is a result mainly of the way Reginster
frames these two types of nihilism. If we frame these two versions of ethical nihilism
instead as nihilism of value privation (or the absence of absolute values) and nihilism of
worthlessness (as involving the normative claim that the world ought not to exist),
respectively, we can capture the way in which Nietzsche’s treatment of the ethical aspects
of nihilism is equally concerned with claims about values and claims about the value of
the world. In particular, there seems to be insufficient reason to treat “nihilism of despair”
(or any ethical nihilism involving claims about the world, for that matter) as “primary” to
Nietzschean nihilism, especially given the mature Nietzsche’s extensive treatment of
nihilism as a meta-ethical devaluation of values. 366
2.13.1 Reginster’s nihilism of disorientation vs. nihilism as value privation
Nihilism as value privation, on my account, is nearly identical to what Reginster calls
nihilism as disorientation. As such, it involves a meta-ethical claim: There are no
absolute values. This means, especially, that there is no value to those moral values
historically recognized by the the Judeo-Christian tradition. As a “radical repudiation of
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value, meaning, and desirability,” nihilism involves very particular beliefs about values:
namely, that values are absent from the world to which we belong. 367 This is the kind of
nihilism which results when “The highest values devalue themselves [die obersten
Werthe sich entwerthen].” 368 We see a clear example of the highest values’ selfdevaluation in the way that Judeo-Christian morality (as requiring and valuing honesty)
comes to undermine the widespread Judeo-Christian belief in objective, universal
morality: “among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness: this eventually
turned against morality, discovered its teleology, its partial perspective.” 369 The result of
the devaluation of one’s highest values is nihilism as value privation, or as Nietzsche
would put it, nihilism as “the belief in absolute worthlessness, i.e., meaninglessness [an
die absolute Werthlosigkeit das heißt Sinnlosigkeit]” which Nietzsche calls “the
annihilation of ideals [Vernichtung der Ideale].” 370
The main difference between my account of nihilism as value privation and
Reginster’s account of nihilism as disorientation is the greater emphasis that I place on
the importance of meta-ethical nihilism as a denial of absolute values. 371 To see just how
extensively Nietzsche treats European nihilism as a meta-ethical concern — and, more
particularly, as value privation — one must look both to his published works and beyond
them. In the Nachlass, Nietzsche claims that “skepticism about morality” is the key to
understanding nihilism [Skepsis an der Moral ist das Entscheidende]. 372 Elsewhere, he
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notes that unless mankind can “recognize” valuations or estimations [Werthschätzungen]
as “presuppositions” rather than facts, nihilism will be inevitable. 373 Nihilism, on this
picture, involves a belief about values: namely, that there are no real values. Already here
we see nihilism as value privation in Nietzsche emerging; as meta-ethical nihilism, this
involves claims (characterized by repudiations and refusals) about values. 374
In 1886, Nietzsche defines nihilism as the “demise of a total valuation (namely
the moral)” which is “lacking in new interpretative powers.” 375 Nihilism occurs here as
the demise of a value system which has not yet been replaced by new interpretations of
value; in short, as a lack of value, or as value privation. This definition does not identify
nihilism with a belief in the inhospitality of the world. Instead, nihilism is the demise of
moral valuation; in this sense, the problem of nihilism is the problem of a dearth of
values and our impotency to interpret and create values anew, not merely a problem
about the mismatch between our values and the potential of our world to actualize such
values.
Later reflections from 1887 offer more substantial evidence for this claim. In one
note, Nietzsche explicitly connects moral valuation with nihilism: “Every purely moral
value-setting/scale of values ends with nihilism [Jede rein moralische Werthsetzung
endet mit Nihilismus]… One believes one can get along with a moralism without
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religious backgrounds: but with this is necessarily the way to nihilism.” 376 Here, nihilism
is a result of the activity of a certain kind of value-setting and valuation: a “purely moral”
value setting, or a version of “moralism.” The emphases here on a “pure” morality or
“moralism” which leads to nihilism lends support for nihilism as a value privation which
results from the collapse of absolute standards of right or wrong which function as
universal guides for behavior. When Nietzsche insists in another note that “the attempt to
escape nihilism without revaluing those values… brings about the opposite and
intensifies the problem,” we see even more clearly that the problem of nihilism is, at least
in part, a problem of valuation and values. 377 If the overcoming of nihilism must involve
a revaluation of values, then the overcoming of nihilism can not just involve the
revaluation of our world (or the affirmation of life), but learning to interpret values and
valuation anew in the face of the absence of absolute values. 378
We see this borne out also in selections from Nietzsche’s published work. In
Book Five of The Gay Science, Nietzsche suggestively frames nihilism as an abolition of
mankind’s “reverences [Verehrungen].” Examples of such reverences here are false
interpretations of the world which revere transcendent sources of absolute value, such as
the worldviews of Buddhism and Christianity. 379 If we combine this notion that nihilism
is the abolition of our reverences in light of their falsehood with the excerpt from the
Nachlass directly above, we see the suggestion that while nihilism involves the collapse
of false interpretations and valuations, overcoming nihilism requires the formation of new
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interpretations and valuations. If, as is suggested by the above excerpts, overcoming
nihilism involves changing how we value, not just what we value, then the problem of
nihilism is not, as Reginster argues, primarily our problematic assessment of our world
and whether or not it reaches our expectations; it is just as much of a problem with the
actual values we hold.
In a number of other places, the published work further bears this out. In the
Preface to the Genealogy, Nietzsche reads Schopenhauer’s transformation and
“transcendentaliz[ation]” of ascetic ideals into “‘values as such’ on the basis of which he
said ‘no’ to life and to himself as well” as mankind’s “temptation… to nothingness.” 380
According to Nietzsche, the absolutization of ascetic values both in Schopenhauer and in
Judeo-Christians before him is a symptom of mankind “looking back wearily, turning its
will against life… the onset of the final sickness becoming gently, sadly manifest: as
[European culture’s] detour” to nihilism. 381 Thus, absolute ascetic ideals pave the path for
European nihilism. As we come to see throughout the rest of the Genealogy, the birth and
universal legislation of ascetic ideals is the result of a power-hungry priestly caste’s
capitalization on a widespread physiological condition: weakness of will, impotence,
powerlessness. 382
We see this same life-denying structure implicit in nihilistic valuations explicated
in The Anti-Christ, where Nietzsche details the structure and mechanism of “nihilistic
values”:
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Life itself appears to me as an instinct for growth, for survival, for the
accumulation of forces, for power: whenever the will to power fails there is
decline (or: decadence) [wo der Wille zur Macht fehlt, giebt es Niedergang]. My
contention is that all the highest values of humanity have been emptied of this
will—that the values of decline (or: decadence), of nihilism, now prevail under
the holiest names [dass Niedergangs-Werthe, nihilistische Werthe unter den
heiligsten Namen die Herrschaft führen]. 383
In this excerpt, Nietzsche clearly refers to nihilistic values [nihilistische Werthe] as
values which facilitate the decline of life and power from which they originated; he
further suggests an identity between these “highest values of humanity [obersten Werthen
der Menschheit]” and absolute religious values. Nietzsche’s claim here that there are
properly nihilistic values — and not merely nihilistic worldviews or attitudes towards
one’s world — suggests that if there is a problem of nihilism, it is in some large part a
problem of values and valuation.
European nihilism as the collapse of contemporary Europe’s systems of morality,
or absolute value — as value privation — is characterized by Nietzsche as nihilism
because it leaves Europe in a vacuum of valuelessness or worthlessness [Werthlosigkeit]
which leads to a sense of meaninglessness. Yet insofar as earlier moral systems offered
life-denying or nihilistic conceptions of good and evil — conceptions which resulted
from and responded to life-denial as an affective condition and physiological weakness of
the will — European nihilism as value privation is a precondition for learning how to
value from a position of strength. The importance of understanding previous valuations
and better ways to value for understanding Nietzsche’s interpretation of nihilism and its
overcoming indicates that Reginster’s relative lack of attention to nihilism as a “problem
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with our values” is an oversight. Nihilism is characterized in part by Nietzsche as a
problem with the way we value; as such, it involves meta-ethical concerns.
Nietzsche’s discussion of nihilism, then, introduces the devaluation of values as a
separate phenomenon from a nihilism of worthlessness, which involves a negative
normative assessment of the world. Insofar as he recognizes a role for that which he calls
nihilism of disorientation in Nietzsche, Reginster would acknowledge that one should
isolate nihilism as value privation from that which I call nihilism of worthlessness in
Nietzsche. 384 Yet in his treatment of this kind of nihilism as a mere “side-path one takes
[while] trying unsuccessfully to escape from the nihilism of despair,” Reginster's reliance
merely on 1) the incompatibility of nihilisms of disorientation and despair and 2) the lack
of a consistent and systematic meta-ethical stance in Nietzsche remains unconvincing
evidence for Reginster’s lack of emphasis on nihilism as value privation. 385 Just as one
should not argue that an individual does not hold a belief simply because it was either 1)
actually inconsistent with some other belief that individual holds or 2) not systematically
developed and explicated by the individual, Reginster concludes too quickly that nihilism
involving beliefs about the value of the world more properly captures Nietzsche’s
understanding of nihilism than a version of nihilism involving a disbelief in absolute
values. 386
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2.13.2 Distinguishing Reginster’s “nihilism of despair” from nihilism of
worthlessness
The second aspect of ethical nihilism which Nietzsche explicitly treats is the notion that
the world is worthless. Since there are no absolute values, our world appears to be a
valueless world. 387 Since the nihilist had previously found her value only as part of an
inherently valuable world that worked through her, this realization that the world is
valueless results in a feeling of the worthlessness [Das Gefühl der Werthlosigkeit] both of
the world and of oneself: “At bottom, man has lost the faith in his own value when no
infinitely valuable whole works through him [Im Grunde hat der Mensch den Glauben an
seinen Werth verloren, wenn durch ihn nicht ein unendlich werthvolles Ganzes wirkt].” 388
Although this nihilism of worthlessness provokes despair, it is different from that which
Reginster characterizes as “nihilism of despair.”
As mentioned above, Gemes nicely frames the incompatibility remarked upon by
Reginster in The Affirmation of Life between nihilisms of despair and disorientation.
While nihilism as disorientation involves the belief that “there are no ultimate values,”
nihilism as despair insists that “there are ultimate values” and that these values are
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unattainable and unrealizable, given the constitution of the world. 389 On my account,
instead, both nihilism as value privation and nihilism as worthlessness involve the belief
that there are no absolute values. The critical issue for a version of nihilism which judges
the world negatively is not that the world is inhospitable to certain absolute values, such
that some fact about the world as it is makes such values unrealizable. The issue is that
absolute values, deeply rooted in the human psyche though they may be, are mere human
constructs. The resulting meta-ethical realization that the world is devoid of value,
combined with humanity’s deeply rooted human need (established as a long habit) for
absolute valuation, leads to humanity’s condemnation of the world: its nihilistic belief
that “the world ought not to exist.”
Unlike Reginster’s account of Nietzsche on nihilism as despair, then, the
condemnation of the world (characteristic of this version of nihilism) is not merely a
negative judgment that results from my previous expectations for the actualization of my
highest values in the world and my current recognition that such values are unrealizable
in this world. 390 Rather, the condemnation of the world characteristic of nihilism as
worthlessness, as an assessment that “the world ought not to exist,” results when
humanity comes to the meta-ethical realization that there are no absolute values yet still
retains a deeply rooted — and now frustrated — need to assign absolute values to the
world. It is not a mere matter of expectation; the problem is not that I expect the world to
be hospitable to my highest values, and I realize it is not. The problem is that I have
developed a need for the world to be hospitable to a certain set of highest values —
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absolute values — but I recognize that there are no such values. In nihilism as
worthlessness, absolute valuation is undermined as a source of justification and meaning
for myself and human existence; any “ultimate values” are rejected. Thus, when
humanity recognizes that there are no absolute values, something humanity experiences
as a fundamental need becomes impossible for it. The frustration here is not merely a
theoretical one, a “conclusion of an implicit reasoning,” a mismatch of my meta-ethical
assessment of the world and belief as expectation, resulting in a form of cognitive
dissonance; it is a frustration of the will, resulting from the felt need to will in a direction
which becomes impossible for us. 391
Against Reginster, I do not believe that Nietzsche’s presentation of the lifenegating ethical stance that “our world ought not to exist” 392 presupposes some real,
higher standard to which one holds the world. It is not the case, on my account, that “the
core notion of a life-negating value remains that of a value that cannot be realized under
the conditions of life in this world.” 393 Rather, the “core notion” of a particular value
which determines its life-negating tendency lies in that value’s tendency to turn life
against itself; whether or not it is “hostile to life” and “uses power to block the sources of
power, [turning] the green eye of spite on… physiological growth itself” and becoming
“more self-assured and self-triumphant to the same degree as its own condition, the
physiological capacity to live, decreases.” 394 In other words, a value tends to lifenegation insofar as it diminishes or weakens the activity of the drives as wills to power,
thus turning life against itself. This is the sense in which Nietzsche intends when he
391
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claims that “moral value judgments are condemnations, negations” and “morality is the
renunciation of the will to existence.” 395 The most dangerous repercussions of this
version of nihilism lie in the affective life-negation in which it was originally rooted and
to which it returns.
2.14 Affective Nihilism and Ethical Nihilism
Ethical nihilism, as in the cases of epistemological nihilism and nihilism of
purposelessness, both originates from out of affective nihilism and initiates its return. In
short, certain sources of meaning (objective truths, higher purposes, and absolute values)
allowed for humanity to alleviate affective nihilism by offering a justification for human
existence. Post-Enlightenment, these sources of meaning are withdrawn, and humanity is
left without alternative sources of meaning. This plunges humanity back into the depths
of its original, yet long-forgotten, illness: affective nihilism. We see this in Nietzsche’s
assessment of the ascetic priest as the potential doctor, with his various Judeo-Christian
methods, for existential suffering: “is he really a doctor, this ascetic priest? … it is only
suffering itself, the discomfort of the sufferer, that he combats, not its cause, not the
actual state of being ill — this must constitute our most fundamental objection to priestly
medication.” 396 As mentioned earlier, this illness is the affective nihilism in Nietzsche, a
physiological condition best characterized as a life-denying global mood resembling
depression. Affective nihilism results in the “physiological inhibition and exhaustion
[physiologische Hemmung und Ermüdung]” 397 of the drives, in which life “turn[s] against
itself and den[ies] itself” via depressive affects. This condition, as involving the
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dominance of depressive affects in an individual, manifests in the affective nihilist as a
“deep disgust for themselves, for the world, for all life.” 398 Although nihilistic
conceptions of truth, purpose, and value provide man with a justification for existence in
the short term, with the development of the will to truth post-Enlightenment, they must
collapse and ultimately make man sicker:
man, suffering from himself in some way, at all events physiologically, rather like
an animal imprisoned in a cage, unclear as to why? what for? and yearning for
reasons — reasons bring relief — yearning for cures and narcotics…. and lo and
behold! from this magician, the ascetic priest, he receives the first tip as to the
‘cause’ of his suffering: he should look for it within himself. 399
In the Genealogy of Morality, we see the ascetic ideal — which, importantly, includes
particular nihilistic conceptions of purpose, value, and truth from Judeo-Christian
systems as well as nihilistic conceptions of purpose, truth, and value from a scientistic
approach to the world — as an attempt to “alleviate and anesthetize” man’s affective
nihilism by offering man a justification for his suffering. Yet the ascetic ideal ultimately
makes man sicker, turning him against himself and making him feel guilty for the gift of
divine purpose and value which transcendental sources have bestowed upon him. 400 We
see this idea also in Nietzsche’s 1886 “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” which describes
Christianity and Christian morality as “disgust and weariness with life, which only
dressed itself up, only hid itself in… the belief in an ‘other’ or ‘better’ life. The hatred of
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the ‘world’…[and] a world beyond created so that the world on this side might be more
easily slandered, at bottom a longing for nothingness, for extinction, for rest.” 401
In Zarathustra, we see again how an affective nihilism served as the original
motivation for those ideals which temporarily preserved life. 402 There, Nietzsche argues
that humanity’s belief in absolute morality functioned mainly as a palliative for feelings
of powerlessness, allowing for the self-preservation of humanity; as Nietzsche claims in
Zarathustra, “humans first placed values into things, in order to preserve themselves.” 403
Humanity’s attempt to “place value” in the world in order to preserve life manifests an
affective nihilism, merely preserving a sick form of life. The subsequent loss of absolute
value in ethical nihilism as value privation and worthlessness, however, leads to
circumstances in which even a weak, sick will cannot even be preserved. This is how the
collapse of nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and value above leads to the various
moments of epistemological, purposeless, and ethical nihilisms— moments in which
projections of meaning become unbelievable, are unable to preserve life, and lead to a
deterioration of life which destroys the will to existence and leads to a felt weariness with
the world.
In short, with Europe’s post-Enlightenment disbelief in absolute values — with
nihilism as value privation — the will turns against itself once again. This physiological
deterioration of the will is life turned against itself. 404 The ethical stance “our world
ought not to exist” arises from European individuals’ senses that they ought not to exist;
this sense is nothing more than the will turned against itself. Thus, while nihilism as
401
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worthlessness as an ethical stance can be represented by the belief that “our world ought
not to exist,” it is fundamentally rooted in one’s affective, psycho-physiological
constitution.
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Chapter Three: Nietzsche’s Metaphysics and the Problem of Nihilism
3.1 Metaphysical Resources for Responding to Nietzschean Nihilism
How might post-Enlightenment Europe move beyond European nihilism and towards a
“high point of humanity?” 405 In this chapter, I offer an interpretation of Nietzsche’s
ontology, with a special emphasis on an essential permeability between the individual as
subject-unity and the world of which she is a part (also referred to below as the “porosity
of the self”). In the final chapter, I will utilize this ontology as a resource for responding
to the problem of European nihilism (as a belief-system involving a series about beliefs
about truth, purpose, and value) and the personal transformation required to overcome
affective nihilism. Although my picture of Nietzsche’s metaphysics will stay true to the
“metaphysical sketches” from his published works and his notes, I will extrapolate from
these sketches to demonstrate how one might utilize his metaphysics to re-conceive truth,
purpose, and value in a way that enables one to overcome European nihilism.
3.2 Nietzsche against Metaphysics: Substance, Atomism, and Mechanistic Physics
In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate that Nietzsche provides an account of the
constitution of reality which can be characterized as a metaphysics. My case for this point
will become clearer later in this chapter, as I outline the particular ontological framework
which Nietzsche presents in his work. On the way to understanding what kind of
metaphysical picture Nietzsche offers, however, it is helpful to first see the kinds of
metaphysics he rejects. In order to aid my case for the kind of metaphysics which
Nietzsche sketches in his work, I will focus especially on his critique of 1) Being and a
metaphysics of substance; 2) atomistic interpretations of the world; and 3) mechanistic
405
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accounts of reality. Nietzsche’s rejection of these metaphysical frameworks will help us
to better understand the positive metaphysical picture which he formulates, for in his
critical remarks on a metaphysics of substance, atomism, and mechanism, we find
evidence supporting a metaphysics of interpenetrative, ever-changing force. This positive
metaphysical picture — Nietzsche’s drive ontology — disrupts the boundaries between
self and world, thus results in an ontological porosity between individuals as driven
beings and the driven world in which they are embedded. This picture of Nietzsche’s
drive ontology will allow us to see how individuals can find themselves situated in a
meaningful world of truth, purpose, and value while still rejecting nihilistic conceptions
of objective truth, higher purpose, and absolute value.
Nietzsche’s crusade against these particular metaphysical interpretations turns up
very early in his writings, as early at least as 1873, and continues throughout both his
body of work and in his unpublished notes. 406 Here, I will establish this lifelong tendency
by tracing it genealogically through the development of Nietzsche’s thought. In
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche supports Heraclitus’s denial of the
stability and permanence of existence, or the belief that the world “nowhere shows a
tarrying, an indestructibility, a bulwark in the stream.” 407 He also praises Heraclitus’s
genius for recognizing that any supposed stability ascribed to reality by human beings is a
result or consequence of the falsifying function of human experience and language. 408 In
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this same section of Philosophy in the Tragic Age, Nietzsche gestures towards his support
of an anti-atomistic account which he deems equally Heraclitean and Schopenhauerian:
that “everything which coexists in space and time has but a relative existence, that each
thing exists through and for another like it, which is to say through and for an equally
relative one.” 409 Although this early support by Nietzsche for what seems like a relational
ontology can not be taken as evidence that for the continuation of such a picture in his
later projects, it allows us to identify a strong anti-substantivist tendency even in early
Nietzsche. 410
In Human, All too Human, this tendency continues. Early in the first book,
Nietzsche argues that a genealogical account of the development of the idea of substance
and being (“that all the rest of the world is one thing and motionless”) reveals that “belief
in unconditioned substances and in like things [gleiche Dinge] is… a primordial and
equally ancient error of everything organic.” 411 In short, and as Nietzsche makes clear at
the end of this section, human belief in substance is a fundamental error of organic life,
and “insofar as all metaphysic has concerned itself particularly with substance and with
freedom of the will, it should be designated as the science that deals with the fundamental
errors of mankind as if they were fundamental truths.” 412 Metaphysics, for Nietzsche,
will not be a metaphysics of substance. Nietzsche argues that our understanding of a
“very object by itself, as in essence a thing unto itself, therefore as self-existing and
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unchanging, in short, as a substance” 413 reveals certain necessary features of human
cognition, not certain features about the world. This idea is repeated in notes from 1881,
in which Nietzsche again remarks that the very activity of thinking “must assert
substance and the same, because knowledge of the fully fluxional is impossible.” 414 In
other words, the fixing of flux into stable substances is an activity of the mind which
makes the world comprehensible to human beings. There is, in actuality, no such thing as
a metaphysical substance. 415
In “‘Reason’ in Philosophy” from Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche rejects notions
of permanence, being, and substance more straightforwardly perhaps than anywhere else
in the corpus: “precisely insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity,
identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we see ourselves somehow
caught in error, compelled into error.” 416 He begins this critique of substance metaphysics
again with reference to Heraclitus, this time explaining in more detail that human
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attempts to interpret the testimony of the senses with the use of reason falsifies reality. 417
Later in this section, Nietzsche goes on to explain how rational beings get it wrong:
through the translation of the world into language, by explaining the world in the same
terms we employ to explain our own first-personal experience. 418 As Nietzsche notes,
“Everywhere [reason] sees a doer and doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in
the ego, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the egosubstance upon all things--only thereby does it first create the concept of “thing.’” 419 A
metaphysical interpretation of the world as containing unified, discrete substances is
merely a result of human beings’ first-personal experience of themselves as unified egos
and their mistranslation of this experience into reality. 420 As we see also in his 1887
notes, this role for language and first-personal experience in metaphysical interpretations
(which understand the world as composed of unified substances) is why Nietzsche
identifies the Cartesian ego as the sources of this mistaken metaphysics of substance:
“our belief in ‘ego’ as a substance [is] the sole reality from which we ascribe reality to
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things in general.” 421 We see Nietzsche emphasize this role for our first-personal
experience as unified through an ego-substance also in his assertion that “the concept of
substance is a consequence of the concept of the subject: not the reverse! If we relinquish
the soul, ‘the subject,’ the precondition for ‘substance’ in general disappears.” 422
According to Nietzsche, without the unity of the subject first proposed by Descartes and
his cogito, humanity would not have internalized the concept of metaphysical substance
and interpreted the world primarily by employing this concept.
Along with a metaphysics of substance (or “being”), Nietzsche also rejects
atomistic interpretations of the world, according to which the world is composed of
countless discrete pieces of matter called “atoms.” 423 In an excerpt from his notes entitled
“Against the physical atom,” Nietzsche remarks:
to comprehend the world, we have to be able to calculate it; to be able to calculate
it, we have to have constant causes; because we find no such constant causes in
actuality, we invent them for ourselves— the atoms. This is the origin of atomism.
The calculability of the world, the expressibility of all events in formulas — is
this really “comprehension?” 424
The last question, of course, is rhetorical. Just as with substance, the atomistic conception
of reality is an invention and projection of human beings. What Nietzsche calls elsewhere
421
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the “atomistic hypothesis [der atomistischen Hypothese]” is a hypothesis “with which we
humanize the world… and make the world accessible at the same time to our eye and our
calculation.” 425 In other words, the formation of an atomistic worldview for Nietzsche is
merely a translation of reality into discrete substances — atoms — which allow us to
calculate and measure our world. Yet as Nietzsche remarks in his 1887/88 notes, “there
are no durable ultimate units, no atoms, no monads: here, too, ‘beings’ are only
introduced by us (from perspective grounds of practicality and utility).” 426 This
projection of an atomistic interpretation onto the world, formulated as a useful way for
humans to understand the world around them, falsifies the world. There are no discrete
and stable pieces of matter; in this sense, there are no “atoms” for Nietzsche. 427
As we see in the above excerpts — and as H. Caygill asserts in “Nietzsche and
Atomism” — Nietzsche “constantly aligns his critique of atomic doctrine with his
critique of the subject.” 428 This parallel between a critique of the subject and a critique of
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a metaphysical interpretation reminds us of Nietzsche’s reflections on substance
metaphysics above: “the concept ‘reality,’ ‘being,’ is taken from our feeling of the
subject.” 429 As Caygill notes, Nietzsche believes that we “[transpose]… the feeling or
belief that ‘the ego counts as a substance, as the cause of all deeds, as a doer” into the
‘belief in substance, accident, attribute, etc.’” 430 This translation of the belief in a unified
ego into a belief in unified substance is most evident in Beyond Good and Evil:
With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a
small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds —
namely, that a thought comes when “it” wishes, and not when “I” wish; so that it
is a perversion of the facts of the case to say that the subject “I” is the condition of
the predicate “think.” One thinks; but that this “one” is precisely the famous old
“ego,” is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an
“immediate certainty.” After all, one has even gone too far with this “one thinks”
— even the “one” contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong
to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical
formula— “To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active;
consequently” . . . It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism
sought, besides the operating “power,” the material particle wherein it resides and
out of which it operates — the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last
to get along without this “earth-residuum,” and perhaps some day we shall
accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without
the little “one” (to which the worthy old “ego” has refined itself). 431
In this selection, Nietzsche claims that human beings reason by analogy from our
experience as agents to the way substances cause, on an atomistic view. 432 Just as the
human being deduces a unified, underlying mental substance (the Cartesian ego) from the
activity of thinking alone, so, too, does atomism deduce material substance from the
operations of the universe. (Whether or not this is convincing, this does seem to be
Nietzsche’s argument.) These mistaken deductions are mere interpretations of the
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workings of thought and the universe shaped by certain grammatical conventions. Human
attempts to communicate action via spoken language, in particular, always involve
positing some agent behind the action: one never simply says “thinking” or “thinks,” but
“she is thinking” or “one thinks.” As Nietzsche points out, this is merely a function of
grammar; still, on this picture, this grammatical formulation affects the way our minds
interpret the world. In short, this leads individuals to posit a unified substance beneath or
behind activity when, in fact, there is none.
As mentioned above, Nietzsche also rejects mechanistic interpretations of the
world. 433 His critique here is closely connected to that of atomism; in fact, he even speaks
of “the development of mechanical-atomistic [mechanistisch-atomistischen] modes of
thought.” 434 We see also in his notes that he contrasts a “dynamic interpretation of the
world” with a mechanistic interpretation, since the dynamic interpretation includes a
“denial of ‘empty space’ and its little clumps of atoms.” 435 It should not be surprising,
then, that certain of Nietzsche’s critiques of the mechanistic worldview echo his critique
of atomism. We see Nietzsche insist that “the mechanistic explanation of the world is an
ideal: to explain as much as possible as little as possible, that is, in formulas.” 436 In its
attempts to simplify our explanations of reality, we falsify reality by projecting on it a
mere ideal.
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Nietzsche more specifically claims that, as with atomism, purely mechanistic
interpretations of the universe project falsifying human categories — such as “regularity”
— onto the world. In 1885, he argues that “‘attraction’ and ‘repulsion’ in a purely
mechanistic sense are complete fictions” attributable to the fact that human beings
“cannot think of an attraction divorced from an intention… In short, the psychological
necessity for a belief in causality lies in the inconceivability of an event divorced from
intent.” 437 This excerpt echoes earlier critiques of atomism, according to which a
particular mistaken understanding of the world is deduced from our experience as causal
agents. Because we experience ourselves and our intentions as causes which bring about
certain effects in the world, we understand the world in terms of these same kinds of
causes and effects.
We can understand more about the connections between Nietzsche’s critique of a
certain conception of cause and effect and his critique of mechanistic science in Beyond
Good and Evil, where Nietzsche’s rejection of a causa sui (self-caused cause) turns into a
rejection of a mechanistic interpretation of the world:
One should not wrongly materialize “cause” and “effect,” as the natural
philosophers do (and whoever like them naturalize in thinking at present),
according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press
and push until it “affects” its end; one should use “cause” and “effect” only as
pure conceptions, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of
designation and mutual understanding, — not for explanation. In “being-in-itself”
there is nothing of “casual-connection,” of “necessity,” or of “psychological nonfreedom”; there the effect does not follow the cause, there “law” does not obtain.
It is WE alone who have devised cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity,
constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we interpret
and intermix this symbol-world, as “being-in-itself,” with things, we act once
more as we have always acted — mythologically. 438
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In this selection, Nietzsche calls an interpretation of causality which separates some
cause A from its effect B insofar as it understands the cause A as a discrete entity or
event which brings about some other discrete entity or event B “the prevailing
mechanical doltishness.” Nietzsche’s main issue with this picture seems to be the positing
of a cause as an “ontologically independent existent” which brings about certain
effects. 439 As Poellner points out with the aid of Richardson in “Nietzsche’s
Metaphysical Sketches,” for Nietzsche there are no “ontologically independent
existent[s]”: everything is constituted in part by its relations to other processes in the
world around it. 440 In Nietzsche's view, anything we can pin down as an entity is both a
cause and effect, both caused and always-already affected: cause and effect, then, cannot
be separated in the superficial way mechanistic interpretations of reality attempt to
separate them. Insofar as a mechanistic conception of causality forces us to think a
separation between cause and effect as two discrete entities or events, this conception
presents a falsified picture of reality. 441 As Nietzsche puts this in his late notebooks, a
picture of causality which posits “two successive states, the one ‘cause’ and the other
‘effect’” is “false.” 442 Instead, for Nietzsche, “the concept of cause and effect is reduced
to equations of proportion [or relation], with the ambition to prove that on each side the
quantum is of force, [and that] the driving force is wanting: we consider only results.” In
other words, what humanity conventionally calls “causes” and “effects” are simply
outcomes of the relations of forces — and, in particular, the drives. When we understand
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Nietzsche’s critique of mechanistic interpretations of the world as, in part, a critique of a
particular picture of causal relations — of discrete causes bringing about effects — this
also helps us to see how Nietzsche's rejection of a purely mechanistic interpretation of the
world is connected to his rejection of enduring substance as a projection of our own
experiences as unified agents onto the world around us.
In a reflection on causality from 1885, Nietzsche notes that “The separation of the
‘deed’ from the ‘doer,’ of the event from someone who produces events, of the process
from something that is not process but enduring, substance, thing, body, soul, etc… this
ancient mythology established the belief in ‘cause and effect’ after it had found a firm
form in the functions of language and grammar.” 443 Here, as before, we see Nietzsche
locating individuals’ understanding of cause and effect in ways of speaking about human
agency and the grammatical constructions that posits a subject under the action (as in the
example before of “thinking” vs. “she is thinking”). Earlier in this same fragment,
Nietzsche notes that the “mechanistic world-view” reduces such a “mode of thinking
[about cause and effect] which only and everywhere feels the will to act… to a
mathematical formula with which, as we must constantly underline, something is never
apprehended, but is designated, recorded.” 444 For Nietzsche, mechanistic worldviews
attempt to capture the motions and workings of the universe by describing the world with
formulas and appealing to natural laws. As we see here, however, Nietzsche understands
this as a mere interpretation and translation of the world, a picture formed through the
habitual lens of human agency, focused and sharpened by human language.
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Nietzsche’s critique of atomism is echoed in his critique of mechanistic
interpretations which posit unified, discrete substances in this kind of causal interaction
with one another. This corpuscular picture is what Poellner rightly identifies Nietzsche as
rejecting when he rejects the mechanists’ picture of the physical world. 445 We see this
also in a fragment entitled “Critique of the mechanistic theory,” in which Nietzsche notes
that in attempting to comprehend the world, we translate the world “into a visible world
— a world for the eyes — [with] the concept ‘motion.’” He goes on:
This always carries the idea that something is moved — this always supposes,
whether as the fiction of a little clump of atom or even as the abstraction of this,
the dynamic atom, a thing that produces effects — i.e., we have not got away
from the habit into which our senses and language seduce us. Subject, object, a
doer added to the doing, the doing separated from that which it does: let us not
forget that this is mere semiotics and nothing real. Mechanistic theory as a theory
of motion is already a translation into the sense language of man. 446
Here we see Nietzsche’s notion that the corpuscular picture of causal relations put forth
in mechanical explanations of reality is a result of the projection of an understanding of
the efficacy of discrete human subjects, or ego-substances, onto the non-human world.
His claim that this is a matter of “mere semiotics” and a result of a “translation” of the
world “into the sense language of man” emphasizes the role of grammatical constructions
in language in shaping our understanding of the world around us; in this particular case,
of course, the issue is a mechanical understanding of the world.
In Nietzsche’s rejection of substance and critiques of atomistic-mechanistic
interpretations of the world, we see that he views these conceptions as falsifying insofar
as they involve the projection of stable, discrete entities — whether those be substances,
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atoms, or discrete causes — onto a dynamic, fluxional world comprised not of discrete
entities or isolated events in succession, but interpenetrating forces. 447 Furthermore, in
each of these cases, Nietzsche describes the ways in which the projection of a particular
kinds of human experiences — feelings of agency and the causal efficacy of intentions —
onto the non-human world falsifies this world. 448 A well-known example of this kind of
falsification is the lightning example found both in his notes (A) and in the Genealogy
(B):
A. If I say “lightning flashes,” I have posited this flash once as an activity and a
second time as a subject, and thus added to the event a being that is not one with
the event but is rather fixed, is, and does not “become.” — To regard an event as
“effecting” and this as being, that is the double error, or interpretation, of which
we are guilty. 449
B. A quantum of force is just such a quantum of drive, will, action, in fact it is
nothing but this driving, willing and acting, and only the seduction of language
(and the fundamental errors of reason petrified within it), which construes and
misconstrues all actions as conditional upon an agency, a “subject,” can make it
appear otherwise. And just as the common people separates lightning from its
flash and takes the latter to be a deed, something performed by a subject, which is
called lightning, popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of
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strength, as though there were an indifferent substratum behind the strong
person… 450
In these excerpts, we see Nietzsche describe our understanding of the workings of the
world in terms of human agency as a “double error,” as the result of “the seduction of
language” and “fundamental errors of reason.” The idea here seems to be that the
workings of the universe and our notions of causes and effect, understood in this way,
allow us to rationally comprehend the world of which we are a part. But by forcing the
world into a pre-existing, rational framework of action which we have acquired through
the phenomenological experience of agency, we falsify the world. This is the case when
we understand of cause and effect in mechanistic terms; it is also the case, as we saw
above, for our understanding of substance and atomism’s conception of unified
substances as the basic constituents of reality: “‘beings’ are part of our perspective…
The fictitious world of subject, substance, ‘reason,’ etc., is needed [for our
comprehension] —: there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially
distinguish” although the “world in a state of becoming [is] incapable of formulation.” 451
In short, our concepts of substance and discrete, ontologically independent beings are
projections, attempts to place the world into a formula or a context which we can
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understand, when in fact the world as it truly is — as continual flux — cannot be
understood in terms of such formulas or conceptions of agency which separate an acting
subject from that upon which a subject acts.
Rather than understanding nature and the workings of the natural world in terms
of human experience, Nietzsche aims to understand human experience (morality being
the most familiar phenomenon under investigation — in terms of nature (and, in
particular, the play of forces in nature). On my reading, this is a different version of what
Nietzsche calls “translating the human back into nature.” 452 In “Nietzsche’s SocioPhysiology of the Self,” Herman Siemens discusses Nietzsche’s critique of the
“moralization of nature” and insists that we must not only “translate values and the
human being back into nature… [but also] translate morality out of (human) nature.” 453
Just as morality results from a “psychological misunderstanding [psychologisches
Mißverständniß]” which understands “the false independence of the ‘individual,’ as an
atom” and moral subject as “an opposition to [the natural world of] striving forces,” 454
the above metaphysical interpretations of the world results from a mistranslation of our
own experience, projected onto the world. 455 This view of “the ‘real world’ as a spiritual
world, as accessible through the facts of consciousness” is called a “tremendous blunder”
by Nietzsche. 456
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As we see Nietzsche emphasize again and again, however, such substantivist,
mechanistic, and atomistic ways of seeing the world have been “needed” for
intelligibility and comprehensibility of the world. Does Nietzsche’s identification of these
metaphysical interpretations as essentially erroneous and falsifying mean, then, that
knowledge of the world is impossible for human beings? In short, no: as Nietzsche notes,
these particular metaphysical interpretations have been required for the kind of
knowledge after which philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers the world over have
been chasing: knowledge as “objective,” “taking possession of things” with “concepts”
which take possession of discrete ‘“things’ that constitute the process[es]” of the
universe. 457 Since what this kind of knowledge thinks it knows is fundamentally
mistaken, Nietzsche believes we can understand humanity’s attempts as knowing as
attempts to fix the world and make it comprehensible. As Nietzsche notes, “the character
of the world in a state of becoming [is] incapable of formulation… Knowledge [KC:
traditionally understood] and becoming exclude one another. Consequently, ‘knowledge,’
must be something else: there must first of all be a will to make knowable, a kind of
becoming must itself create the deception of beings.” 458 When we realize that what we
understood as absolute, objective knowledge is merely a result of our will imposing itself
on reality, this allows for us to think of new ways of knowing the world. What Nietzsche
hopes for instead is to broaden what it means to know one’s world, so that what one
“knows” will not falsify the essence of the world as becoming. 459 It is from this that
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Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the world as will to power — as composed of drives and
forces — originates.
3.3 Nietzsche’s World: Forces, Drives, and the Will to Power
At this point, we are familiar with Nietzsche’s critiques of metaphysics of substance,
atomism, and mechanistic interpretations of the world. These critiques were made clearer
by the recognition of certain points of influence in two thinkers whose work preceded and
influenced Nietzsche: Lange and Boscovich. Lange’s History of Materialism and
Criticism of its Present Meaning (1866) influenced Nietzsche’s account of the way in
which human attempts to know and describe the world around them thus far have fixed
and therefore falsified reality. Boscovich’s rejection of the corpuscularian account of
“absolutely impenetrable extended particles” was thought by Nietzsche to be proof
positive of the untenability of mechanistic-atomistic interpretations. 460
Up to this point, my characterization of Nietzsche as a critic of metaphysical
systems is uncontroversial: no Nietzsche scholars reject the idea that Nietzsche rejects
certain more conventional approaches to metaphysics. What is more controversial,
however, is the idea that Nietzsche himself presents a positive metaphysical view. 461
Although there is disagreement among Nietzsche scholars as to whether or not Nietzsche
presents such a metaphysics, I argue that his accounts of forces [Kräfte], drives [Trieben,
Instinkte], power-quanta [Kraft-Quanta], will-quanta [Willens-Quanta], centers of force
[Kraftzentrum], and constellations of force [Kraftconstellationen] function throughout his
corpus — but especially in his late work — as descriptions of underlying components
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which comprise reality. In “Nietzsche’s Metaphysical Sketches,” Poellner notes that
Nietzsche’s status as a metaphysician can be decided by whether or not he “asserts a view
about the basic characteristics or properties of reality.” 462 With Poellner and others, I
insist that Nietzsche does offer such a view, and that it is this view which enables his
reader to recognize the inherence of value, purposiveness, and perspectives as truthconditions in the world of earthly existence, albeit in a very unique and particular way. 463
In this section, I will look to Nietzsche’s account of the drives, individual human
beings as driven “subject-unities,” and the will to power as resources for founding truth,
purpose, and value in this-worldly existence. My claim will not be that Nietzsche himself
intends these concepts to function in this way, although we will see that sometimes he
hints at this. Rather, I claim that Nietzsche’s thought offers us resources for re-conceiving
truth, purpose, and value and allows us to think of a world in which the discovery of
specific kinds of truth (as perspectival truth), purpose (as purposiveness immanent in the
driven world), and value (as always-already from the perspective of a drive or driven
being) is possible. In other words, since Nietzsche’s picture of this-worldly existence
presents a purposeful and value-laden world which conditions our participation in truth,
Nietzsche’s account of this-worldly existence offers his readers hitherto untapped
resources for re-thinking the world as meaningful. There are four features of Nietzsche’s
metaphysics which I outline in this section:
1. The doctrine of Becoming: Reality is in flux, dynamic, and ever-changing.
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2. Drives: Reality is composed of what Nietzsche calls drives [Triebe], forces, or
power-quanta.
3. The will to power: Nietzsche’s “will to power” is inseparable from his account of
drives, insofar as will to power only describes the operations or workings of these
drives. Drives are, therefore, wills to power. 464
4. Permeability: There is a fundamental permeability between human beings as
complexes of drives and the driven world in which they are embedded. Driven
beings, as complexes of drives, are porous beings; human beings, as subjectunities, are porous selves. 465
3.3.1 Nietzsche’s doctrine of Becoming
One of the theories for which Nietzsche is most well-known is his doctrine of Becoming.
For Nietzsche, reality is dynamic, in flux, and undergoing constant change. In Ecce
Homo, Nietzsche praises “the affirmation of flux and destruction… the yea-saying to
contradiction and strife, the notion of Becoming, along with the radical rejection of even
the concept, ‘Being”” as “that which is closest to [him] of all that has previously been
thought.” 466 Here, we see Nietzsche emphasizes the affirmation of flux, destruction,
contradiction, and strife of Becoming while rejecting Being. 467 In “On Self-Overcoming”
from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra speaks of “the river of becoming" and
exclaims that he must be “struggle, and becoming, and purpose, and cross-purpose;” in
“On Old and New Tablets,” Zarathustra describes becoming as the “dancing of gods, and
464
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wantoning of gods, and the world unloosed and unbridled and fleeing back to itself.” 468
In a fragment on nihilism, Nietzsche explicitly rejects a unified world of Being when he
remarks that “any comprehensive unity in the plurality of events is lacking.” 469 Indeed,
this account of reality is repeated again and again, both throughout Nietzsche’s notes and
in his published works. 470
Furthermore, in his notes Nietzsche contrasts “absolute reality” and “being-initself” with “a world of becoming” and describes how the same projection of our
phenomenological experience of ourselves as unified agents which gives us a mistaken
notion of substance results in our mistaken imposition of stability and permanence — or
being — onto a world of becoming. 471 This emphasis on impermanence and critique of
Being both harkens back to and supplements Nietzsche’s rejection of substance
metaphysics from above: unified substances do not exist, since the existence of these
requires some degree of permanence and stability which is absent in the world as
Becoming. We see this also in an 1887 fragment, in which Nietzsche notes that our
insistence on Being and stability — as with our insistence on the existence of discrete,
unified substances — is an anthropomorphic projection onto reality, not a fact about
reality: “because we have to be stable in our beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made
the ‘real’ world not of change and becoming, but one of being.” 472
Nietzsche’s doctrine of Becoming is directly influenced by his interpretation of
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Heraclitus and his reading of Boscovich’s dynamic conception of reality. 473 In Philosophy
in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche notes that Becoming for Heraclitus consists in
an “everlasting and exclusive coming-to-be, the impermanence of everything actual,
which constantly acts and comes-to-be but never is” and heralds this account of reality as
a “divine stroke of lightning.” 474 In an 1885 note, Nietzsche describes Becoming as
“Heraclitean Becoming [Heraklitische Werden]” and in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche
notes that he “takes the name of Heraclitus with great respect” since while others
“rejected the testimony of the senses, because they showed the same multiplicity and
change, [Heraclitus] rejected their testimony, because they showed things as if they had
permanence and unity.” 475 In short, becoming as the truth of reality ascertained via the
senses was first ascertained, in Nietzsche's view, by Heraclitus. We see this also later in
this same section, where Nietzsche notes that “Insofar as the senses show becoming,
passing away, and change, they do not lie at all.” 476
The influence of Boscovich on Nietzsche’s conception of becoming is also
critical, since Boscovich offers Nietzsche a more precise way to think becoming as the
flux of force. As Poellner points out, Boscovich offers a “dynamist conception… of the
physical world as constituted by real, attractive and repulsive, forces centered on
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unextended physical points” according which matter “consists intrinsically of forces.” 477
In other words, the world for Boscovich is constituted by ever-changing interactions of
forces which, through their relations, effect changes in other forces. In 1884, Nietzsche
refers to Boscovich’s “dynamic world view” as an alternative to the flawed “mechanisticatomistic world-view,” and in 1888, we see Nietzsche offer his own account of relations
of force (here, “power quanta”) after rejecting a mechanistic conception of cause and
effect: 478
Two successive states, the one “cause” and the other “effect”: this is false… It is a
question of a struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new
arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of
them. The second condition is something fundamentally different from the first
(not its effect): the essential thing is that the factions in struggle emerge with
different quanta of power. 479
In the dynamic struggle among forces, there is no discrete cause which brings about an
effect: there is only the play of forces (or power-quanta) which, in their struggle with one
another, are configured and re-configured in various arrangements.
This idea, influenced by Boscovich’s dynamism, is also found in Nietzsche’s
account of process and the flux of events from The Gay Science:
We have discovered a manifold succession [ein vielfaches Nacheinander] where
the naïve man and investigator of older cultures saw only two things, "cause" and
"effect," as it was said; we have perfected the conception of becoming, but have
not got a knowledge of what is above and behind the conception. The series
[Reihe] of "causes" stands before us much more complete in every case; we
conclude that this and that must first precede in order that that other may follow
but we have not grasped anything thereby… We operate only with things which
do not exist, with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces
how can explanation ever be possible when we first make everything a
conception, our conception! It is sufficient to regard science as the exactest
humanizing of things that is possible; we always learn to describe ourselves more
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accurately by describing things and their successions. Cause and effect: there is
likely no such duality; in fact there is a continuum [ein Continuum] before us,
from which we isolate a few portions; just as we always observe a motion as
isolated points, and therefore do not properly see it, but infer it. The abruptness
with which many effects take place leads us into error; it is however only an
abruptness for us. There is an infinite multitude of processes [eine unendliche
Menge von Vorgängen] in that abrupt moment which escape us. An intellect
which could see cause and effect as a continuum [der Ursache und Wirkung als
continuum], which could see the flux of events [den Fluss des Geschehens] not
according to our mode of perception, as things arbitrarily separated and broken,
would throw aside the conception of cause and effect, and would deny all
conditionality. 480
In this rich selection of text, Nietzsche again rejects a picture of causality which isolates
two discrete moments, events, or substances — cause and effect — the former of which
directly brings about the latter. Instead, Nietzsche speaks here of a “manifold
succession,” a “series of ‘causes,’” a “continuum,” and “infinite multitude of processes”
which comprises “the flux of events.” 481 The flow of Becoming dissolves substance,
bodies, and atoms in its wake, as well as determinate space and time, leaving only an
ever-changing manifold or complex of processes. In a fragment, Nietzsche characterizes
this manifold of becoming: “All events, all motion, all becoming, as a determination of
degree and relations of force, as a struggle [Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles
Werden als ein Feststellen von Grad- und Kraftverhältnissen, als ein Kampf].”482 The
universe is in constant flux, and the struggles and relations of force comprise this
fluxional universe. Thus, the Nietzschean account of Becoming is inseparable from his
account of forces and drives, as well as his account of the characteristic workings of these
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forces and drives, or the various “pattern[s] of effort” manifest by the drives: will to
power. 483
3.3.2 Drives as ontological constituents
As we see above, Nietzsche’s world of becoming is a world of forces, drives, powerquanta, and constellations of force. In short, Nietzsche’s fluxional world is fundamentally
composed of drives. With the help of textual selections from Nietzsche’s published and
unpublished work, Richardson’s seminal interpretation from Nietzsche’s System, and
Katsafanas’s detailed explication of the nature of drives, we will come to understand
what characterizes Nietzschean drives.
For Nietzsche, the terms “forces,” “drives,” “centers of force,” and “powerquanta” all designate the same thing: the basic “units” of reality, constantly in motion,
always becoming and undergoing change. 484 These basic constituents of reality are what I
will refer to as Nietzschean drives. Although thinking of these drive as basic “units” of
reality is helpful, we must be careful not to think these drives in an atomistic way, as
discrete and separate substances; instead, Nietzsche’s account of the drives encourages
his reader to understand the interactions of drives as a matter of “not of succession — but
of interpenetration/interlocking, a process [nicht um ein Nacheinander, — sondern um ein
483
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Ineinander, einen Prozeß] in which the individual successive moments are not related to
one another as cause and effect.” 485 The world of becoming is a manifold of process, a
continuum of force brought about by the interaction of drives which penetrate one
another, incorporate one another, assimilate others, and cannot be separated into discrete
beings.
As Graham Parkes demonstrates, Nietzsche’s treatment of drives begins as early
as his student writings, when he remarks in an Emerson-inspired essay “On Moods,”
“How often the will sleeps and only the drives and inclinations are awake!” 486 In this
context, as in many others throughout Nietzsche’s corpus, drives are psychological forces
which constitute or comprise the human being and shape our perspectives, values, and
behaviors. 487 In 1871, Nietzsche introduces the concept of the individual’s drive-life
[Triebleben] as “the play of feelings, sensations, affects, [and] acts of will,” 488 noting
elsewhere that an individual’s “character” appears as a pouring out of our “drive-life,” a
“representation [Vorstellung]… in the midst of which all the expressions of these drivelives come to light.” 489 This concept of the drive-life of human beings recurs also in
Nietzsche’s later notes, first in an 1880 fragment in which Nietzsche notes that “Our
[human] knowing is the most weakened form of our drive-lives: therefore [it is] most
powerless against the strong drives [Triebe].” In another fragment, Nietzsche notes that
“Every person, whom we encounter, excites certain drives [Triebe] within us” and refers
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also to the “uninterrupted movement of our drive-lives through the external world
(Nature).” 490
Nietzsche also characterizes both types of individuals (such as the scholar, artist,
etc.) and particular individuals (such as Wagner) in terms of the drives which manifest in
them and the arrangement of these drives. In Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche
describes the scholar as a “complex network of very different drives and stimuli… and a
result of “a pouring together of a host of small, very human drives and drivelets
[Triebchen].” 491 In Human, All too Human, Nietzsche notes that just as the scholar
“‘consists of a tangled network of very various motives and stimuli,’ the same likewise
applies to the artist, the philosopher, the moral genius.” 492 This idea that particular
arrangements of drives create particular types of individuals is explicitly echoed in
Nietzsche’s account of the philosopher from Beyond Good and Evil: “Who the
philosopher is [depends on] the order of rank in which the innermost drives of his nature
are placed in relation to one another.” 493
Nietzsche also gives examples of particular individuals and the arrangement and
workings of their drives. Most notably, in “Wagner in Bayreuth” Nietzsche remarks that
“each of [Wagner’s] drives strove into the immeasurable, and each of his talents — from
joy in its own existence — wanted to tear itself away from the others to attain its own
satisfaction; the greater the abundance, the greater was the tumult and the greater their
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hostility when they crossed one another.” 494 Here, we see Nietzsche utilize drives as
explanatory mechanisms for Wagner’s many talents; he also attributes to Wagner a
“ruling passion” able to “bring his entire nature together” to the famous composer. 495 As
Parkes points out, Nietzsche also makes a broader point about the drives here: the
importance of a “coordination among competing drives to avoid destructive chaos” in the
individual. 496
Nietzsche does not only discuss drives in the context of types of individuals or
particular individuals; he also claims more broadly that every human being is composed
of drives and can be understood as a complex of drives. In Beyond Good and Evil,
Nietzsche offers an alternative to the human being as unified soul, proposing that we
think the soul as “subject-multiplicity [Subjekts-Vielheit]” or as “social structure of the
drives and affects [Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte].” 497 In a later aphorism,
Nietzsche characterizes willing as a “something complex, something that is a unity only
as a word” and the soul or the will as containing many “under-wills” or “under-souls,”
noting that “our body is but a social structure composed of many souls.” 498 In these
selections, human beings are described as embodied complexes of drives and affects, as
structured multiplicities of force. Such multiplicities, as social structures, are not unified
through the power of a sovereign or any one drive with supreme power or authority over
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the other drives; rather, they have the structure of a regency [Regentschaft]. 499 This
picture of the human being as an embodied complex of drives best described as a regency
is echoed in a fragment from Nietzsche’s 1885 notes:
The body and physiology the starting point: why? — We gain the correct idea of
the nature of our subject-unity [Subjekt-Einheit], namely as regents at the head of
a communality (not as ‘souls’ or ‘life forces’), also of the dependence of these
regents upon the ruled and of an order of rank and division of labor as the
conditions that make possible the whole and its parts. In the same way, how living
unities continually arise and die and how the ‘subject’ is not eternal… The
relative ignorance in which the regent is kept concerning individual activities and
even disturbances in the communality is among the conditions under which rule
can be exercised… The most important thing, however is: that we understand that
the ruler and his subjects are of the same kind, all feeling, willing, and
thinking… 500
The picture of the individual human being which emerges here is the human being as a
dynamic multiplicity, composed of myriad drives which are dependent on one another for
their continued existence. Nietzsche’s notion of the subject-unity is that of a “regent at
the head of a communality” which rules over the drives of which one is composed. This
regent is not some fixed, constant cogito, functioning as ruler over the drives; it does not
exert sovereign power over the drives which it organizes. Instead, Nietzsche speaks of a
“dependence of these regents upon the ruled,” and crucially emphasizes “the ruler and his
subjects are of the same kind.” If the subject-unity here is thought as an embodied
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complex of drives situated in power relations to each other, then the regent here must be a
drive as well, albeit a dominant or organizing drive which compels the other drives in a
certain direction. In any case, the human being, as composed of drives, is a driven being.
In Human, All too Human, we see a prefiguration of the human being as a
dynamic and embodied complex of drives. Nietzsche speaks of an individual who
experiences “two heterogenous powers holding sway” in him- or herself:
Supposing someone lives as much for love of the visual arts or of music as he is
enraptured by the spirit of science, and he regards it as impossible to resolve this
contradiction by annihilating one of the powers and giving the other completely
free rein: the only alternative is for him to make himself into a large enough hall
of culture that the two powers can dwell in him, even if at different ends of the
building, while beside them reside conciliatory mediating powers that possess
sufficient strength to resolve any conflict that might break out. 501
Here, an individual with two competing drives finds a way to successfully incorporate
two very strong powers into himself. Yet it is significant that this is made possible only
by the mediation of other, weaker drives. As Parkes notes, “the conflict between two
predominant powers is not resolved by a third superior party, but by an assemblage of
lesser forces situated between them.” 502 We see this feature — characteristic of a regency
without a sovereign power — at the end of this aphorism, where Nietzsche draws an
analogy between culture in the individual and culture more broadly: the “mission” of a
“great architecture of culture” is to “compel opposing powers to harmony, by means of
an overwhelming assembly of other, less irreconcilable powers, without thereby
oppressing and placing them in fetters.” 503 The goal both of cultural creation and selffashioning for Nietzsche is to achieve some level of harmony. This harmony is made
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possible only by the structure of the drives which compose the individual. To harmonize
the drives is to hold these drives temporarily in tension.
This harkens back to Heraclitus’s comparison between a harmonized world of
opposites and the holding-in-tension of a bow or lyre. In a fragment, he insists that the
common men “do not understand how that which differs with itself in is agreement: there
is a harmony in opposing tension, like that of the bow and the lyre.” 504 This is similar to
Nietzsche’s point: just as Nietzsche’s cultured individual is must harmonize her drives by
holding them in tension, so too must the lyre be held in tension to make a sound, or the
bow to function efficiently. This idea is treated by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield in
Presocratic Philosophers:
the tension in the string of a bow or lyre, being exactly balanced by the outward
tension exerted by the arms of the instrument, produces a coherent, unified, stable,
and efficient complex. We may infer that if the balance between opposites were
not maintained… the unity and coherence of the world would cease, just as, if the
tension in the bow-string exceeds the tension in the arms, the whole complex is
destroyed. 505
Although Nietzsche will not claim that the human being, as an embodied complex of
ever-changing drives should be understood as a “unity” or “stability” in the conventional
(substance-oriented) sense, he will claim that the “unity” of the subject-unity or subjectmultiplicity can be found in the structure of the drives and the tension in which these
drives are held from moment to moment. 506 Indeed, Nietzsche even uses this Heraclitean

504

Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the
Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press,
1983), 28.
505
G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History
with a Selection of Texts, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), 192.
506
We should remember here that since the human being, as complex of drives, changes moment
to moment, this tension is likely reconfigured moment to moment — and may even sometimes be
absent, in cases of disunity.

176

language explicitly — without mention of Heraclitus — in the Preface to Beyond Good
and Evil, where Nietzsche discusses the impact that European cultural developments have
had on individuals. Indeed, Nietzsche remarks that Europe’s struggle against Christianity
(as well as Platonism) made possible a “magnificent tension of soul, such as had not
existed anywhere previously” and remarks that “with such a tensely strained bow one can
now aim at the furthest goals.” In sum, if one is a cultured individual — what Nietzsche
calls a “free spirit” — one is able to hold one’s drives in tension, achieving a sort of
harmony. 507
The human being, then, is conceived by Nietzsche as a complex of drives. Yet
Nietzsche also believes that animals, plants, and all forms of life — all organisms — are
complexes of drives. In a note from 1883, Nietzsche notes that:
Animals follow their drives and affects: we are animals. Do we do something
different Perhaps it is only an appearance, when we follow morality? In truth we
follow our instincts [Trieben], and morality is only a sign language of the drives
[Triebe]? What is ‘duty,’ ‘right,’ the ‘good,’ the ‘law,’ — which drives
correspond to these abstract signs [Zeichen]? 508
In this excerpt, Nietzsche straightforwardly asserts that animals are composed of drives
and affects, just as humans are. And just as we appeal to the drives, affects, and instincts
of animals to explain their behaviors, so too can we appeal to the drives, affects, and
instincts of human beings to explain their behaviors, beliefs, and cultural practices. In
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche suggests that humans ought to “recognize the animal,
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the commonplace and "the rule" in themselves.” 509 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche notes
that man “wants to forget with all his power that he is basically impulse [Trieb], instinct
[Instinct], folly [Thorheit]” although he is no more than a “fantastic animal
[phantastischen Thiere].”510 Later in this same work, Nietzsche refers again to this error,
remarking that the human “[feels] himself in a false position in relation to the animals
and nature.” 511 In short, for Nietzsche, animals are constituted by drives, just as human
beings are. Daniel Conway notes that, for Nietzsche, “human psychology is merely “a
more complicated instance of ‘animal psychology’… as animal activity… is always the
encrypted surface expression of the operation of primal drives and impulses.” 512 Conway
here quotes the third essay of the Genealogy, in which Nietzsche emphasizes that all
animals seek to expend strength and “achieve [their] maximal feeling of power.” 513
Human beings and animals, however, are not the only driven beings. Plant life is
also explained in this way in a fragment, where Nietzsche claims that “In order to
understand what life is, what kind of striving and stretching life is, the formula must
apply as well to tree and plant as to animal.” 514 In “What We Can Learn from Plants
About the Creation of Values,” Vanessa Lemm persuasively establishes that plant life
and human life are, indeed, similar forms of life, both with the capacities to measure,
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incorporate, and create values. 515 Lemm’s argument relies on Nietzsche’s view that
anything living necessarily participates in valuation: she cites his view that “to live means
to judge, measure, evaluate” 516 as well as his claim that life is a “normative force” which
can be found even in the “moral character of plants and animals.” 517 As Lemm argues,
this moral character of all life — plants, animals, and human beings — is made possible
by the capacity of life forms to respond creatively “to conditions of life and growth as
they pertain to the entire species and not just the individual.” 518 Thus, value creation
involves the creative response of a life form to the conditions in which it finds itself
embedded and within which it either transforms itself or other forms of life, often through
what Lemm calls the “creative transfiguration of forms of life.” 519 In other words, the
value creation of the plant for Nietzsche will always already take into account the
ecosystem to which it belongs as a determinant of what values it can create, just as value
creation for human beings is always already situated with in a culture or a species. It is
thus “from the consideration of the life of plants” that Nietzsche shows “that the ways of
evaluating of animals and plants continue within the human being.” 520 On the picture I
advance here, these similar capacities of plants, animals, and human beings result from
their similar constitution: all forms of life are embodied complexes of drives, though
some forms are more complex than others. 521
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Indeed, Nietzsche explains all of life — and, not only life, but all of reality — in
terms of drives. Parkes’ Composing the Soul persuasively argues that both artifacts of life
(such as texts, artworks, and beaver dams) as well as socio-cultural principles and
practices (such as different philosophies, moralities, and behaviors) manifest the drives of
those who created them. In “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” Nietzsche notes that
“[philosophers] lack all impersonal interest in problems of knowledge: just as they
themselves are persons through and through, so all their knowledge and insights grow
together again into a person, into a living multiplicity whose individual parts are
interdependent and interpenetrating and communally nourished.” 522 Parkes shows in his
work how these “personality-infused structures of knowledge” constitute dynamic
multiplicities held in tension “just as an organism gets its structural unity from the life
that animates it.” 523 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche explicitly remarks that various
philosophical systems, as well as the various moralities they might present, express “the
rank ordering in which [one’s] innermost drives of his nature are placed relative to each
other.” 524 In short, philosophical systems and reflections disclose the drives of the
philosopher composing them. The same is true of an artist’s artwork, or a text: as
Nietzsche remarks, “the book becomes almost human” and “takes on a life of its own.” 525
Nietzsche describes this in much more detail:
That author has drawn the happiest lot who as an old man can say that all of lifeengendering, strengthening, elevating, enlightening thought and feeling that was
in him lives on in his writings… If one now goes on to consider that, not only a
book, but every action performed by a human being becomes in some way the
cause of other actions, decisions, thoughts, that everything that happens is
522
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inextricably knotted to everything that will happen, one comes to recognize the
existence of an actual immortality, that of motion: what has once moved is
enclosed and eternalized in the total union of all being like an insect in amber. 526
In this excerpt, we see the way in which artifacts of life manifest and preserve the drives
of the individual who creates that artifact. We also see the way in which these artifacts of
life offer opportunities for other individuals, as complexes of drives, to continue to be
moved by the drives of those who no longer exist, yet left artifacts in their place. Even in
what may seem like a moment of solitude, one is surrounded by “form[s] and mode[s] of
life,” by other life forms and the artifacts they leave behind: 527 “The past of every form
and mode of life, of cultures which earlier lay right next to or on top of each other, now
streams… into us ‘modern souls,’ our instincts now run back everywhere, we are
ourselves a kind of chaos.” 528 In short, the human being is a driven “being” embedded in
a driven world, a complex of assimilated and incorporated cultures and forms of life held
in tension, just like Heraclitus’s lyre and bow.
Indeed, in a famous passage from Beyond Good and Evil, we see that all of reality
is composed of drives — and that this is what Nietzsche intends to capture when he
remarks, as he does with some frequency, that life is will to power:
If we assume that nothing is “given” as real other than our world of desires and passions
and that we cannot access from above or below any “reality” other than the direct reality
of our drives — for thinking is only a relationship of these drives to each other —: are we
not allowed to make the attempt and to ask the question whether this given is not a
sufficient basis also for understanding the so-called mechanical (or “material”) world on
the basis of things like this given. I don’t mean to understand it as an illusion, an
“appearance,” an “idea” (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer), but as having the
same degree of reality as our affects themselves have - as a more primitive form of the
world of affects in which everything is still combined in a powerful unity, something
which then branches off and develops in the organic process (also, as is reasonable, gets
softer and weaker—), as a form of drive-life in which the collective organic functions,
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along with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, and metabolism, are still
synthetically bound up with one another — as an early form of life? In the end making
this attempt is not only permitted but is also demanded by the conscience of the
method… Of course, “will” can work only on “will” - and not on “stuff” (not, for
example, on “nerves”—). Briefly put, we must venture the hypothesis whether in general,
wherever we recognize “effects,” will is not working on will — and whether every
mechanical event, to the extent that a force is active in it, is not force of will, an effect of
the will.— Suppose finally that we were to succeed in explaining our entire drive-life as a
development and branching off of a single fundamental form [Grundform] of the will —
that is, of the will to power, as my principle asserts — and suppose we could trace back
all organic functions to this will to power and also locate in it the solution to the problem
of reproduction and nourishment — that is one problem — then in so doing we would
have earned the right to designate all efficient force unambiguously as will to power.
Seen from inside, the world defined and described according to its “intelligible character”
would be simply “will to power” and nothing else. 529

Nietzsche rejects a purely mechanical world of matter in favor of a world in which
change, growth, and decay are understood as results of the interactions of drives. 530 This
is what Nietzsche means when he claims that “‘will’ can work only on ‘will’ — and not
on ‘stuff.’” Alongside his above account of non-living artifacts as manifestations of
drives, this excerpt extends the notion that drives for Nietzsche are at work even in the
realm of the non-living, even in what appear to be mechanical interactions.
3.3.3 Features of drives
Drives for Nietzsche, then, are the basic units of reality; even the inorganic world is
composed of drives. To understand Nietzsche’s metaphysics, then, requires one to
understand the various features and workings of Nietzschean drives. As we saw at the
beginning of the previous section, and as Richardson persuasively argues, Nietzsche
believes that drives are essentially processes or becomings; that is to say, they are “how a
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future is being approached from a past.” 531 Thus, insofar as reality is “[stretched] out as
processes,” 532 drives have a temporal structure: they are thrust from out of a past and
towards a future. The basis for this temporal structure of drives is their end-directedness,
or their nature as purpose-driven. This purposiveness “lays out the temporal structure of
[drives as] processes: these [processes] aren’t just valueless fluctuations, but becomings”
which are directed at certain aims. 533
Nietzschean drives are essentially purposive or purposeful forces: as Richardson
makes clear, “each drive is identified in terms of a certain outcome it is ‘to,’ so that
Nietzsche speaks of drives ‘to’ knowledge, life, etc.” 534 As early as 1870, Nietzsche
introduces a “drive to learn [Trieb zu lernen],” in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche
mentions a “drive to musical discharge [Trieb zu musikalischer Entladung].” There is a
“drive to ever new metaphors” which is discharged [er entladet sich] in the poet. 535 In
Human, All too Human, Nietzsche notes that “A drive to something or for something [Ein
Trieb zu Etwas oder von Etwas], without a feeling that one wants to be promoted…. a
drive without a kind of appreciable estimate of the value of the goal [den Werth des
Zieles], does not exist in human beings.” 536 Here Nietzsche presents the end-directedness
of drives in as pared down a description as we see anywhere: a drive is a drive “to
something” or “for something” which possesses and values its goal. In a fragment from
1880, Nietzsche refers to a drive “to envy, to hate, [or] to fear [zu neiden, zu hassen, zu
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fürchte].” 537 In Dawn, Nietzsche mentions drives “to annoyance or to combativeness or
to reflection or to benevolence [des Ärgers oder der Kampflust oder des Nachdenkens
oder des Wohlwollens].” 538 In all of these excerpts, Nietzsche explicitly describes the
end-directedness of drives.
The outcome towards which a particular drive aims is its “distinctive activity” and
this outcome or “result” can be conceived as a drive’s “individuating goal, which
explains [a drive’s] presence and character.” 539 On Nietzsche’s account, then, drives are
end-directed forces which can be individuated or distinguished from one another on the
basis of the different ends towards which they are directed. With this concept of force,
“one takes doing something, the ‘goal,’ the ‘aim,’ the ‘end’ back into the doing, after
having artificially removed this from it and thus emptied the doing.” 540 Thus, as
Richardson is sure to point out, the goal, aim, or end of a drive is not merely an outcome
that the drive has a tendency to produce or reach; instead, the end towards which a drive
is directed explains “what the drive concretely does:”
Drives are more than just plastic dispositions, because their outcomes are more
than just tended results. When Nietzsche names a drive by citing the outcome it is
‘to,’ he means that outcome to explain what the drive concretely does. It’s
because of what eating is that the drive to eat performs the specific behaviors it
does (e.g., hunting and killing). By contrast a mere disposition’s outcomes don’t
explain it: a stream has a disposition to erode its bed, but this eroding doesn’t
explain why the stream does it… It’s not because they all result in eating that we
collect those behaviors together under a “drive to eat,” but because eating is why
those behaviors occur. 541
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In this excerpt, Richardson makes clear that, for Nietzsche, the end or aim of a drive is
not just an outcome a drive tends to produce; rather, the end of a drive explains the
actions or behaviors that follow from a particular drive. In one example, Richardson
notes that insofar as the love of mankind is a sublimation of the sex drive for Nietzsche,
this love of mankind can only be explained with reference to the sex drive. 542
Even as drives interact with, struggle with, assimilate, and incorporate other
drives — and although they are always becoming, or undergoing constant change —
every drive still retains its essential telic thrust towards its distinctive end. This is the
nature of incorporation [Einverleibung] for Nietzsche. We see this in Nietzsche’s late
notebooks, in which Nietzsche remarks that “in commanding there is a concession that
the opponent’s absolute power has not been vanquished, not incorporated, dissolved.
‘Obeying’ and ‘commanding’ are forms of martial art.” 543 We see here that when one
drive incorporates another, something of the other’s telic power remains: in other words,
if drive D incorporates drive R into its striving, then there will be something of drive R’s
end retained. We see this also in Nietzsche’s note describing how “all thinking, judging,
perception as comparison has as a prerequisite an ‘equalizing,’ even earlier a ‘making the
same.’ This making the same [emphasis mine] is the same as the incorporation of
acquired material in the amoeba… [and] difference is preserved.” 544 In another late note,
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Nietzsche remarks on how that which is incorporated augments that which incorporates
it. Such an augmentation is not a merely quantitative augmentation of the incorporating
drive’s will to power. Instead, it is a qualitative augmentation, a broadening of the means
by which the incorporating drive can achieve its aims. This is best described by
Richardson, when he remarks that since:
Nietzschean power lies chiefly… in enriching the effort at those ends [of an
incorporating complex of drives], and so also [enriching] those ends themselves.
Incorporation must work in a different way than marshaling ‘efficient servants’
[or] functionaries to its ends… To help to the more important sort of power or
growth, the forces subjected must keep their own characters and not be utterly
made over into mere facilitating tools: they must add their own telic patterns and
viewpoints to its fabric. 545
As Richardson makes clear here, the incorporation of one drive D by another R is not the
negation of R’s end; it is the taking of R’s end into itself such that D learns a new way to
attain its original end — a way that necessarily preserves some aspect of R’s original
end-directedness. Later in Nietzsche’s System, Richardson puts this straightforwardly:
“The goal [of incorporation] is not to suppress the foreignness of the other will but to use
its difference to enrich one’s own… To master is not to negate the different but to
incorporate it as other into oneself.” 546
As an example, imagine a drive to combativeness which expresses itself in
explicitly aggressive and unkind remarks and actions. If this drive to combativeness were
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to incorporate a drive to underhandedness, the subsumption of the latter drive’s end under
the former’s end will result in a different expression (here, in the drive to combativeness)
which has adapted the end of the incorporated drive (here, the drive to underhandedness).
We can imagine what the new expression of this drive might look like if we imagine
remarks made or actions performed by a passive-aggressive individual: remarks or
actions which remain unkind and combative, yet are covertly or underhandedly so. 547
Imagine a case in which a particular individual is angry at their next-door neighbor
because they haven’t cut their grass in ages. Whereas an individual dominated by the
drive to combativeness before the incorporation of the drive to underhandedness might
hurl an aggressive insult at their neighbor, the individual dominated by a drive to
combativeness which has incorporated a drive to underhandedness might instead blast
music loudly early in the morning to wake their neighbors and enrage them. 548
Another feature of Nietzschean drives is what Richardson calls their plasticity.
While the telic structure of drives dictates the movement and directedness of the drives,
they are constantly changing the ways in which they approach their goals as other
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processes of reality change around them. 549 Richardson describes it thusly: “if one route
[for a drive] is blocked, it shifts to another. The [plastic] disposition [of a drive]
bifurcates (trifurcates, and so on) but then reconverges: it is a tendency to respond
differently in different contexts, in such a way that the same result ensues.” 550 In other
words, if the expression of a drive is prevented in some way, the drive will find a new
means to reach its end. As Alfano points out (with the help of Janaway and Richardson),
this will sometimes require the shift of the intentional object of the drive. 551 When the
drive to aggression, as a drive “to inflict suffering” is prevented from expression (as it is
during the original socialization of man), it finds a new object and a new means of
expressing itself: as Janaway notes, “when the instinctive drives of a socialized human
individual are prevented from discharging themselves outwardly, they discharge
themselves inwardly, on the individual him- or herself.” 552 Drives, then, are purposive
forces which comprise the continuum of becoming and serve as the basic elements or
constituents of reality. 553 In Nietzsche’s work, these drives have other important qualities
which are essential to the functional role they have in Nietzsche’s metaphysics: they
produce behaviors and interpret the world through the lens of their particular
perspectives, which are also crucially evaluative perspectives.
The first, and most obvious, feature of Nietzsche’s drives is that certain drives
produce certain behaviors. In Dawn, Nietzsche makes this point explicitly:
549
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Suppose we were in the market place one day and we noticed someone laughing
at us as we went by: this event will signify this or that to us according to whether
this or that drive happens at that moment to be at its height in us - and it will be a
quite different event according to the kind of person we are. One person will
absorb it like a drop of rain, another will shake it from him like an insect, another
will try to pick a quarrel, another will examine his clothing to see if there is
anything about it that might give rise to laughter, another will be led to reflect on
the nature of laughter as such, another will be glad to have involuntarily
augmented the amount of cheerfulness and sunshine in the world - and in each
case a drive has gratified itself, whether it be the drive to annoyance or to
combativeness or to reflection or to benevolence.
Here, we see that the different behaviors manifest by different individuals — whether
they bristle, reflect, or laugh — are produced by a variety of different drives and their
expressions as comprising the “kind of person” one is.
In this excerpt, drives are described as explanatory factors for differences in
behavior. But it is also important to note both that events are interpreted in quite different
ways depending on which drives are doing the interpreting and that an action will have a
“very different significance depending on which drive is ‘behind’ it.” 554 We see this
again in a selection from Nietzsche’s notes: “It is our needs that interpret the world; our
drives and their for and against. Every drive is a kind of attempt to dominate; each has its
own perspective.” 555 This characterization, which sees the drives as constituting
interpretative perspectives, is repeated in other notes. In a fragment from 1885, Nietzsche
claims that “from each of our basic drives there is a different perspectival assessment
[perspektivische Abschätzung] of all events and experiences.” 556 Each drive has a
perspective on the world which shapes how events are interpreted, what shows up as
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valuable, and more. In a later note, Nietzsche echoes this fragment: there is a “necessary
perspectivism, by virtue of which every center of force — and not only those of man —
constructs the rest of the world and measures, feels, shapes it.” 557 For Nietzsche, every
drive has a perspective which affects the way the world shows up. Indeed, Nietzsche
describes these perspectives as wearing “party colors,” “taking sides.” 558 As Clark notes,
this makes the perspectives "partial or one-sided.” Clark goes on to sum up the selectivity
(or partiality) of perspectives in her claim that “different affects makes different aspects
of reality salient and focus our attention on them, so that other features disappear from
view.” 559
This important idea —that different drives show the world differently and shape
the perceptions and experiences of certain driven beings — is more recently treated in
Katsafanas’s work. Katsafanas speaks of an “evaluative orientation” of the drives
conditioned by an “affective orientation” induced by the drives. 560 Katsafanas’s account
of the way in which drives lead to selective perspectives on and experiences of the world
is connected to his claim that Nietzschean drives inspire certain “affective orientation[s],”
with affective orientations treated as the emotional reactions or expressions of human
agents. (In “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,” Katsafanas mentions love, hatred,
and jealousy as affective orientations.) Nietzschean drives explain the selectivity of the
experience of driven beings because, as Katsafanas convincingly demonstrates, “having
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an end or harboring an affect” makes “certain features [of the world] salient.” 561 An
example will help us to see what is meant here. Imagine I inhabit a cruel perspective on
the world I am encountering (that is, a perspective shaped by a drive to cruelty and
accompanied by various cruel affects). If I were to see a starving man on the street whilst
inhabiting such a perspective, I might be inclined to view him as weak and deserving of
his plight. If, on the other hand, I inhabit a compassionate perspective on the world (that
is, a perspective shaped by a drive to compassion and accompanied by various
compassionate affects) then when I see this same man on the street, I might instead be
prone to see him as undeserving of his position and making a claim on my assistance and
care. From these two different perspectives, the world appears in completely different
ways. These examples show how my perspective — as shaped by my interests and affects
— shows the world to me in a particular way and excludes other ways of seeing.
According to Katsafanas, our drives “generate” selective perspectives because
these drives structure “the agent’s perceptions, affects, and reflective thought.” 562 This
happens even though the drives and their operation remain unconscious or unknown to
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the being under their influence. 563 Katsafanas offers a compelling example of jealousy in
The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious which
emphasizes the way in which the interpretation activity of the drives, while remaining
largely unconscious, still shapes conscious experience and reflective thought:
...agents often fail to grasp the ways in which they are being moved by their
attitudes. An agent who is moved by jealousy is rarely an agent who consents to
be moved by his jealousy; indeed, an agent moved by jealousy need not even
recognize a fully-formed attitude of jealousy… the agent experiences herself as
having a reflective distance from the attitude, as scrutinizing the attitude and
asking herself whether there is a reason to act on it; but, all the while, the attitude
influences the agent’s reflective thought in ways she does not grasp. The jealous
agent sees the phone call as furtive, the lateness as suspicious, the handkerchief as
damning: and these perceptions, were they accurate, would indeed justify the
jealousy… This type of influence is easiest to detect when we consider an action
retrospectively… Looking back on my jealous spat… the problem was not that I
deliberately yielded to jealousy: the problem was that, in the grip of jealousy, I
took harmless factors to vindicate my jealous behavior. The problem was that I
saw my rage as warranted by the fact that she arrived a few minutes late. I now
see that the rage was entirely unwarranted, that I was driven to rage in a way that I
did not comprehend. 564
A driven being’s experience is constituted by the interpreting activity of her drives and
the affective orientations they induce. This is why, for Nietzsche, experience is always
perspectival: one’s perspective is a result of the interpreting activity of the drives and the
affective experiences they generate (as they foreground certain aspects of reality while
other features of reality recede into the background of the experience). 565 In the above
example from Katsafanas, my jealous affect is induced in some way by a particular drive
or set of drives, and these drives and affects offer me a particular interpretation of the
563
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world. A partner’s lateness which would have gone unnoticed if I were in another
affective state is foregrounded and interpreted as grounds for suspicion when I am in a
jealous mindset. Indeed, the world and phenomena in the world are differently revealed
depending on the different perspectives one occupies.
In order to better understand the interactions of affects and drives, we must look
not only at the way that drives structure one’s affects, but the ways that affects, too, bring
about changes in the drives. This is consistent with drives’ inducing affective
orientations, but is something which Katsafanas does not treat. As we saw in the section
on affective nihilism from the second chapter, the affects which one experiences also
shape the strength and directionality of the drives alongside which they occur. We saw
this in the second chapter’s section on affective nihilism, in Nietzsche’s example of the
criminal from Twilight of the Idols, whose “most lively drives [Triebe], which he has
brought with him, soon grow together with depressive affects [Affekte], with suspicion,
fear, and dishonor… [thus,] his feelings turn against his instincts.”566 As we saw,
Nietzsche remarks that this turning of the feelings against the instincts of the criminal is
“virtually the recipe for physiological degeneration,” for the weakening of one's
drives. 567 Furthermore, these individual affects arise in relation to the perceived affects
and evaluations of others — in this example, the “[deprivation] of public approval” or the
“[knowledge] that they are not perceived as beneficial, as useful.” 568 By looking carefully
at this example, we can add more detail to Katsafanas’s preceding analysis (and, it’s
worth noting, there is certainly room in his account for the picture I now present).
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Indeed, although drives induce affective orientations, there is a “feedback loop” of sorts:
drives induce certain affective orientations, but those affective orientations also exert
influence on the drives, either 1) enhancing or weakening a drive’s activity or 2)
changing the directionality of the drives, depending on whether they are positive or
negative affects, or whether they lead one to “feel” either positively or negatively. 569
Furthermore, the influence which affects exert over the drives can even involve an
affective appraisal made on the behalf of another individual, based in drives which do not
belong to the individual being appraised. 570
As we see in the example of the criminal above — and as Katsafanas argues —
these “affective orientations” which drives inspire are also “evaluative orientations.” 571
The tendency of drives to inspire certain affects and emotions thus enables Nietzsche to
explain and elaborate upon the wealth of evaluative perspectives manifest by driven life,
as manifest even in instances and circumstances which we would not conventionally
associate with valuing or valuation. In his notes, for example, Nietzsche claims that “all
sense perceptions are wholly permeated with value-judgments.” 572 Although one would
not typically associate perception with an evaluative perspective, Nietzsche argues that
even perceptual experiences are evaluative experiences. This is supported by an remark
of Richardson’s, in which he suggests that valuation is a function of affective orientation:
valuation “lies in how things ‘matter’ to the will and so depends on that deep
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receptiveness of will that Nietzsche calls ‘affect’ [Affekt] or ‘feeling’ [Gefühl].” 573
Katsafanas expands this analysis, emphasizing that due to drives’ propensity to induce
affects, “the world does not present itself as an indifferent array of inert facts. The world
tempts and repulses, threatens and charms… Our experience of the world is
fundamentally value-laden.” 574 Another way to put this is the following: since drives
induce positive and negative affects which shape a driven being’s perspective on the
world and these affects arise in response to features of the world which driven beings
experience as having a certain value (including, as I point out in the preceding paragraph,
the affective responses of others), drives lead the driven being to “experience situations in
evaluative terms.” 575
While this is an influential and critically important account for understanding the
more complex evaluative and affective orientations of life forms, Nietzsche’s desire to
expand the realm of drives beyond life forms as those capable of affective orientations as
emotional affectations suggests that he likely conceived of affective orientation more
broadly than Katsafanas does in his work. Although Nietzsche most frequently refers to
human emotions and feelings when he refers to affects, in order to understand the
affective orientations of non-human drives, we must conceive of affect in Nietzsche more
broadly. 576 Here, I suggest reading the transformative potential of Spinoza’s notion of
“affect” in a non-mechanistic way in order to more broadly characterize the affective
orientations that driven beings possess for Nietzsche. In his Ethics, Spinoza defines
affects as “affections [emphasis mine] of the body by which the body’s power of acting is
573
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increased or diminished, aided or restrained.” 577 Most broadly, since the manifestation of
a particular affect or emotion for Spinoza determines a set of possibilities for interacting
with one’s world, a change in affect change the way in which one is situated in one’s
world. On Spinoza’s account, this is due to the role affects or emotions play in changing
one’s potential to affect or be affected. An indication that Nietzsche himself might be
influenced by these thoughts of Spinoza on affect shows up in a letter he wrote to a
friend, in which he enthusiastically describes Spinoza as his “precursor” and remarks that
he shares an “overtendency” with Spinoza: namely, “namely to make all knowledge the
most powerful affect [Affekt].” 578 Yet since affects as feelings or emotions for Spinoza
are types of affections, Spinoza offers an undeniably mechanistic account of the sort
Nietzsche consistently critiques.
Still, I suggest that an understanding of affect which makes sense of Nietzsche’s
extension of his drive ontology to non-human life can preserve Spinoza’s broader point
about the transformative potential of affects while rejecting his mechanistic framework:
an individual’s affects, or a being’s affective orientation, puts this individual or being in a
determinate sort of relation to the world, such that certain interactions are open for it and
others are closed off. Affects, then, shape a being's relational possibilities, thus shaping
577
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the potential that the world has to transform that being and the potential that being has to
transform the world. For a being to have an affective orientation in Nietzsche, then,
means that this being is situated in the world in some determinate way, such that it can be
influenced and transformed by certain things and not others, in certain ways and not
others (what Spinoza’s causal account would call a capacity for being affected).
Furthermore, the affective orientation of the being in question enables it to influence or
transform its world in certain determinate ways and not others (what Spinoza would think
of as a capacity for affecting). 579 Understanding affects or affective orientations as the
potential or capacity to transform and be transformed — as that which situates one in
one’s world in a particular way and influences the interactions between oneself and one’s
world — allows us to extend affective orientations to animal life, plant life, and even to
drives constituting the inorganic world (such as those Nietzsche suggests are present in
chemical interactions and the cosmic order). 580
This account of the affects enables us to see how affective orientations — as
determinate potentials both to transform and to be transformed by the world of which one
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is a part — can be extended to non-human life and the inorganic by Nietzsche. It is
important to remember, however, that a drive’s affective potential is inseparable from the
end at which the drive manifesting such an affect is directed (or: a being’s affective
potential is inseparable from the ends towards which that being, as a complex of drives,
are directed). Drives are dispositions to affective orientations because the characteristic
activity of a particular drive, fixed by its individuating aim or goal, orients this drive in
the world such that it will transform and be transformed in some ways and not others.
The most basic sense in which affective potential in Nietzsche can be read, then, is as a
potential which conditions the excitation or inhibition of drives. This fits nicely with
Nietzsche’s characterization of affects as inclinations and disinclinations.
There is a danger here — especially evident in Spinoza’s language of “affecting”
and “being affected” — that we will fall back into the kind of atomistic metaphysics that
Nietzsche rejects, involving discrete substances in causal relations. It is therefore crucial
to keep in mind that this relationship among affects and drives must be understood as an
“interpenetration/interlocking, a process.” 581 An affect, for Nietzsche, most basically
situates an individual or object in this “interpenetration of process” in a certain
determinate and determining way, such that something about oneself — one’s affective
orientation — shapes the way that one exerts and feels force. When I say that an affect
for Nietzsche is most basically a drive’s determinate potential for influencing or being
influenced by interactions with other drives, this non-mechanistic sense must be kept in
mind.
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In sum, even the drives of non-human life and the inorganic world can be said to
have affective orientations which are connected to the evaluative perspective of those
drives. After all, as Richardson points out, the evaluative perspectives of drives can be
explained as an emergence of values from out of the end-directedness of drives which
“polarizes” the world:
Each drive’s end-directed activity already ‘polarizes’ the world toward it, giving
everything a significance relative to it. So, for example, the sex drive views the
world as inspiring or requiring a sexual response, the world appears with erotic
potential as its meaning or sense. 582
This “polarization” of the world is possible only insofar as a drive has an affective
orientation, or a determinate potential to transform and be transformed. As Richardson
insists, the fact that every drive can only approach the world around it through its own
goal-directed activity means that the world is never “experienced” as a neutral world for a
drive; it is experienced, rather, as a world that aids or hinders a drive’s end (or, perhaps,
does neither). This is what Nietzsche means in Human, All too Human when he connects
a drive’s “feeling that one wants to be promoted” with its “estimate of the value of the
goal.” 583
This account of affect in Nietzsche allows us to understand the affective
orientation of a drive in broader terms than Katsafanas, allowing for all driven beings to
manifest affects — and thus evaluative orientations. Although the complex, emotionladen activity of human valuation described by Katsafanas cannot be something in which
all complexes of drives and individual drives participate, even these drives and
complexes of drives have affective orientations. It is also worth noting that the kinds of
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affective orientations (love, hatred, and jealousy) mentioned by Katsafanas fit neatly into
my broader definition of affect.
On this picture, not only is the experience of the world from the perspectives of
driven beings value-laden, as Katsafanas suggests: indeed, the whole world is valueladen, insofar as the world is nothing but the play of forces and drives which have their
own affective and thus evaluative orientations. As we saw in Human, All too Human,
Nietzsche insists that “A drive to something or for something [Ein Trieb zu Etwas oder
von Etwas], without a feeling that one wants to be promoted…. a drive without a kind of
appreciable estimate of the value of the goal [den Werth des Zieles], does not exist in
human beings.” 584 Again, we see here that a drive for Nietzsche both possesses and
values its goal. After all, in later notes, Nietzsche remarks that “every center of force has
its perspective, i.e., its very definite value, its mode of action, its mode of resistance.” 585
This essentially evaluative component to the activity of the drives or “center[s] of force”
helps us to understand to what Nietzsche refers when he describes a “necessary
perspectivism, by virtue of which every center of force — and not only those of man —
constructs the rest of the world and measures, feels, shapes it ... They have forgotten to
include this perspective-fixing power into ‘true being.’” 586 In this selection, we see that
drives establish perspectives which give the world to a drive or a driven being in a way
that always already includes some valuation. All drives, or centers of force, “measure” in
some way; even drives which do not induce complex emotional responses on behalf of
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the driven beings to which they belong, such as those comprising inorganic life, will have
evaluative perspectives, due to their affective orientations.
Let us first imagine a simple form of plant life and the kind of evaluative
perspectives they can be said to possess. Imagine, for example, a sunflower as possessing
a drive to photosynthesis. Because of this drive, the sunflower has a particular affective
orientation, in the broad sense I introduce above: it is capable of being transformed in
certain ways (in this case, by the presence or absence of light) and of transforming its
world in certain ways (in this case, either using sunlight to “split” water — separating
hydrogen from carbon dioxide, and turning carbon dioxide into sugars for energy — or
failing to split water in the absence of sunlight). In this case, sunlight allows for the
sunflower to flourish insofar as it enables the sunflower to split water and utilize carbon
dioxide for energy (in virtue of the sunflower’s drive to photosynthesize); for this reason,
the plant can be said to have a positive evaluative orientation towards sunlight in virtue of
the affective orientation afforded to it by the drive to photosynthesis.
To imagine the kinds of evaluative perspectives which drives of inorganic objects
might possess, we can take photosynthesis as an example of a chemical interaction in
which a particular drive might be manifest: the drive to split water. 587 The drive to split
water present in the chemical interaction of photosynthesis affords a plant cell which
undergoes this process the potential to split the water molecule into hydrogen and carbon
dioxide. This end-directedness is a determinate way in which such a drive may transform
other drives constituting the world in which it is embedded. On the other hand, there are
587

It is especially apropos to investigate a chemical interaction here, as Nietzsche identifies
chemical reactions as consisting in interactions of drives. See his claim that “The chemical world
is ruled by the keenest perception of differences in force” (KSA 11: 35 [58]). See also KSA 13:
14 [81].

201

determinate ways in which the world interacts with the drive to split water: such a drive
to split water increases in activity only with the proper amount of sunlight and at the
proper temperature. If there is not enough light, or if the temperature is sub-optimal, then
the process of photosynthesis: the drive to split water is foiled in its attempt. Thus, the
affective orientation of the drive to split water — its determinate potential for
transforming and being transformed by its interactions with other drives — results in an
evaluative orientation which positively values warm temperatures and full sunlight and
negatively values extremely cold or hot temperatures and a lack of sunlight.
In sum, Nietzschean drives are disposed towards certain outcomes; these drives
dispose driven beings to particular behaviors and thoughts. The perspectives from out of
which these behaviors and thoughts are generated are fundamentally evaluative, insofar
as they involve affective orientations of the kind I argue for above. As Richardson
reminds us, a drive can not be separated from the behaviors, interpretations, experiences,
or thoughts it induces. Indeed, a drive’s outcomes are not simply “tended results.” 588
Instead, a drive’s outcome can only be understood and explained in terms of the
particular drive which incites that outcome, that drive’s characteristic aim, and its
affective orientation (and thus what it values). A drive’s characteristic aim, its affective
orientation, what the drive values, and its outcomes in thought and action are essentially
connected.
3.3.4 Drives as wills to power
Given Nietzsche’s assertion in Beyond Good and Evil that will to power is a fundamental
shape or form of the development of drive-life, understanding Nietzsche’s metaphysics
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requires us to understand not only his account of the drives, but also his account of the
will to power [Wille zur Macht]. 589 References to this concept in Nietzsche’s works are
numerous. His treatment of the will to power begins in a note from 1876 and continues
through the end of his working life. 590 In his earliest treatments, he introduces the will to
power as an alternative to Schopenhauer's account of the will to life, remarking that “at
center, I always only find the will to power.” 591 In “On Self-Overcoming” from Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche calls the will to power “the unexhausted procreative will of
life” and suggests that which is usually characterized as “a will to procreate or a drive to
an end, to something higher, farther, more manifold” can be understood instead in terms
of the will to power. 592 In these remarks from Nietzsche’s early and middle periods, only
living things are characterized by the will to power: he specifically locates the will to
power “in the functions of the organic.” 593
In his later work, Nietzsche continues describing the activities of living things in
terms of the will to power while also extending the domain of the will to power past
organic life to inorganic life. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche mentions the will to
power in nearly a dozen separate aphorisms. In this work, he claims note only that “life
itself is will to power” 594 but also remarks that if we can explain all life in terms of will to
power (which he believes we can), then we “would thus have acquired the right to define
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all active force (emphasis mine) unequivocally as will to power.” 595 In this case, “the
world seen from within, the world defined and designated according to its ‘intelligible
character’… would simply be ‘will to power,’ and nothing else.” 596 In On the Genealogy
of Morality, written in 1887, Nietzsche calls the will to power the “essence of life” while
also describing the activity of the will to power present in the “development of a thing” or
a “tradition” [„Entwicklung“ eines Dings, eines Brauchs]. 597 Nietzsche’s later works
(including the Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist) and several sections of the
posthumously published Will to Power are dedicated to characterizing the nature of
reality itself — and not only living beings — as will to power. 598 In his notes, Nietzsche
calls the will to power “a new interpretation of all happenings (emphasis mine)” and
characterizes it as a metaphysical account: it is “the real and the only reality of things.” 599
Indeed, an 1885 remark published in The Will to Power announces that “This world is the
will to power — and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power —
and nothing besides!” 600
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As we already saw in an excerpt from Beyond Good and Evil above, Nietzsche
also explicitly connects drives and the will to power. 601 In an 1885 fragment, Nietzsche
locates the “will to power in every force-combination [Kraft-Combination].” 602 In
another remark, the world as will to power is described as:
force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces [als Kraft überall, als
Spiel von Kräften und Kraftwellen], at the same time one and many, increasing
here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing
together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back… with an ebb and a flood of
its forms… 603
The picture of reality as will to power here is the ever-changing interactions and
manifestations of drives (the “play of forces and waves of forces”). The drives which
comprise the world are “many” insofar as there are innumerable drives with innumerable
aims; they are “at the same time one” insofar as the workings of all of the drives can be
described in terms of the will to power. In another fragment, Nietzsche identifies the will
to power as an instinct to assimilate or incorporate which results in growth. 604 This
description of will to power is identical to Nietzsche’s description of the activities and
workings of the drives. We see this connection between the drives and the will to power
also in a very late note, in which Nietzsche suggests that the will to power as “the desire
to become stronger” is “the only reality from every center or force.” 605 Elsewhere,
Nietzsche describes the will to power as the “primitive affective form [die primitive
Affekt-Form]” and remarks that all configurations of affects result from the will to
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power. 606 In this same excerpt, he remarks that “all driving force [alle treibende Kraft] is
will to the power” and that “there is no physical, dynamic, or psychic power besides [es
keine physische, dynamische oder psychische Kraft außerdem giebt].” 607 In this excerpt,
Nietzsche notes the will to power does not describe only the “phenomenon of life” but
also non-living phenomena, such as chemical interactions and the cosmos. Thus, just as
Nietzsche insists that inorganic phenomena are comprised of drives, he insists that the
workings of the drives comprising these inorganic phenomena can be captured by his
understanding of the will to power.
For Nietzsche, as we have already begun to see, the will to power describes the
characteristic activity of the drives. As Richardson points out, Nietzsche means
something quite specific by this: drives “are ‘wills to power’ in that they essentially
pursue the continual enhancement of their distinctive activities.” 608 As we saw above,
Nietzschean drives are characterized by the particular aims and ends at which they are
directed. Drives are always drives “to something” or “for something,” and that drive’s
“to” or “for” is what Richardson calls its distinctive activity. 609 Since a drive is
characterized and individuated from other drives by the particular end towards which it is
directed, an increase in “power” for a particular drive must take this particular end into
account. Thus drives, as will to power, aim to enhance the achievement of their
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characteristic ends in some way: “as will to power, a drive aims at ongoing growth in its
distinctive activity.” 610
Nietzsche’s will to power, then, does not refer to a unified will underlying all of
the drives and aiming at power; rather, there are innumerable drives, all of which are
wills to power insofar as they retain an instinct for growth. 611 This instinct for growth
results in what Nietzsche characterizes as the “mutual struggle of that which becomes
with each other [der Kampf der Werdenden mit einander].” 612 In other words, drives are
in a continuous struggle with other drives because each wants to enhance its own
characteristic activity, even at the expense of other drives.
Nietzsche’s metaphysics of drives is inseparable from his account of the will to
power, then, because drives are simply wills to power: they are “power-wills” which
Nietzsche also designates “power quanta.” 613 Furthermore, for Nietzsche “there remain
no things but [these] dynamic quanta in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta”
and the “essence” of these power quanta “is in its relation to all other quanta, in its
‘action’” on other dynamic quanta. 614 Reality is fundamentally comprised of drives and
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their relations to one another, and drives themselves are shaped by the other drives with
which they interact. This claim — that reality is fundamentally comprised by drives and
their relations to one another — is inseparable from Nietzsche's claim that the world is
will to power, and both are ontological claims.
Without the end-directed striving of the drives, there would be no world as will to
power. In his characterization of the will to power as “the drives striving for expression,”
Ken Gemes persuasively continues Richardson’s argument that “the drives are for
Nietzsche the physical embodiment of the will to power” and that “in emphasizing the
(explanatory and causal) primacy of the will to power, Nietzsche is expressing the
(explanatory and causal) primary of the drives.” 615 This is made all the more convincing
by looking at the similar (and often identical) ways in which Nietzsche talks about the
drives and the will to power: as perspectival, as interpretative, as evaluative.
In his notes, Nietzsche remarks that “the will to power interprets,” just as drives
do. 616 He also notes “from all of our basic drives [Grundtriebe] come different
perspectival evaluations of all happenings and experience… Man as a complexity of
‘wills to power.’” 617 Nietzsche here equates the basic drives of human beings with wills
to power and remarks that such wills to power comprise different perspectives, especially
evaluative perspectives. This is emphasized also in Zarathustra, where Nietzsche notes
that “out of esteeming itself speaks the will to power.” 618 Although an individual taking
an evaluative stance is not conscious of it, the will to power underlies and motivates
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every act of valuation. In a late fragment, Nietzsche notes that all “value estimations are
only results and narrow perspectives in the service” of the will to power. 619 The
evaluative perspectives formed by drives, in their end-directedness, are manifestations of
the will to power insofar as they are formed by the drives as wills to power.
Although Nietzsche claims elsewhere that “all ‘ends,’ ‘purposes,’ ‘senses,’ are
only expressions and metamorphoses of one will, which inheres in all events, the will to
power,” it is clear that he wants to dissociate the activity of the drives as wills to power
from an account which relies on a unified, purposeless will which underlies reality. 620
Instead, Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of putting “the something-done (emphasis
mine), the ‘aim,’ the ‘goal,’ the ‘purpose,’… back into the deed, after having been
artificially taken out of it, and the deed emptied therewith.” 621 Here, Nietzsche
distinguishes the will to power from empty willing or mere striving. That which is willed
by the various drives as wills to power cannot be separated from the will to power; the
end of a drive cannot be separated out from the drive itself. In these remarks, Nietzsche
separates his view from what he understands as Schopenhauer’s projection of the felt
unity of the will of psychological experience onto reality itself. Instead, Nietzsche
dissociates the will to power from psychological accounts which rely on a unified will,
remarking that “the will of the former psychology is an unjustified generalization” which
“does not exist at all” and instead “removes” or “subtract[s] out” the character of the
will” (or, in our case, the drives as wills to power): 622
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Is ‘will to power’ a kind of “will” or identical with the concept “will”? Is it the
same thing as desiring? or commanding? Is it that “will” of which Schopenhauer
said it was the “in-itself of all things”? My proposition is: that the will of
psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalization, that this will does not exist at
all, that instead of grasping the idea of the development of one definite will into
many forms, one has eliminated the character of the will by subtracting from it its
content, its “whither?” — this is in the highest degree the case with
Schopenhauer: what he calls “will” is a mere empty word. It is even less a
question of a “will to live”; for life is merely a special case of the will to power;
— it is quite arbitrary to assert that everything strives to enter into this form of the
will to power. 623
In short, the world as will to power for Nietzsche is the world as composed of complexes
of drives, as a world of purposiveness without one concrete purpose unifying them. Even
the drives’ attempts at “power” does not unify them, since what power “looks like” (the
“content” of power) differs depending on the drive. Thus, Nietzsche rejects any attempt
to separate the will to power from the characteristic purposes and activities of the
drives. 624
Nietzsche’s description of the world as the manifold of Becoming also supports
his picture of the world as will to power. As we saw above, Nietzsche’s fundamental
principle of reality is that everything becomes: nothing is; nothing rests. That such a
picture of flux supports drives as wills to power is clear enough by the way that Nietzsche
talks about will to power: the play of force as will to power is constant. Resistance,
overcoming, and creation are ever ongoing. The play of force as will to power does not
stabilize or reach neutral states of equilibrium. While there may be moments of forces
slightly later note, Nietzsche characterizes the “will to truth… will to justice, will to beauty, will
to help” as “all will to power” (KSA 11: 38 [12]).
623
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held in tension, even tension requires movement. This relation between the will to power,
drives, and Becoming is nicely captured by Richardson’s discussion of Becoming in
Nietzsche’s System, where he remarks that “being [for Nietzsche] occurs only as a
temporal spread.” 625 This “temporal spread” of Being is manifest in drives, or the
“constituting forces [of] wills to power… [which] serve… as an ever-running engine for
change insofar as they inherently tend or try to change, to overcome their present.” 626 In
other words, the basic constituents of our reality are always in motion, trying to overcome
and develop themselves through constant change, while still retaining their characteristic
telic thrusts and thus their essential nature.
3.4 Permeability, Porosity, and Receptivity in the World as Will[s] to Power
As we saw above, Nietzsche’s ontology of drives as wills to power characterizes events,
existents, and their interactions as a matter of “not of succession — but of
interpenetration, a process [nicht um ein Nacheinander, — sondern um ein Ineinander,
einen Prozeß] in which the individual successive moments are not related to one another
as cause and effect.” 627 Unlike on the atomistic-mechanistic picture, the world for
Nietzsche is not comprised of stable substances and there are no discrete causes which
bring about particular effects. Rather, as we see in his account of the drives as wills to
power, the world is a process of growth, decay, and stages in-between, brought about by
the interaction of drives which incorporate one another, assimilate others, and cannot be
separated into discrete beings. We might be reminded here of Nietzsche’s claim that “the
separation of the ‘deed’ from the ‘doer,’ of the event from someone who produces events,
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of the process from something that is not process but enduring, substance, thing, body,
soul” is “ancient mythology.” 628 In these selections, we see that any picture which
attempts to separate moments, substances, objects, life forms, or individual human beings
from the driven world in which they are necessarily embedded falsifies this world and its
constituents.
As we see in his conception of humans as driven beings in a driven world,
Nietzsche firmly situates human beings within his interpenetrative drive ontology, along
with plants, animals, and inorganic beings. As driven beings in a driven world, humans
incorporate and assimilate the drives of other driven beings into themselves and viceversa: their drives are vulnerable to incorporation or assimilation by the drives of other
beings. This is echoed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, when Zarathustra asks “How should
there be an outside-myself? There is no outside.” 629 This feature of human existence —
the permeability of the border between an individual and the world of which she is a part
— is what I will call either a fundamental permeability established between oneself and
one’s world or, alternatively, the porosity of the self in Nietzsche.
This concept of permeability — as a fluid interchange between some “outside”
world and some “internal” self — is featured in Charles Taylor’s work A Secular Age, in
which he discusses porosity in relation to selfhood and subjectivity. 630 Taylor contrasts
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two different kinds of selves: a pre-modern, “porous” self and a modern, “buffered” self.
The buffered self, in contrast with the porous self, experiences a boundary between the
self and the world outside the self; it supposes that this “clear boundary [allows] us to
define an inner base area, grounded in which we can disengage from the rest.” 631 For the
buffered self, “ultimate purposes are those which arise within me [and] the crucial
meanings of things are those defined in my responses to them.” 632 In other words, the
buffered self in Taylor experiences a boundary between the self and the world around that
self and sees the inner realm as something over which it has complete control. 633
Although the buffered self can not control certain features of the external world around it,
it is free at least to control the way it reacts to the external world and thus is able to
delude itself into thinking that the external world must be defined and understood in
relation to itself as an entity separate from that world in some important way.
The porous self, on the other hand, experiences itself both as part of the world in
which it finds itself and as subject to the forces of that world. 634 For the porous self, “the
boundary between agents and forces is fuzzy… and the boundary between mind and
world is porous, as we see in the way that charged objects can influence us.” 635 The
porous self is open to the world around it and recognizes that it is subject to the forces of
the world; therefore, it understands itself as vulnerable to that world and thus not in
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control of that world. While the buffered self is characterized by an “interiorization,” 636
the porous self does not recognize any boundary between “interior” (the inner world of
the buffered self) and “exterior” (the external world as something separate from oneself).
Importantly, for Taylor, the buffered self is a development of the porous self
which ultimately negates any interchange between the self and the world that the self
finds itself in. 637 That is to say, as Taylor puts it, that “to be a buffered subject [is] to have
closed the porous boundary between inside (thought) and outside (nature, the
physical).” 638 The porous self is a pre-modern phenomenon which lost its force when
individuals began to understand themselves as disengaged, rational subjects. 639
According to Taylor, this “disengaged, disciplined stance to self and society” which the
buffered self adopts “has become part of the essential defining repertory of the modern
identity.” 640
When Taylor remarks upon the difference between porous and buffered selves,
both porosity and a lack of porosity are described as existential conditions. To be a
porous self is to live in an enchanted world in which one experiences oneself as
“vulnerable to a world of spirits and powers:” to experience oneself as embedded and
enmeshed in a world of interpenetrative forces which permeate one’s being. 641 Porosity is
an existential condition, a feature of one’s experience which leads one to experience
oneself in a particular way. When Taylor speaks of “porous” selves and “porousness,” he
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is not making ontological claims about how the world used to be in reality, but instead
offering an existential description of pre-modern human experience.
Although I employ one of Taylor’s basic concepts from A Secular Age —
porosity as a feature of individuals (and permeability as an openness to one’s world
which enables an interchange) — I identify porosity as an ontological condition. Porosity
or permeability, on my view, is a fact about the way the world — and individuals in it —
actually are. It is a feature of Nietzsche’s drive ontology, whether or not driven beings
recognize this ontological feature. This is especially important to note, for in my attempt
to conceive of permeability ontologically, I do not intend for those who recognize such a
permeability to be in the same existential condition as Taylor’s “porous selves,” who
experience a world enchanted by magical forces. 642 Rather, I hope to show that
Nietzsche’s metaphysics contains a post-modern variety of ontological permability, the
recognition of which allows an individual to re-conceive truth, purpose, and value in a
life-affirming way. Indeed, Nietzsche’s porous individual — as a complex of drives —
might come to be re-enchanted by the world in which she finds herself, but this will be an
immanent enchantment, without any belief or experience of some a suprasensory world
of spirits and demons. 643
Nietzsche introduces ontological permeability — as a feature of driven beings —
very early on in his writings. Although he does not use this particular term, we see an
inseparability of the individual human being from the driven world of which she is a part
evidenced by excerpts from Nietzsche’s notes (which Vanessa Lemm treats in her essay
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on plant life and value-creation). 644 As we saw above, in Nietzsche’s early notes on
perspectives in human knowledge, he draws a close parallel between plant life and human
life and “extends the capacity of evaluating and measuring to other living beings, in
particular to plants: ‘The plant is also a measuring being.’” 645 One fundamental
difference between plant life and human life, however, is the following:
…whereas humans come to the illusory presupposition of an outside world due to vision
and hearing (which Nietzsche understands as internal perceptions, images and sounds we
form within ourselves), plants do not perceive an outside world because they live without
the illusory distinction between outside and inside (KSA 7: 19 [217]). They are an
inseparable part of their environment, and, vice versa, their environment is an
inseparable part of them [emphasis mine]. Hence, plants do not suffer like the human
beings from the illusion of their higher distinction and separation from nature and their
environment (A 14). 646

According to these very early remarks (1872/3), the experience of plants gets something
right that human experience continually gets wrong: the inseparability of one from one’s
environment. Plants do not see themselves as separate from their world; they
“understand” themselves as a part of their world, and “understanding” themselves in this
way leaves plants free of illusion. The wisdom of plants in this excerpt is that they do not
deny a permeability between themselves and their world in a way that modern humans
do. Although this feature of existence often goes unrecognized by human beings, one is
inextricable from one’s world and changes in one’s world frequently result in changes in
oneself. 647
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This formative role that the world plays in the case of individuals is continually
present in Nietzsche’s work, from early works through later fragments. For Nietzsche, we
do not simply shape the world with our drives; we are also shaped by the drives of other
individuals, texts, life forms, and entities which we encounter. In Human, All too Human,
Nietzsche remarks that the individual is the artistic object created out of necessity by the
world. 648 This recalls The Birth of Tragedy, where Nietzsche notes that “man is no longer
an artist, he has become a work of art: all nature’s artistic power reveals itself here.” 649
Nietzsche’s mature picture of personal development matches this description surprisingly
well, although any formative power is located in natural forces and socio-cultural
circumstances rather than a purposeful artist-god. In Dawn, Nietzsche emphasizes the
active role played by the world in an individual’s formation in his response to the skeptic
who cries out: “‘I have no idea how I am acting! I have no idea how I should act!”
Nietzsche responds by saying “You are right! — but do not doubt this: you are being
acted upon! In every moment! Mankind has at all times confused the active and the
passive: it is their perpetual grammatical blunder.” 650 In this excerpt, Nietzsche again
attributes a misunderstanding of the nature of the human being — as agent characterized
solely by self-directed activity — to a confusion of grammar and the ways we speak
about agents. 651 A proper understanding of the human being for Nietzsche requires
understanding both the active contribution that an individual makes to her experiences
and the world (through her drives) and the contribution that the world makes to an
648
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individual. The human being as subject-unity for Nietzsche is both an active generator of
its own experience as well as a receptive conduit through which its own drives and the
drives of other life forms and elements of reality work.
In Ambiguity and the Absolute: Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on the Question of
Truth, Frank Chouraqui supports this notion when he argues that “Nietzsche links man
and the world in an ontological manner… overcoming [subjectivity] through the cosubstantiality of man and ‘nature.’” 652 On my account, the co-substantiality of man and
world which we see in Nietzsche’s work — characterized more typically as a
consubstantiality, as a sharing in the same essence — is made possible by Nietzsche’s
ontology of the drives as wills to power. As we have seen, this ontology is worked out
mainly in Nietzsche’s later work and his late notes. But as Chouraqui points out in
“Nietzsche’s Science of Love,” an early excerpt from “Schopenhauer as Educator” helps
set the stage for this consubstantiality of man and world in Nietzsche:
There are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light
we cease to understand the word ‘I’ [wir nicht mehr das Wort „ich“ verstehen],
there lies something beyond our being which at these moments moves across into
it [was in jenen Augenblicken zu einem Diesseits wird], and therefore we desire
from the bottom of our hearts bridges between here and there [den Brücken
zwischen hier und dort]. 653
In moments of the kind Nietzsche describes — in moments of “love” — one’s
understanding of oneself as a unified, discrete ego-substance dissipates. 654 In such a
moment, one comes to see how the world which seems to be fundamentally separate from
oneself in fact plays a fundamental, constitutive role in what one is and becomes:
something which seems to be “beyond our being” effectively “moves across” the porous
652
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boundary between the self and the world and moves “into” one’s “being,” expanding
one’s affective and evaluative ranges. (Alternatively, something which seems to belong
exclusively to oneself also has the potential to move across this boundary.) Chouraqui
characterizes this movement as the incorporation of some element of the world into
oneself (and vice-versa); such an incorporation, however, “takes place between
organisms as well as within them” and “transforms both the incorporator and the
incorporated.” 655 We see also that in a fragment discussing human experience as alwaysalready involving an “incorporation of the outer world.” 656 This activity of incorporation,
assimilation, or appropriation — Nietzsche frequently uses these interchangeably — is
characteristic of the driven world, whether that which Nietzsche addresses is an the
organic or inorganic being. In his notes, Nietzsche remarks upon the will to power as “the
instinct of assimilation” as the “fundamental organic function on which all growth
rests.” 657 Elsewhere, he also will suggest that “suggests that “the body assimilates
inorganic matter.” 658 This identity between the inorganic and organic world suggested by
Nietzsche’s ontology of the drives as will to power is also argued for by Chouraqui, who
notes that Nietzsche “presents the pre-organic and the organic, the mineral and the
intellectual as consubstantial.” 659
Nietzsche’s account of the world as wills to power, as fundamentally constituted
by drives, explains this mechanism of incorporation. And indeed, as we have already
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seen, Nietzsche often speaks of the drives as incorporating or assimilating other drives. 660
Furthermore, as Chouraqui points out, since “incorporation is continual… identity is
impossible.” 661 In other words, for Nietzsche, there is no way to fix my identity as an
ego-substance or the identity of other life forms or texts as unchanging and stable. Any
“identity” is dispersed into the world in which one is embedded. 662
In an 1881 note, Nietzsche speaks of always striving to “understand becoming, to
deny ourselves as individuals, to see the world with many eyes as possible, to live in
instincts and engagements and to make eyes with these, to intermittently let ourselves
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over to life, in order to intermittently hold the eye in abeyance to life thereafter.” 663 In
this pregnant excerpt, Nietzsche connects the world of becoming with a de-individuated
world in which one lives in and understands oneself as seeing through our drives and
their engagement with the world. This “[living] in instincts and engagements” allows for
human beings to recognize a permeability between themselves and the world to which
they belong, which allows them to see themselves as letting themselves over to life and
intermittently suspending their individuality to the flux and flow of the driven world.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, this theme of metaphysical porosity also appears. In
“On Neighborly Love,” Zarathustra talks especially about the importance of
understanding how to be a sponge:
I teach you the friend and his overfull heart. But one must understand to be a
sponge if one wants to be loved by overfull hearts…
I teach you the friend in whom the world stands complete, a capsule of the good,
— the creating friend, who has always a complete world to bestow.
And as the world unrolled itself for him, so it rolls together for him in rings…
In this short but rich selection, Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of the porosity of
human beings for befriending and being transformed by others with “overfull hearts…
who always [have] a complete world to bestow.” 664 In what serves also as a lesson on
friendship, Zarathustra also offers an account of a creative and active individual, one
whose self as subject-unity is permeated by the world in which she is embedded, in which
the world unfolds itself and is folded back in on itself by the individual’s driven nature.
This folding/unfolding harkens back to an excerpt from Dawn, in which Nietzsche claims
that “Every moment of our lives sees some of the polyp-arms of our being grow and
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others of them wither, all according to the nutriment which the moment does or does not
bear with it.” 665 As complexes of drives embedded in a driven world, individuals, life
forms, and events are excited or inhibited — they unfold themselves in certain directions
and fold back into themselves like polyp-arms — in accordance with their constitution
and the ways in which they interact with other complexes of drives.
To be a true friend for Zarathustra — and for Nietzsche — is to recognize and
affirm this porosity, and especially the permeability between human beings as two
complexes of drives with the potential to transform one another. What separates the
creative and active individual here from other kinds of individuals is an attitude of
affirmative openness and recognition of the permeability between oneself, one’s world,
and others. These features allow for one to engage more authentically with transformative
sources from without. The individual who does not recognize this porosity and
understands herself (even unconsciously) as closed off from the world (as Cartesian
notions of selfhood encourage one to do) is less likely to be nourished and authentically
transformed by her world. 666 This individual is likely to overemphasize a role for her own
will in the creative process and close herself off from a plurality of creative acts which
require engagement with drives and complexes of drives not her own. 667
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In “The Three Metamorphoses” and the references to the various stages of the
camel, lion, and child through Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the attentive reader finds
Nietzsche again emphasizing the significance of recognizing the permeability between
oneself and one’s world and cultivating receptivity for becoming truly creative. In
Zarathustra’s Dionysian Modernism, Robert Gooding-Williams persuasively argues this
point. As we saw above, in the lion stage, one is destructive: one rejects old values and
worldview and aims to bring about their destruction. The lion’s orientation in the world
consists in a Nay-saying which leads to the moment of European nihilism as a denial of
objective truth, higher purpose, and absolute values. In the final stage of the child, on the
other hand, one becomes creative. This creativity is made possible by the lion’s
destruction, but involves a critical move beyond the reactive attitude of the lion. As the
“child,” one creates values of one’s own and learns to affirm the world: one says Yes to
existence.
For Gooding-Williams, being stuck in the stage of the lion consists in nothing
other than “disowning [the] power of receptivity” and “obscur[ing] the reality of…
[one’s] body and one’s passions.” 668 In the lion stage, according to Gooding-Williams,
the individual feels her power to destroy old values as a power which arises from the
“absolute independence” of her will. 669 Yet in this insistence on her will’s absolute
independence, the leonine individual remains unable to see that the creation of new
values and perspectives requires a receptivity to values and perspectives external to her
will: this individual “disowns [her] power of receptivity and disclaims [her] ability to go-
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under to a chaos of uncreated passions… [because] acknowledging [this] ability… would
involve admitting that his will depends on factors other than itself to create new
values.” 670 This leonine individual, in her denial of the power of receptivity for creating
new values and perspectives out of one’s engagement and interaction with a world
beyond herself (as subject-unity), remains impotent and reactive. A critical component of
the creation of new values in Zarathustra is a going-under which “involves both a
destruction of particular values and of the individual self these values produce [emphasis
mine].” 671 While the leonine individual can affirm the destruction of old values, she is
not willing to undergo the destruction of her individual identity required for the creation
of a new self and new values. After all, as Gooding-Williams persuasively argues, life as
composed of wills to power involves “[squandering] an established form of life and
[embracing] the body’s capacity to be affected by passional chaos.” 672 It is in the
“reasserting” of new wills to power after this initial destruction of established forms of
life and identities which makes a new life, perspectives, and values possible. On this
picture, although all driven beings have a “receptive power to be affected by unmastered,
passional chaos,” this receptive power can be obscured or lessened, however, if one
rejects the permeability between oneself and one’s world and disallows “the reality of
uncreated, living passions.. [to] affect the body independently.” 673
This disallowal becomes possible when one’s attachment to the idea of oneself as
an freely determining and determined ego-substance “engenders… illusions [such as]…
permitting bodily acts to appear as direct, unmediated manifestations of an ego
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substance’s acts of willing.” 674 The nature of reality as composed of drives, and an
understanding of oneself as a complex of drives (among others) embedded in a driven
world, can be forgotten or obscured — and the necessity of porosity for the creation of
new perspectives and values can be ignored — if one remains attached to traditional
concepts of the subject and the will. While a leonine individual believes in the limitless
power of his own will to create new values and thinks that “willing to create new values
will suffice by itself to create them,” the childlike individual discards any belief in an
ego-substance fundamentally separate from the world of which it is a part and
“acknowledges… [her] vulnerability… to Dionysian chaos, which Nietzsche [in his later
works] interprets as a chaos of uncreated, bodily passions.” 675 In short, the childlike
individual — and the individual able to create truly new perspectives and values out of an
active spirit — recognizes the necessary permeability between herself as a driven being
and the world of drives with which she is engaged. We will see more about how this
works in the next and final chapter. 676
As Gooding-Williams remarks, we see this in “The Night Song,” where the
“creation of new values involves both giving and receiving.” 677 This theme reappears
throughout Zarathustra, especially at moments of great significance. In “On the Great
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Longing,” in which Zarathustra enters into conversation with his soul, Zarathustra
recounts his spiritual transformation and all that he has “given” to his soul. 678 After
listing everything that he has given to his soul – contempt that loves, wisdom, his silence
and longing, etc. – Zarathustra tells his soul, “I have given you all, and even the last I
had… that I bade you sing, behold, that was the last I had. That I bade you sing – speak
now, speak.” 679 Here, we see that after Zarathustra has completed willing everything that
he was capable of willing his soul to do – after he has become truly empty – he must
hand over the reins to some aspect of himself or his reality beyond his own conscious will
and listen for what this aspect of his has to “say” to him. It is worth noting that given
Nietzsche’s understanding of the porous nature of existence and the extension of the
boundaries of the self, this aspect of Zarathustra’s soul might in some sense come “from
without.”
In the following sections, it becomes increasingly clear that his soul speaks to him
by encouraging him to create in a poietic way. In “The Other Dancing Song,”
Zarathustra’s realization is one of the “creative breath… [as] heavenly need.” 680 Here,
Zarathustra recognizes that beyond his own power of willing is the soul’s need to create
from out of itself. That this is to be a poietic endeavor appears when Zarathustra claims
shortly thereafter that “the earth is a table for gods and trembles with creative new
words.” 681 Since so much of the earlier portion of the work is concerned with finding the
“meaning of the earth,” 682 we can come to recognize the significance of this claim about
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poetry and its tie to the earth. As we see in Nietzsche’s picture of the child above, giving
meaning to the earth in one’s own unique way ultimately requires both a giving and a
receiving. This language of receptivity is stressed earlier on when Nietzsche suggests that
one must sacrifice oneself to the earth and to one’s greatest virtue. 683 Since this greatest
virtue is the gift that one “gives” to the soul until one is empty, it must be that the
creation of a new virtue — a new value or perspective — will involve taking the world
into the newly-emptied soul and creating from out of this receiving. 684
On Gooding-Williams’ picture, as opposed to Taylor, the receptive individual
possesses an actual capacity (or “power”) of receptivity. Receptive individuals (as
opposed to Taylor’s porous selves) are possible even today, and they are not incompatible
with an understanding of oneself as an embodied individual, who also engages actively in
the world and understands herself as playing a role in meaning creation and her own
interests and values as integral ingredients in the creation of meaning which exceeds
these interests and values. Although it is important to emphasize a role for receptivity or
porosity in value creation for Nietzsche, a truly Nietzschean account of the creation of
value and meaning will involve the engagement of an active self, even if only as “subjectunity.”
Nietzsche’s re-thinking of what Parkes calls the “interplay between the inner and
outer that is set up by the operations of the drives,” or the interaction between oneself as a
subject-unity composed of drives and the driven world, continues also in selections from
Beyond Good and Evil. In one earlier aphorism, Nietzsche describes how philosophical
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ideas develop from out of “a distant collective household of the soul:” 685
[Such ideas] develop connected to and in relationship with each other… no matter
how suddenly and arbitrarily they may appear to emerge in the history of
thinking, they nevertheless belong to a system just as much as do the collective
members of the fauna of a continent… [although] they may feel they are still so
independent of each other, with their critical or systematic wills. 686
This account of the development of ideas in the history of philosophy shows how
perspectives emerge from out of the interactions and engagements of various drives and
complexes of drives with one another. In particular, Nietzsche claims here that allegedly
novel ideas emerge from out of a collective history of the interactions of various wills to
power. This echoes a later remark, in which Nietzsche notes that “The past of every form
and mode of life, of cultures which earlier lay right next to or on top of each other, now
streams [strömt]… into us ‘modern souls,’ our instincts [Instinkte] now run back
everywhere, we are ourselves a kind of chaos [wir selbst sind eine Art Chaos].” 687 This
“streaming [strömen]” of forms and modes of life into our souls and the flowing out of
our instincts in all directions is made possible only because of the porosity of our
existence. In another aphorism, Nietzsche talks about how “spiritual glance and insight”
allows for the expansion of the space around the individual:
with the power of [man’s] spiritual glance and insight the distance and, as it were,
the space around man expands: his world becomes deeper; new stars and new
riddles and pictures always come into his view. Perhaps everything on which the
eye of his spirit practiced its astuteness and profundity was just an excuse for
exercise, a matter of play, something for children and childish heads. Perhaps one
day the most solemn ideas, the ones over which we have fought and suffered the
most, the ideas of "God" and "sin," will seem to us no more important than a
children's toy or childish pain appears to an old man — and perhaps then "the old
man" will need again another children's toy and another pain — still sufficiently a
child, an eternal child!
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This selection, as in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, connects the creativity and play of the child
— the creation of new perspectives, purposes, and values from out of the destruction of
the old — with the expansion of the individual into the world around herself, a deepening
of her world which allows her to see and engage with the “new riddles and pictures”
which stream forth from other complexes of drives and wills to power.
As might be expected, the world plays an important role not only in the formation
of new perspectives, purposes, and values, but in the formation of human beings as
subject-unities. This formative role for the world in the creation of the subject-unity is
possible because, for Nietzsche, the boundaries between self and world are not firmly
fixed and closed off, but permeable. Nietzsche captures this porosity of the self in his
notes, when he claims that the self is “a multiplicity of affects, with an intellect, with
uncertain boundaries.” 688 Twentieth century philosopher Gilles Deleuze echoes this same
notion in his interpretation of Nietzsche, according to which “the self is only a threshold,
a door, a becoming between two multiplicities.” 689 This is also the account which
Chouraqui offers:
…[an individual is] determined only by the lines of conflict that surround it, lines
that are not only always contingent, but further, whose unending motion…signify
that it (or some of it) incorporates or becomes incorporated. Consequently,
bearing in mind that nothing defines the individual but these lines, a change in
lines means a change in the identify of the individual. 690
On my view, it is the metaphysical permeability inherent in Nietzsche’s drive ontology
which enables the subject-unity to incorporate new perspectives “from without” in the
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way Chouraqui describes, and this, in turn, leads to new affects, interpretations, and
values. It is only in virtue of my interaction — as a subject-unity and complex of drives
embedded in a driven world — with other complexes of drives that I can extend and
expand my perspectives, interpretations, values, purposes, and my affective range.
Insofar as this reciprocal shaping of self and world is continuously ongoing, “the sphere
of the subject [is] constantly growing or decreasing, the center of the system constantly
shifting.” 691 Thus, the human being participates in the creation of meaning in the world
through her interaction with other sources of meaning: new drives and driven beings with
diverse purposes, values, and perspectives. Yet the world (previously misunderstood as
merely as a world of passive objects) also plays an active a role in creating the subjectunity (previously misunderstood as the unified, active subject or “ego-substance”). This
is what Nietzsche refers to as the “felt text” of the world which one experiences and with
which one’s engages in Dawn. 692 Nietzsche describes one’s interaction with this felt text
of reality in the following way:
Suppose we were in the market place one day and we noticed someone laughing
at us as we went by: this event will signify this or that to us according to whether
this or that drive happens at that moment to be at its height in us and it will be a
quite different event according to the kind of person we are. One person will
absorb it like a drop of rain, another will shake it from him like an insect, another
will try to pick a quarrel, another will examine his clothing to see if there is
anything about it that might give rise to laughter, another will be led to reflect on
the nature of laughter as such, another will be glad to have involuntarily
augmented the amount of cheerfulness and sunshine in the world and in each case
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a drive has gratified itself, whether it be the drive to annoyance or to
combativeness or to reflection or to benevolence. This drive seized the event as its
prey: why precisely this one? Because, thirsty and hungry, it was lying in wait…
What then are our experiences? Much more that which we put into them than that
which they already contain! Or must we go so far as to say: in themselves they
contain nothing? To experience is to invent? 693
For Nietzsche, then, one’s experience and what one becomes is a product of the
interaction between one’s constitution and certain external influences with the ability to
change one’s constitution. The self as a subject-unity — as an embodied complex of
drives — is constantly held open to an essential shaping by the aims of the forces and
drives of other life forms, artifacts of life, and non-living entities which comprise the
world as wills to power. For the mature Nietzsche, one is constantly being shaped by
one’s world and the interaction between one’s constitution and this world: indeed, this is
part of what it means to be a subject-unity. In the same aphorism from Dawn as above,
Nietzsche describes the activity of “the totality of drives which constitute [one’s] being”
as an “ebb and flood… play and counterplay among one another,” a process of
nourishment and starvation by the world which remains unknown to the subject-unity.
Nietzsche goes on:
This nutriment is therefore a work of chance: our daily experiences throw some
prey in the way of now this, now that drive, and the drive seizes it eagerly; but the
coming and going of these events as a whole stands in no rational relationship to
the nutritional requirements of the totality of the drives: so that the outcome will
always be twofold the starvation and stunting of some and the overfeeding of
others. Every moment of our lives sees some of the polyp-arms of our being grow
and others of them wither, all according to the nutriment which the moment does
or does not bear with it. Our experiences are, as already said, all in this sense
means of nourishment, but the nourishment is scattered indiscriminately without
distinguishing between the hungry and those already possessing a superfluity.
And as a consequence of this chance nourishment of the parts, the whole, fully
grown polyp will be something just as accidental as its growth has been. To
express it more clearly: suppose a drive finds itself at the point at which it desires
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gratification or exercise of its strength, or discharge of its strength, or the
saturation of an emptiness… it then regards every event of the day with a view to
seeing how it can employ it for the attainment of its goal. 694
In this selection, Nietzsche gives an account of the subject-unity as a polyp with drives as
a “polyp-arms of our being” which find occasions for discharge in interactions with some
drives and starvation from a lack of opportunities in interactions with others.
Nonetheless, the nutriment of our drives is a feature of one’s being embedded in her
world and a “work of chance” which depends on what experiences one has and the drives
which one comes into contact with at any given moment. The world thus plays a critical
role in shaping the subject-unity.
In Ecce Homo, we see Nietzsche remark on the formative role of seemingly small
and insignificant aspects of one’s world, such as the natural environment in which one’s
thought is conducted, one’s dietary habits, and one’s physical condition. In this work,
Nietzsche consistently refers to what might seem to be insignificant aspects of the world
in which he found himself as conditions in which his work and thought necessarily
developed, conditions which advanced his projects in certain directions rather than
others. In one excerpt, Nietzsche remarks that “The Wanderer and His Shadow”
developed in a period of his most intense blindness, in which his vision was often limited
to shadows. 695 Even as Nietzsche wrote in the midst of various physiological ailments,
his work retained its life-affirming quality because of his “choices of climate and
locality.” 696 On my account, these seemingly small or insignificant aspects of Nietzsche's
world were able to play such a significant, formative role in Nietzsche’s work, thought,
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and identity because of the fundamental permeability between Nietzsche, as an embodied
complex of drives, and the driven world.
The permeability between oneself and one’s world (the porosity of the self) as a
feature of Nietzsche’s metaphysics is also treated by Graham Parkes in Composing the
Soul. In his final chapter, Parkes characterizes the embedded nature of the subject-unity
in an extremely descriptive account of what he characterizes as “the soul” in Nietzsche:
…for Nietzsche the answer to the question of what the soul is like is that
ultimately it is like everything: galaxies, solar systems, minerals from rocks to
metals, bodies of water, dances of fire and wind… Not only natural worlds but the
worlds of human community move and have their beginning within as well as
without. As Aristotle said, the soul is in a way all things, and so the boundaries
between inner and outer are dissolved [emphasis mine]. This was a major theme
in Zarathustra — as announced in the protagonist’s prologue: “I love him whose
soul is overfull, so that he forgets himself, and all things are in him: thus all things
become his going under” (TSZ, Preface, 4). If all things are in the soul, there is no
longer any outside; which means the perishing of the separate self. And yet the
ideal is no static condition, but rather one of overflow, downpour, and uprush —
flows of eros in Dionysian Rausch, a constant arising and abating of drives. 697
When Parkes claims here that for Nietzsche, “the soul is in a way all things,” I argue that
his concept of “soul” is best understood as the constitution of reality as drives or wills to
power. Since all things are composed of drives or wills to power, and since there is a
fundamental permeability between these “things” insofar as any boundaries which seem
to go between these things dissolve into the interactions of drives, any attempt to isolate
discrete ego-substances or substances, subjects or objects, falsifies the world as the everchanging flux of drives as wills to power, or what Parkes calls the “flows of eros… [as
the] constant arising and abating of drives.” 698 This point will be developed at more
length in the following chapter.
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Chapter Four: Overcoming Nihilism: Radical Openness and Personal
Transformation
4.1 Active Nihilism, Passive Nihilism, and the “first step towards sobriety”
In this final chapter of my project, I look to resources in Nietzsche for overcoming the
problem of nihilism. Before we get to these resources, however, we must understand an
important distinction which Nietzsche makes between two kinds of nihilism in his notes
from 1887: “Nihilism. It is ambiguous: A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the
spirit: as active nihilism. B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit:
as passive nihilism.” 699 On my view, this basic distinction between a powerful, active
nihilism and a weak, passive nihilism is critical for understanding a “way out” of nihilism
in Nietzsche. In order to overcome nihilism, a culture or individual must both find a way
out of passive nihilism while also fully manifesting — and then moving beyond — active
nihilism. On my view, then, passive nihilism involves a continued personal or cultural
need for absolute sources of meaning; it arises in the return to affective nihilism which
follows European nihilism. Active nihilism, on the other hand, involves both thinking and
feeling a need for meaning anew; although it arises after European nihilism, it comprises
a necessary transitional stage rather than an end-point: it is the first step on the path to
overcoming nihilism, that stage which is characterized by the “leonine individual”
mentioned later in this chapter.
In passive nihilism, the loss of one’s highest values and orienting goals leaves one
devoid of value and goals, and this traumatic loss is paralyzing. Passive nihilism is “a
sign of weakness” and a “weary nihilism that no longer attacks;” in short, passive
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nihilism involves the manifestation of affective nihilism, either in an individual or in a
general cultural tendency towards affective nihilism. 700 A passively nihilistic culture, in
its weariness and eventual paralysis, looks back longingly on old ideals and paradigms
and wishes for their return. Such a culture retains its need for meaning in the form of
objective truths, higher purposes, or absolute values; when they find this lacking, they
become incapable of “believing in a ‘meaning,’” and are instead dominated by
“unbelief.” 701 In such a culture, “the creative strength to create meaning has declined and
disappointment becomes the dominant condition.” 702 In short, the passive nihilistic
individual or culture is weak and rejects its own role in the dynamic creation of meaning.
Since such a passively nihilistic individual or culture remains blind to its role (or the role
of its members) in meaning-creation while rejecting the possibility of its participation in
some external, transcendent meaning, the dominant belief is one of meaninglessness and,
ultimately, worthlessness. Passive nihilism, if it remains, blocks a culture from
overcoming nihilism; this makes it a particularly malignant version of nihilism.
With active nihilism, a culture takes what Nietzsche calls the “first step toward
sobriety: to grasp to what extent we have been seduced” by certain ideals or worldviews. 703 The actively nihilistic culture resents this seduction and no longer believes or
requires the kind of meaning provided by absolute interpretations of reality (i.e. the
world as that in which we can discover absolute values, objective truths, or higher
purposes); the active nihilist has learned to accept hard truths. Active nihilism wishes for
and brings about the destruction of these deceptive ideals; it is a “violent force of
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destruction” which recognizes the necessity of destroying old ideals and paradigms for
the dominance of a new understanding and this-worldly affirmation. 704 An actively
nihilistic culture has not yet come to affirm this world as it actually is, but it wills the
large-scale destruction of misleading pictures of reality. This is a “positive” kind of
nihilism, and a potential sign that “the spirit may have grown so strong that previous
convictions have become inadequate.” 705
If we look to “The Three Metamorphoses” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, wherein
Nietzsche offers an outline of the progression and overcoming of nihilism in the
individual human being, we see a manifestation of active nihilism in the lion stage. In this
section, Nietzsche describes 1) a preliminary stage in which one reveres values and
carries old values with oneself (the camel), 2) a transitional stage in which one rejects and
destroys those values (the lion), and 3) a final stage during which one affirms the world
devoid of those old values and freely creates values of one’s own (the child). During the
lion stage, a culture or individual “[creates] freedom for oneself” from old systems of
value and previous nihilistic frameworks for understanding. The lion learns to issue “a
sacred No even to duty.” 706 This moment of active nihilism is a necessary stage for
overcoming nihilism. Thus, active nihilism is a positive phenomenon for Nietzsche,
although overcoming nihilism requires moving beyond active nihilism. 707
We might remember at this point that Nietzsche insists that “nihilism represents a
pathological transitional stage” in which “what is pathological is the tremendous
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generalization, the inference that there is no meaning at all.” 708 That Nietzsche notes the
transitional nature of nihilism demonstrates that he supposes it possible to get beyond, or
overcome, nihilism. When a culture is pervaded by nihilism, as Richard Schacht
summarizes, “The world looks valueless. But that does not mean it is valueless… With
the collapse of our traditional world view, a period of nihilism must follow. But that is
not, for Nietzsche, the end of the line.” 709 Although the world appears devoid of value to
the European nihilist, that does not mean it is in fact devoid of value. And, as Schacht
suggests, Nietzsche seems to hint at a moment beyond the period of European nihilism.
Both Heidegger and Deleuze also make this distinction between active and
passive nihilism central to their accounts, but offer different interpretations of this
distinction. Heidegger argues that with the destructive negation inherent in active
nihilism, there is an affirmation of the will to power as the “pure” will-to-will, as the
continual overcoming of blind and contentless force, as growth towards ever and ever
more power over other forces. As Thomson notes in Heidegger on Ontotheology,
Heidegger’s Nietzsche understands the world as consisting in the mere “disaggregation
and reaggregation of forces without any purpose or goal beyond the self-perpetuating
augmentation of these forces through their continual self-overcoming.” 710 Active
nihilism for Heidegger’s Nietzsche is thus an affirmation of the self-surpassing nature of
the will to power (as will-to-will). Inherent to this active nihilism for Heidegger, as we
see, is a negation of that which is and which came before. When Nietzsche makes the will
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to power (as the continual overcoming of blind force) the “ground and measure of all
valuation,” nihilism “complete[s] itself.” Thus, active nihilism, on Heidegger’s reading,
is simply a terminus point of nihilism: there is no transition beyond this point possible for
Heidegger’s Nietzsche. For Heidegger, passive nihilism is an earlier stage in which one
“rests content” with the idea that “‘there is no eternal truth in itself’” and “merely
observes the decline of the highest values hitherto.” 711 In other words, Heidegger’s
understands the passive nihilist as a passive observer of the death of God and the
consequences of that death, whereas the active nihilist wills this negation and, even more,
wills the negation of that which is as she wills power. In my account, unlike Heidegger’s,
I take Nietzsche’s seriously when he claims that nihilism is a “pathological transitional
stage [emphasis mine]” and look to potential resources in his thought for the overcoming
of this nihilism. 712 Interestingly, I look to the same place as Heidegger to find these
resources: Nietzsche’s metaphysics as will(s) to power.
In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze traces an alternative history of nihilism in
Nietzsche as the progression from a negative nihilism, through a reactive nihilism, to
passive nihilism. Negative nihilism consists in the “will to deny,” the denial of prior
values and the “supersensible” which turns into a denial of “life” from the “height of
higher values” and “in the name of these values.” 713 For Deleuze, negative nihilism
manifests as the denial of transcendence and the destruction of all values which resulted
from a world which found its meaning only in transcendent ideals and purposes. Reactive
nihilism, on the other hand, is the negation not only of values and weak life, but of all
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willing: the world continues to be meaningless to the reactive nihilist and this leads the
nihilist to a weakened form of life, in which life itself becomes depreciated as purely
reactive life. 714 In reactive nihilism, life continues on only as this reactive and weak form
of life; reactive nihilism is a “pessimism of life” which has lost the ability to affirm and
create. On this picture, “there is no longer any human or earthly will,” since reactive
forces take the place of active, denying forces. 715 Passive nihilism, then, is the “final
outcome of reactive nihilism: fading away passively rather than being led from
outside.” 716 Deleuze also characterizes this transition — from negative to reactive to
passive nihilism — as the transition “from God to God’s murderer, from God’s murderer
to the last man,” and Nietzschean nihilism “not as an event in history but the motor of the
history of man as universal history.” 717 In other words, Deleuze understands this
progression of nihilism as a necessary progression of mankind.
In my view, there are two main issues to take with Deleuze’s account of nihilism.
The first is Deleuze’s claim about the prevalence of reactive forces in reactive nihilism.
As we see here, Deleuze believes not only that individuals, behaviors, or principles can
be considered “active” or “reactive,” but that forces themselves can be characterized as
such. This is a controversial claim, based on a possible conflation of active and reactive
types or phenomena (which are actually remarked upon by Nietzsche, see especially GM

714

Deleuze believes not only that individuals and principles can be considered “active” or
“reactive,” but that forces themselves can be characterized as such. This is a controversial claim,
based on a possible conflation of active and reactive types or phenomena (which are actually
remarked upon by Nietzsche, see especially GM I:10, GM II:11) with active and reactive forces
(Paolo D’Iorio, “The Eternal Return: Genesis and Interpretation” in The Agonist Vol. 4 Issue 1,
2011).
715
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 148.
716
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 149.
717
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 151/2.

239

I:10, GM II:11) with active and reactive forces. 718 Whether or not this is in fact a case of
conflation, there is not sufficient evidence in Nietzsche for an account which relies on
active and reactive forces. Furthermore, Deleuze’s presentation of the progression of
nihilism as a necessary progression injects a global telos into the world which, as we saw
in previous chapters, Nietzsche is at pains to reject. In other words, although Nietzsche
warns against “superfluous teleological principles,” Deleuze employs such a principle to
explain the phenomenon of nihilism in Nietzsche. Insofar as Nietzsche believes the
projection of a universal purpose onto the world to be a nihlistic conception of the world,
Deleuze presents an essentially nihilistic conception of the world in his account of
nihilism! For these reasons, I believe we must reject Deleuze’s thought-provoking
account of Nietzschean nihilism along with Heidegger’s account, although I agree with
Deleuze broadly insofar as he, unlike Heidegger, believes there are resources in
Nietzsche’s thought for overcoming nihilism.
What might a world in which nihilism as a cultural phenomenon is overcome look
like? In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, we find an answer: a world in which nihilism has been
overcome is one in which human beings have learned to “remain faithful to the earth.” 719
As Laurence Lampert points out, Zarathustra’s command to remain faithful to the earth
“means that the earth is not to be disparaged by otherworldly dreams, but is rather to be
won back from the hatred expressed in the judgement that it is inferior to heaven… The
earth to which Zarathustra commands loyalty is the earth that was regarded as merely the
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‘apparent world’ by those who believed in a “true world” beyond it.” 720 Of course, such
an earthly affirmation requires the destruction of unattainable, otherworldly ideals; there
is a destruction inherent to nihilism’s overcoming, and this is the role that active nihilism
must play. But if human beings can afterwards come to affirm and love the world of
becoming even in the face of the destruction of objective truth, absolute values, and
higher purposes, then they will have learned to remain faithful to the earth as it is.721 This
is our first signpost pointing the way out of nihilism.
In order to affirm the earth and move beyond nihilism, human beings must
recognize — and revel in — the ambiguous and multi-faceted character of this-worldly
existence. This requires acknowledging varied ways of coming to know and interpret the
world around us, which in turn requires human beings to move beyond reductive
scientific interpretations of the world as “a world which is supposed to have its equivalent
and measure in human thinking and human valuations.” 722 In the fifth book of The Gay
Science, Nietzsche describes the failure of scientific reasoning in his example of the
interpretation of a piece of music’s value: “Supposing we valued the worth of a music
with reference to how much it could be counted, calculated, or formulated - how absurd
such a "scientific" estimate of music would be! What would one have apprehended,
understood, or discerned in it! Nothing, absolutely nothing of what is really "music" in
it!” 723 Not only does science covertly propagate the nihilistic ideals of a “true” world; it
also robs potentially meaningful encounters and experiences of their potential to affirm
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and celebrate the innumerable aspects of life which cannot be categorized by human
reason.
What is required for Western culture to arrive at a place where it can issue the
sacred Yes of the child and affirm this-worldly existence? In his 1888 notes, Nietzsche
notes that the fact that the “notion of another world has always been unfavorable for, or
critical of "this" world” indicates an “instinct of life-weariness, and not that of life, which
has created the ‘other world.” 724 This other world has different permutations: as we saw
in the first chapter, it can be the rational world of the philosopher, the “divine,
denaturalized” world of religious individuals, or the “good, perfect, just, holy” world of
moral individuals. 725 Insofar as these permutations of the world are the consequences of a
life denial and weariness, a robust, healthy, and life-affirming individual or culture would
reject them. To acknowledge and affirm the natural world (a world without absolute
moral values which exceeds the categories of human reason) from a place of strength, in
all its this-worldly splendor, would be to affirm the world of becoming and overcome the
problem of nihilism. If the “other world” is truly a “synonym for nonbeing, nonliving, not
wanting to live,” then this world must become a synonym for a Yea-saying
superabundance of life: the affirmation of the world as wills to power, in all of its
richness and inexhaustibility, with purposes, values, and truths which exceed an
individual’s own. 726 Such an outcome is only possible, however, “for a people proud of
itself, whose life is ascending.” 727 To overcome nihilism, a strength which results in the
love of earthly existence must reign in individuals and come to dominate a culture. As we
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will see later, such love becomes possible only if the personal transformations of certain
individuals can be brought about by a change in the way these individuals understand the
world as a source of truth, purpose, and value.
Up until this point in my project, I have aimed to faithfully present elements of
Nietzsche’s thought and offer a coherent interpretation of the problems of European and
affective nihilism, as well as his vague proposals for resolving or overcoming such
nihilisms. In the following chapters, however, my goal will not be to present Nietzsche’s
own proposed solutions to these nihilisms. Rather, I hope to find resources in his thought
— in particular, in a reading of the role that drives play in Nietzsche’s metaphysical
picture — which offer a way out of the kinds of nihilism Nietzsche describes.
In the first two chapters, we saw that European nihilism — and the return of
affective nihilism in Nietzsche’s age — results from the collapse of nihilistic conceptions
of truth, purpose, and value which had been “falsely projected into the essence of things.”
We saw also that Nietzsche called this the “hyperbolic naiveté of man: positing himself
as the meaning and measure of the value of things.” 728 The first error of European
nihilism (as a series of beliefs about the world) was the falsification of the world through
the projection of our own categories onto the world itself: a (mis)translation of nature into
something comprehensible by mankind. This project fails as those categories — objective
truth, transcendent purpose, and real, higher value — become unbelievable. Although
Nietzsche remarks that this is a mere stage in nihilism which might be passed through, he
does not give a detailed account of how this might be done.
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In the next section, I will try to show that Nietzsche’s drive ontology (as
presented in the third chapter) can serve as a resource — whether Nietzsche intends for it
to or not — for finding immanent sources of truth, purpose, and value. This drive
ontology allows human beings to translate ourselves and our experiences back into nature
as will to power, thus reversing humanity’s prior nihilistic mistranslation. Nietzsche’s
metaphysics — the world as the ever-changing flux of a multitude of drives as wills to
power — thus offers a potential resource for thinking beyond European nihilism. It is my
view, furthermore, that Nietzsche's drive ontology — and the recognition that any
boundary between oneself and one’s world is a permeable one — might also be utilized
in the fight against affective nihilism. After all, I will argue, re-thinking the world as wills
to power enables one to “learn to think differently… in order perhaps, even very late on,
to attain even more: to feel differently.” 729
4.2 Overcoming European Nihilism: “All meaning is will to power”
As we saw in the work of Gooding-Williams, Nietzsche believes the European man
suffers from an “estrangement from receptivity.” 730 In our scientific, rational, and
anthropocentric age in which external, transcendent sources of truth, purpose, and value
become unbelievable, human beings forget their nature as porous subject-unities and
become estranged from the importance of this receptivity for living a meaningful human
life and creating new values. In this section, I will argue both that European nihilism is
characterized by this estrangement and that overcoming European nihilism requires
individuals and cultures to overcome this estrangement. In the nihilistic age during which
Nietzsche writes, a belief in the limitlessness of human reason and willing (which
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understands the human as a freely determined and determining substance-subject, as egosubstance) leads to the unbelievability of sources of truth, purpose, and value which come
to us from without. 731 Thus, human beings become estranged from their nature as
receptive subject-unities, constituted not only by themselves (as complexes of drives) but
also by the driven world in which they are embedded.
In a note from 1885, Nietzsche sets up the possibility of the world as will to
power to solve the problem of nihilism. In this fragment he asks: ““Is there meaning in
itself? Is not meaning necessarily relations of meaning and perspectives?” He then
proposes an answer to this second rhetorical question: “All meaning is will to power (all
relations of meaning can be dispersed into it). 732 Although Nietzsche himself does not
explicitly utilize his metaphysics of the will to power to formulate a positive solution to
the problem of meaningless inherent in European nihilism, I hope to show that his drive
ontology — and the relations of meaning it makes possible — can be used to do just this.
4.2.1 Overcoming European nihilism
The problem of European nihilism, as described in the first chapter of this work, results
from the collapse of particular widespread conceptions of purpose, truth, and value. As
we saw, European nihilism is composed of three different types of nihilism: ethical
nihilism, a nihilism of purposelessness, and epistemological nihilism. In ethical nihilism,
the nihilist comes to believe that her world is valueless; in a nihilism of purposelessness,
the nihilist comes to believe that her world is without purpose; and in epistemological
nihilism, the nihilist comes to believe that her world is without truth. Since value,
purpose, and truth have historically serves as sources of meaning for human beings, a
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disbelief in value, purpose, and truth results in a belief that the world is “meaningless.”
These beliefs held by the European nihilist and nihilistic cultures — the total
disbelief in value, purpose, and truth— importantly follow from the unbelievability of
specific or particular conceptions of value, purpose, and truth. Nietzsche argues this
explicitly in his notes:
Extreme positions are not succeeded by moderate ones but by extreme positions
of the opposite kind. Thus the belief in the absolute immorality of nature, in aimand meaninglessness… once the belief in God and an essentially moral order
becomes untenable. Nihilism appears at that point… because one has come to
mistrust any “meaning” in suffering, indeed in existence. One interpretation has
collapsed, but because it was considered the interpretation, it now seems as if
there were no meaning in existence, as if everything were in vain.
The European nihilist believes the world is valueless because she comes to believe that
there are no absolute values in the world; she believes the world is purposeless because
there is no higher purpose or telos at which the world aims; and she believes that the
world is false because there is no such thing as objective truth or absolute knowledge. In
these cases, the collapse of the dominant interpretations of value, purpose, and truth is
understood as the impossibility of these, full stop, and this understanding leads to the
nihilistic beliefs about which Nietzsche writes.
My attempt to utilize Nietzsche’s drive ontology as a resource for overcoming
European nihilism does not attempt to re-discover these same conceptions of truth,
purpose, and value in the world and reinstate belief in them, so that these old conceptions
of truth, purpose, and value are “revived” in some way. Instead, I propose that
Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the world as wills to power offers alternative ways of
conceiving of truth, purpose, and value which avoid the pitfalls of the nihilistic
conceptions, and especially the otherworldly belief in non-existent and unattainable
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conceptions of objective truth, higher purpose, and absolute value which give meaning to
human beings “from without.” 733
Nietzsche’s drive ontology first offers the European nihilist a world full of value
and valuing. As composed of drives and complexes of drives, the world is essentially
value-laden, since “Every power center [Kraftcentrum] has its perspective, i.e., its very
definite value, its mode of action, its mode of resistance.” 734 As demonstrated above, this
value which drives (or “power centers”) have is not their value for other beings; it is not a
merely instrumental value. Rather, it is a value which emerges from out of the affective
orientation of the drive as a determinate potential for transforming or being transformed
by those drives that constitute one’s world. This affective orientation is fixed by the
characteristic aim or goal of the drive in question.
Put differently: The characteristic activity of a particular drive, as essentially
connected to that drive’s individuating aim or goal, orients this drive in the world such
that it will transform and be transformed in some ways and not in others. Insofar as
different drives and complexes of drives in the world have the potential for positive and
negative interactions with this drive — interactions which either increase or decrease this
drive’s activity, either facilitating or hindering the achievement of its aim — the world is
“polarized” in relation to the drive. This polarization results in certain aspects of the
world having a positive value and other aspects having a negative value in relation to the
drive in question. As Richardson notes, “Each drive’s end-directed activity already
‘polarizes’ the world toward it, giving everything a significance relative to it.” 735 This
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significance given to the world around a drive means that the world is never neutral for
any particular drive; the drive always has an evaluative orientation.
These drives and their evaluative orientations are always situated in relation to
and in engagement with other drives comprising the world of which they are a part, and
this engagement involves the interaction between drives as “largely stable types” with
“way[s] of pursuing power in a project whose overall lines were drawn beforehand.” 736
Since the evaluative orientation of a drive emerges from out of a drive’s end and the
affective orientation a drive has in virtue of its end, we can imagine that the values a
particular drive is disposed to having will look the same across complexes of drives: for
example, the evaluative orientation of my hunger drive will look very similar to your
hunger drive, but different than your drive to knowledge. But, importantly, if my drive to
knowledge for some reason incorporates my drive to combativeness, there will be
something of my drive to combativeness’s characteristic activity — and its evaluative
orientation — which is preserved. The activities of incorporation and sublimation, as
Richardson observes, always involve preserving some aspect of the essential end of the
drive which is incorporated: as Richardson notes, “drive change… by their amendment,
not their replacement.” 737
Insofar as the basic relations of Nietzschean drives to one another —
incorporation, sublimation, and even resistance — fundamentally involve bringing what
is “outside” in, we would seem to be justified in saying that even at most basic level of
Nietzsche’s drive ontology, existence necessarily involves relating to and being shaped
by something outside, something which exceeds that which we conventionally assign
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independent existence. 738 This is even clearer in the case of human existence, insofar as
the human is a complex of drives constantly interacting and engaging with other
complexes of drives. On this picture, part of what it means for a human being to exist is
to participate and be shaped by a world which exceeds oneself. Given that every drive
possesses an evaluative orientation, it is easy to move from this claim to a claim that
human beings (as driven beings) are always situated in a world of evaluative orientations
— “values” — which shapes and informs their own evaluative orientations. Otherwise
put: human beings, as complexes of drives, inhabit a value-laden world, and their values
are shaped in some basic way by the values “out there” in the world of which they find
themselves a part.
In sum, drives comprise evaluative perspectives in virtue of their affective
orientations, which result necessarily from the concrete end at which a drive aims. Insofar
as drives value the ends at which they are aimed and have evaluative orientations in the
world, driven beings (as complexes of drives) essentially value a plurality of ends and
harbor a plurality of inherent values in the form of their drives’ evaluative orientations. 739
By emphasizing a permeability between driven beings and the driven world of which
they are a part, one comes to see that one does not merely project the evaluative
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orientation of her drives onto the world, but also is permeated and transformed by other
complexes of drives and the various evaluative orientations of the drives of which those
“others” are constituted. 740
The European nihilist, stuck in her culturally inherited habit of identifying a
value-laden world with a world in which absolute values exist — a world in which all
beings should be measured according to the same absolute values — believes that the
world is valueless because values (qua absolute) do not exist. Thus, the European nihilist
is an ethical nihilist. In agreement with the European nihilist qua ethical nihilist,
Nietzsche insists that absolute, higher values do not exist in reality. But Nietzsche hints,
in his remarks that nihilism is a transitional stage, that we can move beyond this belief
and learn to re-think value and found values in this-worldly existence. On my view, his
drive ontology allows us to do just that, even if we cannot claim that he intended it to do
so.
If the European nihilist accepts this new understanding of values — as evaluative
orientations, their intersections, and their engagements — she becomes able to re-think
that culturally established conception of value (as absolute value) which led to her belief
that the world is devoid of value. If she comes to understand the world as value-laden
and, through a deeper understanding of Nietzsche’s drive ontology, recognizes the
permeability between human subjects and the world in which they are a part, she
becomes able to think of herself as embedded in a value-laden world. In this way, she
might move beyond her (mistaken) belief that the world is valueless.
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Because the human being is a complex of drives embedded in a driven world
which extends beyond us, we are always already in a value-laden world. Because there
there is a fundamental permeability between separate driven subject-unities, as well as a
permeability between particular subject-unities and the world of which they find
themselves a part, the creation of new values and valuations is also possible. The
potential for interactions, clashes, and conflicts between evaluative perspectives — and
the incorporation or assimilation of new values and valuations which this makes possible
— is inherent to the driven world as wills to power. The world as wills to power is thus
fertile ground for the participation in and the creation of value and meaning.
In Acampora’s account of agon as a mechanism of meaning production, we see a
version of this idea. According to Acampora, agon — as a contest or struggle between
two parties — is significant for Nietzsche because of “the link between agonism and
meaning-making… [as] the perpetual creation and re-creation of value and
significance.” 741 Insofar as Nietzschean drives are in constant interaction — and, not
infrequently, struggling in resistance against one another — they are constantly
generating new values from out of the meeting of their divergent evaluative orientations
and giving new meanings to those values which they encounter. Since reality is the world
as wills to power, it is part of Nietzsche’s fabric of reality that new values and
significances are always being created. 742 This is something we can imagine when we
think the incorporation of one drive by another, as seen earlier in my example of the

741

Christa Acampora, Contesting Nietszche. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 6.
The notion of permeability between individuals as complexes of drives which I employ is
intended to enables one to understand how such meaning-making works at the level of human
interactions, both as two interpenetrating subject-unities or as a subject-unity and other beings in
the driven world of which one is a part.
742

251

passive-aggressive individual. When my drive to combativeness incorporates a drive to
underhandedness, that drive to combativeness takes on a new meaning and evaluative
stance, shaped in part by the aim of the drive to underhandedness which it incorporates.
This new drive to combativeness will positively value underhandedly unkind behaviors
and negatively value obviously cruel and aggressive behaviors.
Acampora’s understanding of “agon as a mechanism or means for creating other
values” thus fits neatly with the account of Nietzsche’s metaphysics which I offer. 743 In
two short excerpts, Acampora describes specific instances of this mechanism in
Nietzsche’s work. The first is in the agon between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in
The Birth of Tragedy, and the second is the slavish revaluation from the Genealogy. In
the latter case, Acampora describes the following:
what one prospectively undergoes in the aesthetic experience afforded by tragedy
is essentially the play of meaning and measure… the tragic work of art offers
appreciation of the claims of measure, intelligibility, the comfort that comes from
having a compass for our actions and our pursuits of knowledge, while at the
same time affording the sense that the claims of measure are malleable, capable of
relocation, and admit of being reissued in light of a reorganization of desirable
ends…
On my account, Nietzsche’s account of the agon between the Apollinian and the
Dionysian in a tragic work serves as one example in which old values and perspectives
are dislocated and transformed via the interactions of the evaluative perspectives of the
drives. What results is a new value (or set of values) which establishes a new and
previously impossible significance in the world. This creation of value is possible only
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through the interactions of the particular drives which create it through their interactions
or struggles with one another, and any new value importantly preserves elements of both
of the drives involved in the exchange.
In the case of Nietzsche’s Genealogy, Acampora describes “slavish
revaluation…[as] a distinctive and distinguishing possibility of human creativity in value
production, in meaning-making, that was previously unrealized.” 744 In the case of slavish
revaluations of values from the Genealogy, weak, slavish individuals label the practices
of powerful, masterful individuals “evil.” This creative possibility — the possibility to
create a new value — arises from out of the evaluative orientation of the slavish
individuals (which understands the masters as “bad” in relation to themselves), rooted in
a complex affective orientation (a reactive, vengeful orientation) which Nietzsche calls
ressentiment. As Acampora rightly notes, the slaves engage in meaning-making by
creating new values and a new evaluative perspective. This is possible on my account
because of the slaves’ constitution — as a complex of drives — and the interaction of this
driven constitution with other forces and drives. 745 This is a particularly noteworthy
innovation because the incorporation involves an evaluative perspective with an
evaluative orientation which is remarkably distinct from that which it incorporates.
In sum, if the European nihilist can come to “think differently” about value and
understand themselves as valuing beings embedded in a value-laden world, their nihilistic
belief (which understands the lack of absolute values as a complete lack of value) can be
overcome. Not only are human beings, as complexes of drives embedded in a driven
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world, always already held open to the evaluative orientations of other drives and
complexes of drives; they also play a role in the dislocation of old values and the
subsequent creation of new values in virtue of this openness. After all, as we saw earlier,
it is because Nietzsche was in the first case receptive to Schopenhauer’s work and found
it to be of profound value that he was able to productively engage with Schopenhauer’s
thought; because he had first taken on or inhabited the perspectives of Schopenhauerian
values, Nietzsche could authentically engage with and eventually dislocate these values,
creating new values from out of this interaction.
For example, Nietzsche’s emphasis in The Birth of Tragedy on the need for
“illusions of organic unity and thus of enhanced beauty and meaningfulness” (“the world
justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon” 746) reveals his early, profoundly
Schopenhauerian assumption that life as it actually is — as suffering qua endless,
unfulfilled striving — is unbearable, and must be redeemed even if only by employing
consoling illusions. 747 Yet Nietzsche’s occupation of this Schopenhauerian perspective
— his incorporation of this perspective which he lived as his own — was only temporary.
In Nietzsche’s “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” he characterizes the “artists’ metaphysics”
which he presented in The Birth of Tragedy as a “deep hatred against modernism, reality,
and modern ideas… which would sooner believe in nothingness or the devil than in the
here and now” and as “practical nihilism.” 748 In contrast to Schopenhauer, the mature
Nietzsche finds it necessary for himself to “[acquire] hardness as a habit to be cheerful
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and in good spirits in the midst of nothing but hard truths.” 749 In my view, Nietzsche’s
eventual rejection of the life-redeeming value of metaphysical illusions (and any
“metaphysical consolation” that such illusions might provide), as well as the value he
places in an affirmation of this-worldly existence which includes a profound honesty and
ability to face “hard truths,” were made possible by his engagement with Schopenhauer’s
worldview, to which he was in the first instance receptive and affirmative.
In the case of nihilism of purposelessness, the European nihilist — stuck in her
culturally inherited habit of identifying a purposeful world with a world in which there is
a higher purpose or telos at which the world aims — believes that the world is
purposeless. Nietzsche accepts the latter belief: there is no higher purpose or telos at
which the world aims. But he also hints that we can move beyond this belief and learn to
re-think purpose. As we will see below, his drive ontology allows us to re-think
purposiveness in a non-nihilistic way, just as it did for value.
In remarks from his notebooks, Nietzsche suggests that any notion of a single,
higher purpose ought to be rejected in favor of a view according to which all
purposiveness can be explained as the manifestation of will to power:
[Theses.] That apparent ‘purposiveness’ ("that purposiveness which endlessly
surpasses all the arts of man") is merely the consequence of the will to power
manifest in all events… Against apparent ‘purposiveness’ — the latter only an
expression for an order of sphere of power and their interplay.
Given Nietzsche’s drive ontology, we can read this excerpt as involving both 1) an
explanation of the appearance of a world with a single, higher purpose in terms of the
world as wills to power, which order the world in similar ways (in drives’ attempts to
achieve their characteristic aims) and 2) an explanation of purposiveness in actuality as
749
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present only in the expressions of drives and their interactions. Given Nietzsche’s drive
ontology, this makes perfect sense: the defining feature of all Nietzsche drives, after all,
is their end-directedness, which can be explained with reference to the particular goal or
end at which the a drive aims. There is no one, higher purpose at which the world aims,
but as many purposes as there are drives.
Since the world for Nietzsche is composed of drives as wills to power, the world
is a world of innumerable purposes. There is not one purpose towards which the world
aims, but instead, countless purposes towards which drives aim. There is no one purpose
to life, but myriad purposes of life insofar as life is nothing more than driven life (life as
wills to power, as drives and complexes of drives in relation to one another). 750 If
European nihilists can come to “think differently” about purpose in this way and
understand themselves as complexes of drives — and, as such, complexes of purposes
and loci of immanent purposiveness — their nihilistic belief (which understands the lack
of a higher purpose at which the world aims as a complete lack of purpose) can be
overcome.
Nietzschean drives, as purposeful forces and the most basic units of reality, create
a texture of reality which is ever-changing yet still inherently meaningful insofar as it is
inherently purposeful. As Richardson notes, “only with and in [drives’] structures and
750
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meanings does the world get structure and meaning; they give it its ‘joints.’” 751 The
structure of which Richardson here speaks is the telic or end-directed structure of the
drives, that which dictates the purpose or goal towards which a drive moves and situates
the drive as a process, as a becoming rather than a being. Drives are always in motion,
always attempting to subdue, incorporate, and assimilate other drives, while still retaining
their essential telic thrusts and thus their inherent meaning. What Richardson calls the
“telic structure” of a given drive dictates the purpose or goal towards which it moves. Yet
these drives are always in flux, in that they change the ways in which they approach their
goals as other processes of reality change around them.
The nature of the drives as interpenetrative forces, incorporating purposeful
processes means that the “things are connected… by giving meaning to one another, as
voices in a conversational web:” 752 this is the “relational being” of drives. Each drive has
a number of permutations available for it, and these permutations are a result both of a
drive’s own individuating goal and the relation that this goal has to the goals of the drives
with which it engages, or interacting through resistance, incorporating, or being
incorporated. 753 Otherwise put, the telic structure of individual drives dictates the drive’s
activity and essentially influences the forms that a drive’s incorporation or assimilation of
another drive takes. This relational feature of the drives is a function of the permeability
between two drives or complexes of drives, and this relational nature serves to remind
one that although one always harbors a plurality of purposes, one is also embedded in a
purposeful world in relation to which one’s own drives get significance or meaning. In
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this way, the human being as subject-unity always participates in a world of purpose and
meaning which exceeds her own existence.
As Richardson points out, there is a “general richness of drives” internal to human
beings, insofar as persons “enact within themselves the interweaving of
perspectives…[and] encompass and embody the diversity and conflict of viewpoints”:
each individual is a “wealth of interlocking projects.” 754 Every individual already
contains countless perspectives and purposes within herself insofar as she is a complex of
drives; yet each individual is also constituted by the interactions which she has with other
driven beings, each of which is also a more or less rich configuration of purposeful
drives. In virtue of their constitution as complexes of drives, as well as their
embeddedness in a driven world, human beings are always already held open to the
purposes of other drives and complexes of drives. We always already engage with and
therefore participate in purposes “greater than ourselves,” where “greater than” refers to
an extension beyond one’s own complex of purposeful drives. There is no lack of
purpose in the world, as the nihilist of purposelessness believes, but quite the opposite:
the world is excessively purposeful, with countless purposes in which one (even
unknowingly) participates and with which one can (even unknowingly) engage. There is
no one higher purpose at which the world aims, but countless purposeful forces —drives as wills to power — of which the world is comprised: not a higher purpose, then,
but a purposiveness immanent to the world as wills to power.
As should already be quite clear, this new conception of purposiveness will
require the nihilist of purposelessness to think very differently about a purposeful world.
754
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Nietzsche’s purposeful world is a world of always-transforming immanent purposiveness,
in which there is no higher purpose which justifies the actions or behaviors of all beings.
This view of purpose, as immanently unfolding and situated in the world as wills to
power (as the interactions and relations of drives) offers the nihilist of purposelessness a
genuine alternative to higher purpose (as a single purpose towards which the world aims
and in which the aims of all driven beings are unified). Indeed, given the activity of the
drives as wills to power, participating in a world of immanent purposiveness necessarily
involves one’s constant engagement with novel purposes which come “from without.”
Although the end-directedness of particular drives will be fixed (given the individuating
end or goal which that drive has), since the incorporation and assimilation of drives
results in a reshaping of the means by which the purposes of drives or complexes of
drives are reached, one’s participation in an immanently purposeful world will be
transformative.
Nietzsche’s drive ontology, finally, offers the European nihilist the possibility of
truth, albeit a very different kind of truth. Instead of absolute, objective truth, truth for
Nietzsche is always perspectival truth, and knowledge consists in the differential
disclosure of the world as wills to power, filtered through the lenses of the perspectives of
our drives. This view of truth is Nietzsche’s perspectivism, which he formulates perhaps
most clearly in the third essay of the Genealogy:
precisely because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to resolute
reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations…. to see differently in this
way for one, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of
the intellect for its future ‘objectivity’ — the latter understood not as a
‘contemplation without interest’ (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the
ability to control ones’s Pros and Cons… so that one knows how to employ a
variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge.
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Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the
dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure,’ will-less, painless, timeless
knowing subject”…. There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival
‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more
eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our
‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be. 755
For Nietzsche, every perspective or way of knowing a phenomenon reveals different
aspects of that phenomenon; every new perspective is a new interpretation. The more
perspectives one has on a phenomenon, the more one knows about that phenomenon.
This is what Nietzsche refers to when he speaks in this excerpt of a future notion of
“objectivity.”
Insofar as these perspectives are the perspectives of drives or complexes of drives,
understanding Nietzsche’s ontology allows us to reach a better understanding of his
perspectivism. We see a connection between Nietzsche’s drive ontology and
perspectivism as an alternative account of knowledge in Nietzsche’s notes, where he calls
for “a theory of the perspectivism of the affects (to which a hierarchy of affects belong)”
to replace a “theory of knowledge.” 756 We also see this connection in Nietzsche’s
unpublished claim that “From all of our basic drives [Grundtriebe] come different
perspectival evaluations of all happenings… Man as a complexity of ‘wills to power’…
thoughts are merely symptoms.” 757 If our thoughts are merely the symptoms of our
drives, then all knowing and thinking is fundamentally rooted in our nature as driven
beings. In other words, “the perspectival, deceptive character belongs to existence [der
perspectivische, täuschende Charakter gehört zur Existenz]” because existence is nothing
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but wills to power. 758 This realization — that perspectivism is a feature of human
existence — not only enables us to re-conceive what counts for “truth” or “knowledge,”
but forces us to do so.
As Mitcheson persuasively argues in her detailed treatment of Nietzsche on truth,
“knowledge is to be found in the manifold of embodied perspectives [and] not in an
attempt to transcend them.” 759 So, by recognizing the contingency of our conceptions of
truth, as the European nihilist does — we may “gain new habits and engage in a practice
of truth” which emerge from out of our drives and our embeddedness in a driven
world. 760 Nietzsche’s drive ontology allows us to understand knowledge and knowing not
as the acquisition of absolute, objective truth, but as embodied practice in which we come
to know the world in different ways, as it is differently disclosed to our drives, which
always already have evaluative orientations in the world. 761 Since truth emerges from out
of the drives and their evaluative orientations, truth will not be value-neutral. Knowledge
will not be uniform among human beings, even if the mechanism of knowledge (the
filtering of one’s world through the drives) is. Although this conception of truth is
unconventional, Nietzsche’s perspectivism still allows the epistemological nihilist to reconceive truth and knowledge in a way that allows them to reject their total disbelief in
the existence of truth. In fact, for Nietzsche, it is part of our constitution that we
participate in truth; in virtue of our constitution as complexes of drives which compose a
variety of perspectives, we are able to come to know the world in myriad ways.
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Nietzsche’s grounding of knowledge and truth in the drives makes knowledge a
fundamental feature of existence. To exist, as a complex of drives, is to “know” the world
in Nietzsche’s sense.
Let’s return to the fragment with which I started this section, and especially
Nietzsche’s claim that “All meaning is will to power (all relations of meaning can be
dispersed into it).” 762 Some might read Nietzsche here as claiming that all meaning is
mere human projection, as a way of individuals’ asserting power over their world. On this
reading, there would be no “meaningful world” of which I am a part, which resists my
willing. 763As should be clear at this point, I read this claim in the exact opposite way. On
my reading, the participation and creation of meaning (as truths, purposes, and values) is
made possible by Nietzsche’s drive ontology. Nietzsche’s claim that all “relations of
meaning” can be “dispersed” into Nietzsche’s wills to power can be read as a positive
response to the problem of nihilism: since I am always already a complex of wills to
power embedded in a world of wills to power, I always already participate in relations of
meaning. This participation is made possible by a permeability between myself as a
complex of drives and the driven world of which I am a part.
In the moment of European nihilism, as argued above, we become estranged from
our nature as receptive beings, open to the world around us. Yet recognizing this
receptivity is required for understanding the world as meaningful. We must learn not to
be estranged from this any longer; in this way, we can learn that we are embedded in —
and participate in — a meaning-full world. In short, Nietzsche’s ontology, and the
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fundamental receptivity on which it relies, enables us to recognize that we are embedded
in a world of purpose, value, and truth. Insofar as Nietzsche’s drive ontology enables us
to return to ourselves and our nature as receptive beings, it allows us to understand our
participation in truth, purpose, and value anew and thus serves as a resource for
overcoming European nihilism.
4.3 The Diagnosis: Affective Nihilism
Nietzsche’s metaphysics, then, serves as a corrective for European nihilism as a set of
beliefs about meaning. Yet nihilism for Nietzsche is not merely a cognitive problem: as
we have seen, it is also a feeling-based, affective phenomenon. So we must think at this
point whether Nietzsche also provides some resources for treating — or overcoming —
nihilism as a feeling-based, affective condition.
As described at length above, affective nihilism involves a “Nay-saying
[neinsagenden] spirit” which belongs to the affective nihilist at the level of her
physiology, or her basic constitution as a complex of drives. 764 The affective nihilist is
characterized as such not because she holds a series of beliefs about meaning, but
because her drives manifest a “nihilistic instinct [which] says No.” 765 For Nietzsche,
affective nihilism is 1) expressed in particular negative emotional responses and 2) rooted
in an underlying physiological condition — for Nietzsche, a condition of the will —
which Nietzsche characterizes as “weakness of the will [Willensschwäche] and as life
turned “against itself and deny[ing] itself.” 766
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Given Nietzsche’s drive ontology, we can now sharpen our understanding of that
in which affective nihilism consists. The life-denying spirit of the affective nihilist is a
feature of his or her basic constitution. Since all human beings are most basically
constituted by drives and can be understood as embodied complexes of drives, affective
nihilism must be understood as a condition of the drives. 767 As a “weakness of the will”
and life turned “against itself and deny[ing] itself,” affective nihilism is an illness of the
drives as wills to power which is characterized by some weakness or inefficacy of these
wills to power which distorts their characteristic pattern of activity as will to power. 768
According to Nietzsche, drives (as wills to power) aim to enhance the achievement of
their characteristic ends in some way. 769 The weakness of the will characteristic of
affective nihilism to which Nietzsche refers, however, consists in the inefficacy of drives,
as their inability to increase their characteristic activities. As Richardson notes, in the
case of affective nihilism, the “drives… [are] not strong enough to advance against the
forces arrayed around them.” 770 Richardson also refers to an “an incapacity in one’s
drives, an inability to enact them.” 771
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As Nietzsche remarks, the inability of a drive to grow in its characteristic activity
most usually results in the mere self-preservation of the drive. Thus Nietzsche will often
connect mere self-preservation to that weakness of the will characteristic of affective
nihilism: “the wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of a
limitation of the really fundamental instinct of life [emphasis mine] which aims at the
expansion of power, and, wishing for that, frequently risks and even sacrifices selfpreservation.” 772 The distress in which the various drives of the affective nihilist find
themselves results from an involuntary constriction of their activity, as opposed to the
expansion of their activity at which they aim. As wills to power, drives will always aim at
their own growth, but this characteristic pattern of activity can be disrupted. Although
those weakened drives which characterize the affective nihilist have no possibility but to
continue willing power and attempting to increase their activity, they find themselves
unable to achieve this expansion or increase.
As we saw earlier, the affective nihilism which returns in Nietzsche’s age results
from European nihilism insofar as it those nihilistic conceptions of truth, purpose, and
value which alleviated this affective illness become unbelievable in the moment of
European nihilism. Since it was these frameworks for understanding which led human
beings to feel engaged in a meaningful world, when such frameworks collapse one
becomes unmoored. The collapse of such conceptions of truth, purpose, and value which
her to preserve some limited amount of vitality as a driven being results in a weakening
nihilism can be understood as “opposed” or “averse” to life insofar as healthy life involves
growth in a drive’s characteristic activity. The “revolt against” life which Nietzsche speaks of in
Twilight of the Idols is even referred to as a “mere symptom of life” as “declining, weakened,
weary condemned life” (TI.V.5): a symptom of ineffective drives. There is no reason, in my view,
to claim that affective nihilism also involves the development of a new drive.
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of the individual: as her drives — without opportunities for discharge — wither and
weaken, she becomes disengaged from her world. The problem of affective nihilism does
not only consist in the ineffectiveness of one’s drives; it also consists in a felt sense that
one is disengaged (or closed off) from the world in which she previously felt herself
meaningfully engaged.
By attending to the essential affective (and thus evaluative) orientations which
drives have, we can describe the above condition of affective nihilism more precisely.
For Nietzsche, affective nihilism is a loss of one’s capacities — rooted in their drives and
their constitution as a complex of drives — both to actively and effectively will and to
stay engaged in the world in a way that allows the world to inspire or move one. This loss
leads to a disruption of one’s evaluative orientation, such that one is unable to find value
in the world. As we saw in the previous chapter on affective nihilism, the weariness or
disgust that the suffering individual experiences towards life, the world, and human
existence appears to this individual not only as caused by the world, but as justified. In
short, the condition in which one finds one’s drives manifests itself in certain feelings,
behaviors, thoughts, and evaluations.
We can image a concrete case which will make this more intuitive, if we recall the
parallel between affective nihilism and depression from the second chapter. We recall
that the affective nihilist is characterized by exhaustion and disgust; she experiences
feelings of weariness or fatigue, disappointment with herself, and a great nausea with
humanity. 773 Nietzsche describes affective nihilism as “lethargy, heaviness, and
depression:” it is a “slow sadness” and “dull pain,” experienced as a “resistance to
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life.” 774 These descriptions, as well as Nietzsche’s description of the will-weakness
characteristic of the affective nihilist, square with a number of the characteristics required
for a diagnosis of major depressive disorder: 1) a “depressed mood most of the day,
nearly every day, as indicated by… subjective report (e.g., feels sad, empty, hopeless
[emphasis mine]); 2) “markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all,
activities most of the day, nearly every day;” 3) “fatigue or loss of energy nearly every
day;” 4) “feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be
delusional) nearly every day;” and 5) a “diminished ability to think or concentrate, or
indecisiveness, nearly every day.” 775 If we so conceive the affective nihilist, we can
understand the connection between a drive-based account of her condition and
descriptions of its outward manifestations.
As noted in the second chapter, major depressive disorder is, in part, a disruption
of one’s end-directedness: in a depressive state, one’s goals and purposes are unclear,
unattainable, unachieved, undervalued, or absent. It is not difficult to see how Nietzsche
might describe this in terms of an inefficacy or weakness of the drives, as an inability of
end-directed processes to reach their ends and grow in their activity. By comparing the
affective nihilist to one experiencing depression, then, one might concretely imagine how
affective nihilism, as a more general condition involving more complex emotional
responses, can result from disruptions in the operations of one’s drives.
In order to overcome affective nihilism, then, the affective nihilist will have to
undergo a profound personal transformation which enacts fundamental changes in their
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constitution as a complex of drives. This makes affective nihilism in Nietzsche a difficult
problem to solve. By combining elements of Nietzsche’s account of personal
transformation with the metaphysical resources he offers for addressing European
nihilism, however, I believe we can formulate at least one potential treatment. This
potential treatment will not be a definitive solution to the problem of affective nihilism,
but it might allow us to point towards a way in which this condition might be
overcome. 776
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, re-thinking the world as wills to power
enables one to recognize a permeability between oneself as a subject-unity and the world
of which one is a part. An account of personal transformation which takes this porosity
into account, on my view, can help to point us towards a Nietzschean treatment for
affective nihilism. In this way, Nietzsche’s drive ontology, recognized as a response to
European nihilism, enables one to“learn to think differently… in order perhaps, even very
late on, to attain even more: to feel differently.” 777 On Nietzsche’s view, this is the task
of those few individuals who experience this affective nihilism yet possess the ability to
move beyond it and come to affirm life.
Given that affective nihilism is a condition which disrupts one’s capacities both to
will and to stay engaged in one’s world, the overcoming of this condition must involve
both the exercise of agency (as the abilities to have goals, increase one’s activity, and
play a part in one’s own transformation) and an affirmation of the world in all its
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complexity. 778 On my account, the individual who overcomes nihilism first comes to play
a role in her own self-transformation. This process — which critically involves constantly
taking stock of oneself via the reflection upon a personal narrative — offers the potential
for both a reactivation of the end-directed activity of the drives and an increase in their
activity. Otherwise put, it allows for the individual to achieve a measure of agency.
This process also allows an individual to recognize her fundamentally receptive
nature, as a complex of drives embedded in the driven world. When this happens, the
individual is no longer “estranged” from her receptive nature and becomes able to
recognize her participation in a world of immanent purposiveness, inherent value, and
perspectival truth. This way of thinking differently about oneself and one’s world — as
the world as a condition of purpose, value, and truth and oneself as inseparable from this
meaningful world — allows one to re-engage in one’s world and affirm this-worldly
existence as a condition of her positive transformation. This overcoming of one’s
sickness with oneself, as well as the accompanying life-denial, results when one learns
both to play a role in her own transformation and, as Gooding-Williams suggests, to
recognize their fundamentally receptive nature in a way which allows the individual to
create new values from out of the old. Such value creation requires a certain measure of
activeness in the drives, but also requires a deep engagement in earthly existence and
celebration of one’s natural inclinations and instincts.
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As Richardson notes, the perspective of the highest type of individual for Nietzsche —
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4.4 Nietzsche’s Treatment: Self-Narration
As we see above, the problem with overcoming affective nihilism in Nietzsche is that the
affective nihilist, suffering from the incapacity or ineffectiveness of her drives, is
disengaged from her aims and goals, out of touch with herself, and feels helpless to
change her condition. She is unable to exert her will or engage with the world in
meaningful ways, and this leads to a negative valuation of life. 779 Since the problem of
affective nihilism, then, is a problem of agency, its overcoming requires one to become
an agent with goals at which she is directed and towards which she moves. The person
who moves beyond affective nihilism must reestablish goals towards which she is
directed by stimulating the activity of her drives; to become effective, she must move
towards those goals in action.
In the course of our investigation into self-narration as a means of establishing
agency in Nietzsche, we must be careful here to not misunderstand the agent as an egosubstance with a unified, rational will which causes actions. Indeed, Nietzsche rejects this
conventional picture of agency, calling it a “fable” and an “error.” In an aphorism entitled
“The Fable of Intelligible Freedom” from Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche claims that
“we are not the work of ourselves.” 780 Elsewhere, he suggests that humans wrongly
suppose that “the deed of a free will (is) the fundamental cause of the existence of an
individual” and that “man becomes that which he wishes to be [der Mensch werde Das,
was er werden wolle], his willing precedes his existence [sein Wollen sei früher, als seine
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Existenz].” 781 In his excoriation of the human tendency to think that we act and determine
ourselves freely according to certain prior intentions or principles, Nietzsche notes that
we often suppose that “our thinking and judgment…[is] the cause of our nature… but in
fact it is our nature that is the cause of our thinking and judging thus and thus [aber
thatsächlich ist unser Wesen die Ursache, dass wir so und so denken und urtheilen].” 782
This “confusion of cause and effect” appears later as the first great error in Twilight of the
Idols.
Yet in spite of these critiques of conventional agency, Nietzsche still calls on his
readers to transform themselves and insists upon the possibility of self-transformation.
Nietzsche famously calls on his readers to “become what [they] are” in The Gay
Science. 783 Nietzsche’s remarks later in that same work describing the potential to “'give
style’ to one's character…[as] a grand and a rare art” requiring one to “[survey] all that
his nature presents in its strength and in its weakness” and “[fashion] it into an ingenious
plan.” 784 In these excerpts, Nietzsche either calls for self-transformation or implies that
certain human beings, at the very least, have the potential to transform themselves.
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra serves in part as as Bildungsroman about the
edification and personal transformation of the title character. In a section from this text,
on “self-overcoming [Selbst-Überwindung],” Nietzsche speaks of the process of personal
transformation as involving a revaluation and rejection of prior values, as well as the
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individual’s active role in identifying and creating new values unique to herself. 785 He
also refers, at various times, to certain individuals, such as Goethe, who have created
themselves. 786
In sum, although Nietzsche speaks of the importance — and possibility — of selftransformation, he also rejects traditional accounts of agency. The account of personal
transformation which we look to as a resource for overcoming affective nihilism, then,
must allow for one to play a role in one’s own “creation,” while rejecting a more
conventional, active role for the individual as freely self-determining agent. To solve this
puzzle, we will look to the role of self-knowledge — and, especially, personal narrative
— in Nietzsche’s thought, as a resource which allows for one to transform oneself
through the excitation and inhibition of one’s drives. This account will combine the
transformative power of personal narrative with Nietzsche’s drive ontology in order to
envision a possible treatment for moving beyond affective nihilism.
4.4.1 Self-knowledge as self-narration
In this section, I argue that the process of acquiring self-knowledge has to potential to
play an important role in the kind of personal transformation which facilitates a
strengthening or growth in activity of one’s drives, thus allowing one to potentially
overcome affective nihilism. Given Nietzsche’s skepticism about a certain kind of selfknowledge — namely, introspection — this might appear a strange avenue to pursue.
After all, Nietzsche frequently insists on the inaccessibility of the self to itself. In Human,
All Too Human, Nietzsche remarks on the “natural ignorance of mankind as to his
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interior [sein Inneres].” 787 Later in this text, in an aphorism critiquing the use of
introspection [Selbstbeobachtung] for self-knowledge, he compares one’s interiority to an
inaccessible fortress: “Man is very well-defended against himself, his spying and sieges;
usually he is able to make out no more of himself than his outer fortifications. The actual
fortress is inaccessible [unzugänglich] to him, even invisible [unsichtbar].” 788
Human beings on Nietzsche’s account are usually unable to access their inner
world, much less understand its constitution. In Dawn, Nietzsche claims that “however
far a man may go in self-knowledge [Selbstkenntniss], nothing however can be more
incomplete than his image of the totality of his drives [das Bild der gesammten Triebe]…
their play and counterplay among one another and above all the laws of their nutriment
remain entirely unknown to him.” 789 This same sentiment is echoed in the Nachlass,
where Nietzsche calls introspection “essentially erroneous [die wesentlich fehlerhafte
Selbstbeobachtung]” after remarking that “the balance of our drives [der Haushalt
unserer Triebe] is meanwhile far beyond our understanding.” 790
Nietzsche continues to level his critique of introspection as a means of acquiring
self-knowledge throughout his published work. 791 In Ecce Homo, he even insists that “to
become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion what one is.” 792 When
introspection is mentioned in the Nachlass, it is almost always preceded by a description
of its deceptive or falsifying nature. 793 Nietzsche titles one note “Mistrust of
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Introspection [Mißtrauen gegen die Selbstbeobachtung];” in two subsequent notes from
1888, he offers a detailed critique of introspection as a method of psychological
investigation. 794
In spite of Nietzsche’s insistence on the “inner opacity” of human beings, I will
argue that self-knowledge plays a critical role both in Nietzsche’s account of the selftransformation of rare human beings and in stimulating drive-life (and thus treating
affective nihilism). 795 We see Nietzsche hint at the former in Human, All too Human,
where he connects self-direction and self-discipline in certain noble human beings with
self-knowledge: “self-knowledge [Selbst-Erkenntniss] becomes universal knowledge
[All-Erkenntniss] as regards the entire past, and, by another chain of observation… selfdirection [Selbstbestimmung] and self-discipline [Selbsterziehung] in the freest and most
far-seeing spirits.” 796 As we see here, a certain kind of backward-looking self-knowledge
allows for one to play a role in disciplining oneself and directing one’s actions: activities
which are hallmarks of healthy individuals with well-functioning drives. We should be
reminded here of Nietzsche’s remark from Ecce Homo that his account of
Schopenhauer’s influence from the third of his Untimely Meditations was an example of
self-narration (Nietzsche remarks here that “looking back from a certain distance upon
the conditions of which these essays [from the Untimely Meditations] bear witness, I do
not wish to deny that they speak only of me”). 797 This reflection upon the impression
which Schopenhauer made on Nietzsche “functioned as “a new concept of self-
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discipline” in which “[his] innermost history [Geschichte], [his] becoming… [was]
inscribed. [And] above all, [his] promise!” 798 By recounting those features of
Schopenhauer which inspired and moved him, Nietzsche was able to identify values and
“fasten upon” himself a “chain of fulfillable duties.” 799 In short, Nietzsche’s
identification of values in the process of self-narration enabled him to direct his actions
towards those values.
Nietzsche enables us to envision this kind of self-knowledge and its role in selftransformation in an aphorism entitled “A segment of our self as artistic object [Ein
Ausschnitt unseres Selbst als künstlerisches Object].” In this passage, Nietzsche notes
that higher individuals are “necessary, but alterable [veränderlich].” 800 The question then
becomes: How is man alterable? How can man, as necessary, be transformed? Nietzsche
offers us a clue at the end of this same aphorism: higher individuals are alterable only
because they have a special ability to “segregate parts of [their] own development and
exhibit these parts in isolation [in unserer eigenen Entwickelung Stücke heraustrennen
und selbständig hinstellen können].” 801
Higher individuals establish a narrative of their lives which includes significant
moments as milestones in their development and concrete circumstances which they
identify as conditions of their personal development. The reflection on one’s personal
narrative is a unique manifestation of one’s historical sense; the development of this
sense here allows one to see herself and others as “determined by… systems and
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representatives of different cultures, that is to say as necessary, but alterable.” 802 It is this
construction of a personal narrative — this reflection on one’s life thus far, during which
one attempts to understand previous experiences as conditions of one’s development —
which counts for self-knowledge in Nietzsche. One comes to know oneself, in other
words, by constructing and reflecting on a picture of one’s own development. We see
self-knowledge described this way in Dawn, where Nietzsche claims that insofar as the
animal learns “to look back upon itself, to take itself ‘objectively;’ it, too, has its degree
of self- knowledge [Selbsterkenntniss].” 803 This backward-looking reflection which
enables the higher individual to fashion a uniquely individual personal narrative — which
allows this individual, in some sense, to know herself, or to take herself ‘objectively’ —
is what Nietzsche elsewhere in Dawn calls “setting up a real ego, accessible to him and
fathomable to him.” 804
In “Kant and Nietzsche on Self-knowledge,” Paul Katsafanas attempts to offer an
account of self-knowledge in Nietzsche via an extended analysis of the “intrinsic limits”
of introspection in Nietzsche and its corresponding inefficacy for self-knowledge. On
Katsafanas’s view, self-knowledge in Nietzsche requires “looking away from oneself.” 805
Katsafanas nicely demonstrates the relevance of genealogy for self-knowledge: “history
and genealogy can help to reveal the presence of certain drives, in part by showing how
these drives motivate patterns of behavior that might be visible only in the long
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term…genealogy helps us discover unnoticed aspects of the conceptual scheme through
which we experience and interpret the world.” 806
Katsafanas’s analysis of the relevance of genealogy for self-knowledge is inspired
by Nietzsche’s claim that “direct self-observation [unmittelbare Selbstbeobachtung] is
not nearly sufficient for us to know ourselves: we need history [wir brauchen
Geschichte], for the past flows on within us in a hundred waves.” 807 While it seems
plausible that a genealogical practice facilitates self-knowledge in the sense that
humanity may come to access prior conceptual schemes according to which the world
was interpreted, Katsafanas does not elaborate on the importance of understanding one’s
personal history for individual self-knowledge and, eventually, self-transformation. This
is the function which self-knowledge as self-narration performs on my account; this is the
sense in which “we need history” for self-knowledge. 808
Given the ineffectiveness of introspection for recognizing how “the past flows on
within us in a hundred waves,” Nietzsche’s remark that “we need history [wir brauchen
Geschichte]” for self-knowledge can just as easily refer to the need of a personal
narrative as the need of history more broadly: Geschichte can also be translated as
narrative. Even in the broader context of this aphorism, which demonstrates how “selfknowledge becomes universal knowledge as regards the entire past,” the meaning of
Geschichte remains ambiguous, as Nietzsche relates a picture of the constancy of
personal transformation and self-knowledge to our “most peculiar and personal
development”:
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We ourselves are, after all, nothing but our own sensation at every moment of this
continued flow. Even here, when we wish to step down into the stream of our
apparently most peculiar and personal development, Heraclitus’s aphorism “You
cannot step twice into the same river” holds good. 809
Thus, while Katsafanas’s analysis of self-knowledge as “looking away from oneself”
remains at the level of culture or society and reads Geschichte as a more traditional
notion of history, my analysis treats individual self-knowledge and personal
transformation, reading Geschichte instead as narrative, without thereby excluding the
importance that historical developments may play in one’s personal narrative. As
mentioned above, self-knowledge on my picture calls for the “setting up of a real ego” on
the behalf of the individual; it calls for the formation of a narrative of one’s own personal
development.
That the formation of a personal narrative plays an important role in personal
transformation is also evidenced by the biographical details scattered throughout
Nietzsche’s work and the connection that he draws between their necessity for his
personal development. Not only does Nietzsche employ extensive personal narrative in
Ecce Homo, a work subtitled “how one becomes what one is;” we also see Nietzsche
offer accounts of his personal development and the development of his thought elsewhere
in his body of work, often in stray references to the circumstances in which a particular
idea developed. In the first volume of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche recognizes that
growing wise in later life requires an authentic engagement and confrontation with both
religion and art. More specifically, he notes that “one must have loved religion and art
like mother and wet nurse — otherwise one cannot grow wise.” 810 In “Schopenhauer as
809
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Educator,” Nietzsche discusses the importance of his “great teacher” and “antipode”
Schopenhauer for his own growth. As we saw above, Nietzsche’s engagement and
original adoption of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic worldview transformed Nietzsche’s
understanding of the world and himself, leading to the acceptance of an illusory
metaphysics (the world as the work of a world-artist) in The Birth of Tragedy as
“metaphysical consolation” for the unbearable nature of existence. His later reaction to
and eventual rejection of Schopenhauer’s pessimism — as well as the ascetic method of
will suppression Schopenhauer recommends for overcoming the suffering and despair
which leads to pessimism— transformed Nietzsche’s worldview and self-understanding
yet again. 811
Nowhere is this formation of a narrative as evident as in Ecce Homo. In the
preface, Nietzsche explicitly notes that “[I]t seems indispensable to [him] to say who [he]
is” in light of the great task which he hopes to accomplish. 812 Though the biographical
details Nietzsche offers in this text are varied, all of them serve as explanations for his
development. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche notes that he could not have survived his youth
without Wagner’s music. 813 Later in this work, even as he remarks with ambivalence on
his relationship with Wagner, Nietzsche notices ways in which his favorable assessment
of Wagner and Wagnerian music in The Birth of Tragedy discloses something crucial
about himself as a young thinker who had not yet become what he was.
We see this disclosure of Nietzsche to himself via his encounter with Wagner in
the details of their relationship, as recounted by Nietzsche. Although Nietzsche
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interpreted Wagner’s music as an exemplar of the “power” of German music which arose
“out of the Dionysian root of the German spirit” 814 in The Birth of Tragedy, he later
interprets Wagner as a “fanatic of expression,” 815 one whose expressive music ends up
serving the same function as the ascetic priest in a society: anesthetizing suffering
through an excess of emotion. 816 Yet the way Nietzsche describes even this early
encounter with Wagner — and interpretation of the elevating function of Wagnerian
music — is telling. As Nietzsche remarks, “what I heard as a young man listening to
Wagnerian music really had nothing to do with Wagner… when I described Dionysian
music I described what I had heard — that instinctively I had to transpose and transfigure
everything into the new spirit that I carried in me.” 817 According to Nietzsche here, his
early interpretation of the significance of Wagner’s music tells more about Nietzsche than
it does about Wagner. In Wagner’s music, Nietzsche found something of himself,
something which inspired him and drew him aloft, something which facilitated his
interpretation of Dionysian intoxication and tragedy. Even when Nietzsche refers to his
misplaced “practical application of Wagnerism [in The Birth of Tragedy]… [as] a
symptom of ascent,” 818 he remarks upon what this prior interpretation disclosed about
himself: his own early tendency to life-affirmation as the “ultimate, most joyous, most
wantonly extravagant Yes to life” which strengthens life and believes that “nothing in
existence may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable.” 819 The critical response which
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Wagner and Wagnerian music eventually provoked in Nietzsche, furthermore, seems to
have enabled Nietzsche to establish his unique point of view: it enabled him, that is, to
develop an independent direction of his thought and become what he was. This point is
clearest when we attend to the parallel which may be drawn between the anesthetizing
functions of Wagner and the ascetic priest.
Just as Nietzsche details the influence of various thinkers in this work, he also
includes details such as the natural environment in which his thought was conducted,
dietary habits, and his physical condition. These biographical details are consistently
expressed in Ecce Homo as conditions in which his work and thought developed. “The
Wanderer and His Shadow,” for example, developed in a period of his most intense
blindness, in which his vision was often limited to shadows. 820 Even as Nietzsche wrote
in the midst of various physiological ailments, his work retained its life-affirming quality
because of his “choices of climate and locality.” 821 All of these details are aspects of
Nietzsche’s self-understanding, presented as his personal narrative.
Daniel Blue’s work offers further evidence for self-knowledge as self-narration in
Nietzsche. As Blue points out, by the age of twenty-four, Nietzsche had written at least
six separate autobiographies. 822 Although the autobiographical content and philosophical
problems addressed in these autobiographies varied widely, in every case Nietzsche “took
these narratives seriously.” 823 Blue goes on to suggest that these autobiographical
narratives
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…attempted an overview, a bid to plot the course of his existence… as the
sequent development of an autonomous self… Sometimes [Nietzsche] seems to
have treated autobiography as a kind of report card, to assess his progress… All
allowed him to sketch a somewhat objective representation of himself, an
externalized portrait… 824
Nietzsche’s practice of autobiographical reflection in his published works, then, was
preceded by a long and committed practice in his youth of reflecting on his personal
development and attempting to view himself “objectively.” 825 Just as history should be
utilized in the service of life, then, autobiographical reflection should be utilized in the
service of personal transformation.
The transformative force of personal narrative is not only something which we see
Nietzsche practice; it is also something which Nietzsche explicitly acknowledges in
“Schopenhauer as Educator,” where he remark that while “there may be other means of
finding oneself, of coming to oneself out of the bewilderment in which one usually
wanders… but I know none better than to think on one’s true educators and
cultivators.” 826 This process of self-knowledge, as the development of a personal
narrative and reflection thereupon, allows individuals to extrapolate from this narrative
and imagine not only who they have been, but who they want to become. We see
Nietzsche engaged in this process when he remarks that his account of Schopenhauer
offered in the second section of this essay
[describes] nothing but the first, as it were physiological, impression
Schopenhauer produced upon me, that magical outpouring of the inner strength of
one natural creature on to another that follows the first and most fleeting
encounter; and when I subsequently analyze that impression, I discover it to be
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compounded of three elements: the elements of his honesty, his cheerfulness, and
his steadfastness. 827
In Nietzsche’s reflection upon Schopenhauer’s influence, he identifies certain features of
Schopenhauer which stand out as having a special significance to him, as having a
particular value to him. By reflecting upon certain significant circumstances and
influences, or milestones in their development, then, one might identify values towards
which they should strive and, in this striving, be transformed. As Nietzsche remarks,
“from my own experience I am sure of only one thing: that from that ideal image it is
possible to fasten upon ourselves a chain of fulfillable duties.” 828 For Nietzsche, this must
involve identifying a “lofty goal” and bringing it “so close to us that it educates us while
it draws us aloft,” allowing us to “proceed towards so extravagant a goal through a
practical activity.” 829 In short, one’s development of a personal narrative and reflection
upon points of influence and milestones in one’s development (either in certain
circumstances or certain influential individuals), allows one to identify certain values
which they hold.
This narrative practice affords an individual the potential to be inspired and move
towards these values which one identifies — and especially values which have hitherto
gone unrecognized. Personal transformation, as self-culture, is “the child of each
individual’s self-knowledge and dissatisfaction with himself:” when one “is ashamed of
oneself without any accompanying feeling of distress” and “come[s] to hate one’s
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narrowness and shriveled nature,” one takes the first step towards transforming
oneself. 830
Although self-narration as the reflection upon one’s influences and milestones of
one’s development offers the opportunity for transformation, we see in Nietzsche’s
characterizations that such a practice is no guarantee of personal development or
transformation, when he describes the process in detail:
Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly
loved up to now, what has elevated your soul, what has mastered it and at the
same time delighted it? Place these venerated objects before you in a row, and
perhaps they will yield for you, through their nature and their sequence, a law, the
fundamental law of your true self. Compare these objects, see how one
complements, expands, surpasses, transfigures another, how they form a
stepladder upon which you have climbed up to yourself as you are now; for your
true nature lies, not hidden deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or
at least above that which you normally take to be yourself [emphasis mine].
In this excerpt, Nietzsche remarks that while it is possible to identify one’s values,
desired goals, and inspire directions for one’s striving through a practice of self-narration,
it is by no means a guarantee. We see that this potentially transformative practice merely
offers the possibility for personal development even in Nietzsche’s above remark that “it
is possible to fasten upon” oneself a “chain of fulfillable duties” in this way; this
outcome, however, is by no means certain. 831
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4.4.2 The transformative power of self-narration
We see, then, that self-knowledge as self-narration plays a role in personal development
for Nietzsche. At this point, it is critical to investigate both 1) what makes this role
possible and 2) how self-narration transforms the self, stimulating the activity of the
drives in a way that allows for self-narration to serve as a treatment of affective nihilism.
On my account, self-transformation is made possible by the space which self-knowledge
as self-narration opens for one to see oneself anew, since every new instance of selfnarration afford the opportunity for a new interpretation of oneself. In other words, selfknowledge as self-narration calls for reflection on “how things are” with oneself this time
around, and the reflective distance which this practice opens up enables one to interact
with one’s constitution in transformative new ways.
In Nietzsche’s terms, the formation of a personal narrative is what allows one to
engage in a stocktaking of oneself [Selbstbesinnung]. In his work, Nietzsche uses this
term in two different ways. Although he most frequently uses it to refer to mankind’s
taking stock of itself, he also speaks of personal Selbstbesinnung — and, importantly, the
structure of this stocktaking remains the same whether it is described as a practice of
personal or supra-personal reflection. 832
In Beyond Good and Evil, we see Nietzsche connect “a stock-taking
[Selbstbesinnung] of human beings” with their “growth in profundity.” 833 It is a particular
sector of humanity’s ability to take stock of itself which allows it to realize that “the
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decisive value of an action lies precisely in what is unintentional in it… the intention is
only a sign and a symptom, something which still needs interpretation, and furthermore a
sign which carries too many meanings and, thus, by itself alone means almost
nothing.” 834 Although Nietzsche here specifically discusses the potential of those higher
individuals for undermining and overcoming morality, the structure of personal
Selbstbesinnung — as that reflective moment during which one takes stock of oneself and
learns to interpret or see oneself anew — remains. Perhaps most interesting is Nietzsche’s
description of the revaluation of all values as “my formula for an act of the highest selfreflection [Selbstbesinnung] of mankind, that became in my flesh and genius.” 835
Although Nietzsche’s use of Selbstbesinnung here refers to mankind’s taking stock of
itself, this supra-personal reflective practice became possible only in Nietzsche’s own
flesh and genius [Fleisch und Genie]: that is, as his personal practice of reflection on the
origin of values in one’s drives. 836
On my account, those higher individuals capable of taking stock of themselves are
those who reflect on their narrative and interpret themselves anew with every subsequent
narrative. In a section in the Nachlass on phenomena ruined by the church’s misuse,
Nietzsche cites Selbstbesinnung as a practice of personal self-reflection which opens up
the space in one’s soul for spontaneous growth and activity. Nietzsche describes this
tendency as:
…temporary isolation, accompanied by strict refusal, e.g., of letters; a most
profound stock-taking of oneself [Selbstbesinnung] and self-recovery that desires
to avoid, not “temptations,” but “duties”; an escape from the daily round; a
834

BGE 32.
EH, “Destiny,” 1.
836
This foreshadows the necessity of self-knowledge and personal transformation on the behalf of
higher individuals for a transformation of culture.
835

286

detachment from the tyranny of stimuli and influences that condemns us to spend
our strength in nothing but reactions and does not permit their accumulation to the
point of spontaneous activity. 837
This “profound stock-taking of oneself” which inspires the spontaneous activity of the
spirit demonstrates the critical importance of reflection on one’s narrative for personal
transformation. This reflective moment — that moment in which one asks the “question
‘for what?’ after a terrible struggle, even victory… is a hundred times more important
than the question of whether we feel well or not [and the] basic instinct of all strong
natures.” 838 The higher individual’s ability to look back on life and form a narrative
which interprets the significance of points of influence is the “basic instinct of all strong
natures” who review the past in order to look towards the future. As Nietzsche notes,
“you possess in yourself a ladder with a hundred rungs upon which you may climb to
knowledge;” this is the way in which “your own life acquires the value of an instrument
and means of knowledge.” 839 It is one’s ability to identify and review milestones of
personal development in one’s life — the “hundred rungs” of the ladder of life that
appear as particularly significant parts of one’s development only in retrospect — that
leads one to the kind of self-knowledge which can provoke both self-transformation and
the spontaneous activity of the drives.
When one reflects on elements of one's personal narrative, whether it be an earlier
event, circumstance, or feeling, this moment of reflection always presents one with the
opportunity for a new interpretation of that event, circumstance, or feeling. After all,
since the self as subject-unity — as an embodied complex of drives — is a dynamic,
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ever-changing self, and different drives bring different interpretations to bear on the
phenomenon under consideration, any difference in the constitution of the self can make
for a new interpretation. In this sense, one can read Charles Taylor’s account of human
beings as “self-interpreting animals” as another way of putting Nietzsche’s proposal that
“the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself under its perspectival forms, and solely in
these. We cannot look around our own corner.” 840 Accordingly, the formation of a
narrative is always a formation from a perspective (or, more accurately, from multiple
perspectives, insofar as the subject is composed of a multiplicity of drives). Insofar as the
self as subject-unity is dynamic, the perspectives of this subject-unity are in constant flux.
Self-narration as a process of Selbstbesinnung, then, makes self-transformation possible
because forming and reflecting upon one’s personal narrative gives one the opportunity to
find oneself in a different relation to oneself. In short, the reflective space opened up in
the act of narrative and reflection on one’s narrative allows for one to “become other” to
oneself.
The transformative power of self-knowledge — as possible only via the
expression of a personal narrative to oneself and reflection upon this narrative— is
expressed in Taylor’s notion that “the development of new modes of expression enables
us to have new feelings… In being able to express our feelings, we give them a reflective
dimension which transforms them.” 841 In essence, the formation of a personal narrative
offers a new mode of expressing what one is. This adds a new, reflective dimension to
what one is; on my account, this reflection dimension allows for one to transform the self
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through the excitement or inhibition of one’s drives and affects. One’s reflective review
of certain milestones in one’s personal development will provoke particular affective
responses in the individual reflecting, after all, and these responses will encourage the
vitalization of some drives and the withering of other drives. In short, one’s reflection on
particular milestones in her personal narrative provokes affective responses, and these
affective responses function as excitatory, inhibitory, or some combination of the two,
emboldening certain drives and diminishing others.
When one reflects on one’s life in order to construct a narrative, one’s dominant
drives interpret her past and string together a narrative. This narrative interpretation is the
farthest one can go in self-knowledge. Upon the expression of her narrative to herself —
the individual’s taking-stock of herself [Selbstbesinnung] — the subject-unity comes to
know herself in some new way. This stock-taking as self-knowledge provokes negative
or positive affects, which function as excitatory or inhibitory for other drives (the same
affect may function as excitatory for one drive and inhibitory for another). Upon
reflection, one might be positively inclined towards certain milestones in one’s life, and
negatively inclined toward others, given the current arrangement of her drives and their
relative strength and weakness. The affective responses made possible by self-narration
and reflection thus potentially encourage the flourishing of certain drives (and thus the
pursuits of certain ends, manifesting in certain behaviors) and discourage others. In other
words, these affective responses have the potential motivate one's drives in particular
directions. The laws given by these affects and drives are laws of one's own; even as one
“gives herself” these laws and is transformed, she is given these laws by her drives.
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Perhaps the best account of this interaction between one’s world, drives, and
affects in Nietzsche can be found in Dawn:
Every moment of our lives sees some of the polyp-arms of our being grow and
others of them wither, all according to the nutriment which the moment does or
does not bear with it… Take some trifling experience. Suppose we were in the
market place one day and we noticed someone laughing at us as we went by: this
event will signify this or that to us according to whether this or that drive happens
at that moment to be at its height in us and it will be a quite different event
according to the kind of person we are. One person will absorb it like a drop of
rain, another will shake it from him like an insect, another will try to pick a
quarrel, another will examine his clothing to see if there is anything about it that
might give rise to laughter, another will be led to reflect on the nature of laughter
as such, another will be glad to have involuntarily augmented the amount of
cheerfulness and sunshine in the world and in each case a drive has gratified
itself, whether it be the drive to annoyance or to combativeness or to reflection or
to benevolence. This drive seized the event as its prey: why precisely this one?
Because, thirsty and hungry, it was lying in wait… What then are our
experiences? Much more that which we put into them than that which they
already contain! 842
The most important observation here is Nietzsche’s claim that one’s interpretation of the
event at hand is a result of “which drive happens at this moment to be at its height in us”;
this drive-based interpretation gives rise to a particular affective response, which
motivates our behavior. My account here relies on the excitatory and inhibitory potentials
of the affective responses which arise in the reflective moment. As a result of my drives’
current configuration, reflection upon my narrative gives rise to the excitement of certain
drives and inhibition of others, and “I” am thus motivated in certain directions, to change
certain things about myself or to continue on in certain ways as I am. My affective
responses to the elements of the narrative I recount motivate me to act in certain ways,
encouraging the waxing or waning of certain drives.
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Of course, this does not make me a freely acting agent: we cannot say that some
conscious intention has directed my action, or that I have some formed an intention to act
and transform myself which does, in fact, cause a transformation in me. Quite the
opposite: I do not freely choose to be transformed in a certain way. Instead, when I
recount my life thus far, a particular feeling arises in me in response to that which I
recount. This affective response is possible only because of my reflective distance. Since
it changes the configuration of my drives, it changes me, and because the affective
response is wholly mine — a result of my constitution as a subject-unity — this
transformation counts as a self-transformation. The picture of agency that Nietzsche
contrasts with this is one which understands our actions as shaped by our intentions; on
this traditional picture of self-determination, we form an intention to develop in a
particular direction and then will ourselves to develop in accordance with this intention.
This is exactly the kind of personal transformation that we can expect to be inaccessible
to the affective nihilist, as an individual with ineffective drives. Thus, the significance of
the reflective moment of Selbstbesinnung for self-transformation in Nietzsche helps us
envision an alternative account of agency in Nietzsche which might still be available to
the affective nihilist.
It is important to note that on this picture, an individual must meet some minimal
threshold of drive function in order for affective responses to be provoked in the first
place by reflection upon one’s personal narrative. If one’s drive functioning does not
meet this threshold, it is not clear that self-narration will be able to increase the activities
of one’s drives or result in self-transformation, since both of these require the motivating
force of affective responses. Thus, self-narration as a practice of self-knowledge remains
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a mere potential treatment for affective nihilism, and can not serve as a guaranteed
treatment for this condition.
To see why this account of personal transformation — as initiated by a process of
self-narration — counts as self-transformation, consider the following example. Imagine
the case of a high-achieving nursing student named Sally. Sally has consistently achieved
high marks in high school and in her college career. In her everyday, pre-reflective state,
Sally does not recognize that she achieves these marks in large part because of her grademotivated attitude: she aims to get good grades, regardless of whether she learns the
material. This motivation leads Sally to spend long nights cramming for exams, after
which she largely forgets the material she has studied but manages to score high marks
on her exams.
Imagine Sally comes to a crisis point after cramming for a nursing exam on which
she received an A. After the exam, she realizes that although she earned a high mark, she
has not retained any information about actual nursing practices. Upon reflection on her
personal narrative, she recognizes that she has been grade-motivated rather than learningmotivated. Imagine that this reflection incites her to despair. Such an emotion can
encourage the vitalization of certain drives — perhaps the drive to knowledge — and the
weakening of others — perhaps the drive to obtain external rewards. 843 Sally’s formation
and reflection upon her personal narrative, as well as her affective response, not only
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reveals a hitherto unrecognized desire to be learning-motivated; it also brings about a
change in her constitution, or a transformation. Her despairing emotion, brought about by
reflection on a significant part of her personal narrative, is something wholly hers: she
alone experiences this affect and she experiences this particular affect because of the
particular embodied multiplicity that she is. This affective response enacts a
transformation of her drives, therefore, it transforms her. Yet since this affective response
belongs uniquely to her and arises from who she is, her transformation is crucially a selftransformation. 844
This transformation also results in an expansion in the range of affections — the
determinate ways in which one can influence or be influenced by the world — which are
available to the individual, insofar as it brings new drives (and their affective
orientations) to bear on one another. As we saw above, drives inspire affective
orientations. When drives engage with one another, the affective orientations they induce
have the potential to change and transform, depending on the drives’ activities and
relations of resistance, assimilation, and incorporation. The practice of self-narration and

844
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subsequent reflection upon one’s narrative affords one a range of affects and affective
orientations which would have remained unavailable to the individual, since selfnarration enables the reflective individual to bring her drive-based perspective on herself
into an interaction with the drives of which she is composed.
Thus, the reflection on one’s personal narrative which constitutes self-knowledge
for Nietzsche becomes a condition of transformative self-critique. Without a narrative of
the self with which to engage, and without the affective responses which demonstrate
one’s taste or distaste for particular moments of personal development, critical
engagement with oneself — and the potential for transformation that creates — would
remain impossible. 845 In Nietzsche’s 1886 preface to the second volume of Human, All
Too Human, Nietzsche notes that he had to inhabit a critical stance on his previous
instincts and beliefs in this work in order to become free to develop and think beyond
these instincts. 846 There Nietzsche notes that he was “sorely mistrustful… [and] took
sides against [himself] and for everything painful and difficult precisely for [him]
[dergestalt Partei gegen mich und für Alles, was gerade mir wehe that und hart fiel].”847
This, Nietzsche claims, showed him “the way to ‘[himself]’, to [his] task.” 848 We see
examples of this “taking sides against oneself” throughout Nietzsche’s work. One such
845
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example is Nietzsche’s critique of his prior Romantic sensibility. Without constructing a
personal narrative which identified a significant predisposition to a “dangerous form of
romanticism” — and without developing a distaste for this moment in his personal
history — Nietzsche might not have had the impetus to form such a strong attack on the
decadence of romantic ways of thinking. 849 In other words, Nietzsche would have been a
very different thinker and person. 850
Nevertheless, there is no one agent of transformation on this picture; no unified
Cartesian subject directing one’s actions, but instead, the subject-unity as ever-changing
multiplicity. This version of self-transformation is consistent, then, with Nietzsche’s
critiques both of the “ego-substance” and conventional conceptions of agency. At this
point, it bears asking: if my account of personal transformation in Nietzsche’s mature
conception is correct, how ought one to think about Nietzsche’s positive conception of
agency? Although Nietzsche’s remarks on agency seem to me to remain mainly critical,
and his project here mainly negative, Frankfurt’s account of agency serves as a helpful
supplement to my account of self-knowledge and self-transformation.
In “Freedom of Will and Concept of a Person,” Frankfurt insists that human
beings are the only animals “capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and
purposes, from what they are.” 851 Another way to put this is that human beings are
capable of developing second-order desires: they can develop desires about their desires.
Imagine one has the desire for a sweet dessert after dinner. This is a first-order desire. Yet
human beings are also able to develop desires about their desires. I might wish — if I
849
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were on a diet, for example — that I did not have the desire for dessert. But I might also
wish to continue having this desire. (Perhaps I just enjoy dessert!) In both of these cases,
my wishes are second-order desires: desires about more basic desires.
Let us think back to Sally. While Sally’s (unconscious) first order desire before
her transformation is to earn a certain grade, the second-order desire which initiates her
transformation is a desire not to be motivated by grades. This desire, produced in the
moment of self-reflection by an interaction between Sally’s affective response and
particular drives of which she is composed, has transformative force. 852 Thus, this
second-order desire might result in the development of a new first-order desire — in her
case, a desire to truly learn the material she studies. If she were to reflect approvingly on
this new desire at a later time, we might say that she has then developed a new secondorder desire: a desire to be (or to stay) learning-motivated.
Frankfurt attributes this development of second-order desires to man’s capacity
for “reflective self-evaluation,” and suggests that this capacity for self-evaluation as a
“becoming critically aware of [one’s] own will” 853 — what Nietzsche might call
Selbstbesinnung — gives human beings the capacity for freedom of the will (as
distinguished from freedom of action). Without committing Nietzsche to Frankfurt’s
general view, I want to suggest here that what Nietzsche calls the self-transformation of
the higher individual is made possible by a reflective self-evaluation of the kind Frankfurt
suggests which opens up new possibilities for the will: the formation of a personal
852
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narrative (as self-knowledge) and the moment of Selbstbesinnung. In this way, the
inextricability of the human potentials both for self-knowledge and agency advanced by
Frankfurt is prefigured in Nietzsche’s concept of self-knowledge both as self-narration
and as a necessary condition of self-transformation. Taylor’s complementary suggestion
(inspired by Frankfurt) that “the capacity for second-order desires, or evaluating desires,
is essential to human agency” 854 translates (on my account) to Nietzsche’s suggestion that
the presentation of a personal narrative to oneself, and the potential for evaluation it
makes possible, is a necessary precondition for a kind of agency. In more concrete terms,
the ability to form and reflect upon a narrative reveals second-order desires and changes
first order desires by exciting or inhibiting certain of one’s drives through one’s affective
responses.
Of course, neither Nietzsche nor Frankfurt would suggest that one’s desire to be
different than she is or was, expressed through affective means, allows for freedom of
action. Furthermore, Nietzsche would likely insist that what Frankfurt calls the self’s
“second-order desires” — desires to be differently than one is — usually remain
unconscious desires, and at bottom are comprised of nothing more than perspectives of
certain drives in conflict with the perspectives of other drives. Yet such desires, manifest
in affective responses, can still be influential, even potentially steering one towards a
conformity between these “second-order” desires with one’s current self as a
configuration of power-relations (or, as Frankfurt would say, a “conformity of [one’s]
will to [one’s] second-order volitions”). 855
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Self-narration as a practice of self-knowledge which facilitates a personal
transformation is not a guaranteed solution to affective nihilism. Instead, I argue that we
must understand it as one potential treatment of the condition which might function to reengage the affective nihilist with herself and her values, as well as allow her to regain
some measure of agency. This is because this account of self-transformation neither
requires a conscious choice to change nor brute force of will (both of which might be
impossible for the affective nihilist suffering from the ineffectiveness of her drives), yet
still enables one to bring about a transformation in the constitution of one’s drives — and
thus one’s affective orientations. As I mentioned above, the overcoming of affective
nihilism must involve the exercise of agency as the abilities to have goals, increase one’s
activity, and play a part in one’s own transformation. 856 Self-knowledge as self-narration
allow for one to exercise agency through the development of second-order desires with
the potential to change one’s constitution. These second-order desires orient the
individual towards particular goals and prompt the activities of one’s drives, all while
preserving a role for the individual in her own personal transformation. Insofar as it
affords the possibility of reactivating and increasing the end-directed activity of one’s
drives without the need for brute force of will, self-narration might serve as a treatment
for overcoming affective nihilism.857
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4.4.3 The next step: Beyond the lion, the child
The individual able to overcome affective nihilism through the use of personal narrative
is the individual who has learned to will again: the individual whose drives are, once
again, growing in their characteristic activity. At this stage, one becomes able again to
impose one’s will on the world through their drives as wills to power. As we saw above,
this capacity is characteristic of Zarathustra’s leonine individual. Yet there is, of course, a
further stage for Nietzsche: the child-like individual. As Gooding-Williams persuasively
argues in his interpretation of Zarathustra, this final stage of development, the child-like
individual is the individual who recognizes her receptive nature. This child-like
individual allows for the free play of value creation which results from the reception of
values other than her own (those evaluative orientations, on my interpretation, resulting
from the world as wills to power) and bringing her drives to engage with and transform
these old evaluative orientations. In this final section, I argue that the practice of forming
and reflecting upon a personal narrative also enables one to recognize the importance of
an affirmative receptivity for one’s own transformation and the creation of new values.
Thus self-narration is not only useful as a preliminary treatment for the lack of agency
characteristic of affective nihilism; this practice also has the power to enable one the
individual’s recognition of her receptive nature and her participation in a world of
immanent purpose, value, and truth — a world which conditions her transformation and
the creation of new values.
Let us recall elements from Nietzsche’s personal narrative above. In recounting
this narrative, we see the emergence of a pattern. Nietzsche was able to see the truly
harmful effects of Christianity because his very early reverence for Christianity allowed
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him to observe the psychological effects that a serious belief in Christianity could
produce. Schopenhauer became Nietzsche’s “first and only educator” because in his
youth, Nietzsche was able to recognize something of himself in Schopenhauer and
something of his own view in Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Nietzsche was able to critique
Wagner’s music so effectively only because he first felt deeply enamored with
Wagnerian music; the same story can be told about his critique of the Romantic
sensibility. Nietzsche’s personal development involved eventually occupying a critical
stance towards these ideas and figures, but his critical observations were as sharp and
penetrating as they were because he was in the first case receptive and vulnerable to the
influence of these ideas and figures. In essence, Nietzsche was able to create new values
from out of the older values represented by Christianity, Schopenhauer, and Wagner
because he could acknowledge the way the ideas and principles of these influences
permeated his being while also bringing his own drives to bear on them.
In other words, Nietzsche’s acknowledgement of his own vulnerability to the
above influences and the variety of drives they manifested, coupled with his active
engagement with these influences, allowed him not to move on from a purely destructive,
leonine stance to a child-like one in which he acknowledged his embeddedness in the
world as wills to power as a condition of his transformation and the free play requisite for
value creation. Just as the child does in Zarathustra, Nietzsche “acknowledges… his
vulnerability… to Dionysian chaos… as a chaos of uncreated, bodily passions.” 858 Put
more broadly, as the child able to create truly new perspectives and values out of an
active spirit, Nietzsche both recognizes the necessary permeability between himself as a
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driven being and the world of drives with which he is engaged and affirms this, thus
occupying a stance of affirmative receptivity which, as we will see, enables him to affirm
existence and his world.
Nietzsche speaks explicitly of the critical significance of an affirmative
receptivity for knowledge in a number of other noteworthy — and strikingly similar —
passages. In Human, All too Human, Nietzsche claims that “one who really wants to get
to know something new (be it a person, an event, a book) does well to entertain it with all
possible love.” 859 This loving attitude is described here by Nietzsche as an affirmation of
the matter beforehand and an hermeneutical openness to what a person, event, or book
might disclose. 860 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche issues his reader a similar command:
“one must learn to love [Man muss lieben lernen].” 861 Loving consists, in both of these
passages, in adopting an attitude of affirmative receptivity, by which we may coax forth
that which we are attempting to understand. To come to know something, “we need to
exercise effort and good will in order to endure it in spite of its strangeness; we need
patience towards its aspect and expression.” 862 The final place where we see this sort of
attitude mentioned as an expedient to knowledge is in Twilight of the Idols. In this late
work, Nietzsche claims that:
to learn to see — to accustom the eye to composure, to patience, to letting things
come to it [An-sich-herankommen-lassen angewöhnen]; to put off judgment [das
Urtheil hinausschieben]… is the first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to
react to a stimulus right away, but to keep in check the instinct to restrict and
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exclude… What is essential [in learning to see] is precisely not to “will,” to be
able to put off a decision [nicht „wollen“, die Entscheidung aussetzen können]. 863
After one learns to overcome affective nihilism by re-activating one’s drives and
increasing their characteristic activities, one must learn to exert more control over one’s
drives — and, in particular, one must learn not to will when the situation requires it.
Another way to put the significance of love as affirmative receptivity (especially
in light of Chouraqui’s account of Nietzschean love as involving the incorporation of one
drive by another) is that those who have learned to love — those who have learned to
practice an affirmative receptivity to new perspectives, in which one makes a mindful and
concentrated effort to charitably and broadly interpret that which one encounters — are
those best situated to participate in the active creation of new values. After all, the
process of value creation for Nietzsche — as opposed to value destruction — requires
one to become intimately acquainted with the perspectives of a new variety of drives.
The affirmative receptivity required for value creation and life-affirmation is possible in
virtue of the individual value creator’s ontological status as a porous subject-unity, but it
is distinct from this ontological status. 864
Without adopting the attitude of receptive affirmation that Nietzsche describes in
the above passages, Nietzsche would have been unable to have an authentic engagement
with those ideas which changed him most profoundly and led to his own acts of value
creation. Without the affirmative attitude which allowed him to adopt a favorable stance
and receptivity to the influences of Schopenhauer’s works or the climate in Sils-Maria,
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Nietzsche might have remained unmoved by them: in the language of Dawn, the “polyparms of his being” that these influences vitalized might have withered, while others
grew. 865 Quite simply, both what Nietzsche was and which values he created would have
been drastically different had he not been receptive to very particular figures, ideas, and
places. Put more broadly: while an affirmative, open attitude allows for one to be fed by
certain influences, a lack of openness or affirmation blocks this nutriment and thus blocks
these potential avenues for growth. 866 These potential avenues for growth in the
characteristic activities of the drives are those same avenues required for an expansion of
one’s affective range and capacities — and, therefore, an expansion of one’s evaluative
orientations. An attitude of affirmative receptivity that recognizes one’s vulnerability to
sources of meaning outside of the self is a necessary pre-condition for the authentic and
active creation of new values. It is this affirmative receptivity which separates the lion
from the child.
Seeing self-knowledge in Nietzsche as narrative construction therefore also
allows us to recognize the important role that an openness which makes one vulnerable
plays in personal transformation and value creation for Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s emphasis
on an openness with the potential to transform is crucial and, in a field of Nietzsche
scholarship focused on warlike and agonistic attitudes, often overlooked. Indeed, given
Nietzsche’s role as a relentless critic of society and culture, we might find any emphasis
on receptivity or openness in his thought surprising. The open and affirmative attitude
that Nietzsche finds so crucial, however, is not an attempt at total objectivity, or
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“immaculate perception” of phenomena, such that certain perspectives will appear the
same to all who remain open to them. Indeed, as Nietzsche notes in Twilight of the Idols,
his affirmative attitude is “the opposite of a tolerant taste, is… very far from saying Yes
indiscriminately.” 867 This is because, for Nietzsche, one’s constitution at any given time
plays a critical role in determining the certain specific ideas, figures, or locations which
will move the individual who holds herself open to them. In Nietzschean terms, we must
remember that the arrangement of one’s particular complex of drives makes one more
likely to affirm certain sources and to deny others, even as we realize that practicing an
attitude of affirmative openness affords the opportunity to be moved in new directions.
In sum, coming to know oneself by means of constructing a personal narrative
demonstrates the significance of openness as affirmative receptivity for selftransformation and value creation. Indeed, Nietzsche’s own particular manifestation of
self-knowledge as self-narration allows us to see that those moments which offer the
most potential for transformation are those moments in which we are most open and
vulnerable to that which we are encountering. One’s encounters with what one loves “like
mother and wet nurse,” enables one to “look beyond [and] outgrow” these influences in
an authentic and creative way, when it comes time to pass these influences by. 868 Yet it is
only by practicing an affirmative openness towards sources of meaning outside of
ourselves that we can incorporate the aspects of those sources which seem worth keeping
and create new values.
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4.4.4 Self-knowledge, going-under, and overcoming
Nietzsche refers to himself as “the first perfect nihilist of Europe who, however, has even
now lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside
himself.” 869 On my account, Nietzsche’s practice of formulating and reflecting upon a
variety of personal narratives likely served to catalyze his self-transformation and thus
played a critical role in enabling him to leave affective nihilism behind and affirm life. Of
course, Nietzsche does not explicitly claim that reflection upon one’s personal narrative
allows one to overcome nihilism as an affective condition. Thus, as mentioned above, we
must think of ourselves here not as presenting Nietzsche’s own solution to affective
nihilism, but as utilizing Nietzschean resources to address a problem which Nietzsche
introduces.
Although Nietzsche does not explicitly claim that self-narration plays a role in the
overcoming of nihilism, he does remark to his reader that self-knowledge plays a crucial
role in moving ahead and beyond a culture plagued by nihilism. In Human, All Too
Human, Nietzsche suggests that “When your sight has become good enough to see the
bottom in the dark well of your being and knowing, perhaps you will also behold in its
mirror the distant constellations of future cultures.” 870 By recognizing the conditions of
one’s own positive development, one might also become acquainted with the conditions
for developing and moving-forward one’s culture.
We see just how easy it is to miss out on this connection between self-knowledge
and the transformation of oneself and one’s culture when we look back to a potentially
damning excerpt from Ecce Homo, in which Nietzsche claims that “to become what one
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is, one must not have the faintest notion what one is.” 871 In this passage, Nietzsche notes
that becoming what one is often requires an ideal selfishness and self-preservation. In
situations where coming to know oneself might lead to one’s demise or destruction, one
ought to “forget oneself, misunderstand oneself, [and] make oneself smaller, narrower,
mediocre.” 872 After all, Nietzsche calls the injunction “nosce te ipsum [know thyself]” a
“recipe for ruin.” 873 What some readers might miss is the specificity of the context in
which the above course of action is recommended. Self-preservation of the kind
described above is for those who cannot follow “the recipe for ruin” — more helpfully
translated as “the recipe for going-under [das Recept zum Untergang].” If one is not
prepared to embark on such a journey to know oneself, one should forget or
misunderstand oneself in the interest of self-preservation. The reasons for this selfpreservation may vary, but in this specific case Nietzsche is describing an early stage in
the development of an individual whose highest task is greater than she can imagine.
Since an awareness of the individual’s task could destroy her if it is premature, her
ignorance is of practical benefit.
There comes a time, however, when all higher individuals who will be
transformed by their task and bring their task to fruition must go under. This familiar
notion from Thus Spoke Zarathustra presents going-under [untergehen] as a critical stage
in Zarathustra’s Bildung. Zarathustra emphasizes this when he declares “I love those who
go under with my entire love: they are those who will go beyond.” 874 Only those who “go
under” have the potential to go over. In other words, one may transform oneself and
871
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culture in one’s unique way only after one comes to know oneself. Nowhere does
Nietzsche state this connection as clearly as in the excerpt from Human, All Too Human
already mentioned above, where he claims that one must come to know oneself before
one can behold in oneself and one’s own transformation the “distant constellations of
future cultures.” 875 In order to transform culture, then, one must first be transformed and
prepared for that task which is uniquely one’s own. This requires self-knowledge as
reflection upon one’s personal narrative. One’s self-transformation may lead to a cultural
transformation, but this process importantly begins with self-knowledge as a kind of
going-under on the behalf of the individual.
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Conclusion
“We must think differently so that—perhaps very late in the day—we may achieve
something more: to feel differently.” Nietzsche, Dawn, 103
In the first and second chapters of this project, I hope to have offered a
sufficiently detailed and nuanced account of Nietzsche’s interpretation of the problem of
nihilism, both as a cognitive phenomenon involving a set of beliefs about one’s world (as
“European nihilism”) and as a feeling-based phenomenon (as “affective nihilism). In the
third chapter, in order to show how Nietzsche’s drive ontology enables his reader to rethink purpose, truth, and value in a life-affirming and non-nihilistic way, I offer an
extended interpretation of Nietzsche’s metaphysics. This interpretation is informed both
by the metaphysical pictures he rejects and his positive descriptions of the world.
It is in the fourth and last chapter, however, that I begin to suggest ways in which
Nietzschean nihilism might be overcome. In this chapter, I argue that the European
nihilist can think truth, purpose, and value in new and life-affirming ways by coming to
understand Nietzsche’s account of the drives — as wills to power with affective, and
therefore evaluative, orientations — and by applying this account not only to human life,
but to non-human life and the inorganic world (as Nietzsche intended). In this way, I look
to Nietzsche’s drive ontology as a resource for overcoming European nihilism, while
acknowledging that Nietzsche did not necessarily intend it for this use. This overcoming
of European nihilism requires one to think differently about truth, purpose, and value as
sources of meaning and about the world as a meaningful world in which one participates.
In the final sections of the fourth and final chapter, I aim to find resources in
Nietzsche’s thought for overcoming affective nihilism. Since affective nihilism is a
psycho-physiological condition — consisting in a weakness of the will and a disruption

308

of one’s end-directedness and engagement in the world — this is a particularly difficult
problem to overcome. Yet in Nietzsche’s own practices and recommendations as “the
first perfect nihilist of Europe who… has even now lived through the whole of nihilism,
to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself,” we find one potential treatment: the
development of, and reflection upon, a personal narrative. 876 Self-knowledge as selfnarration not only offers the potential for personal transformation; it also enables one to
recognize the importance of an attitude of openness — or affirmative receptivity — for
the authentic creation of new values. Although Nietzsche does not explicitly say that selfnarration can be used to overcome nihilism as a feeling-based phenomenon, and although
there could be no guarantee that this treatment would work for each individual nihilist,
the transformative power of self-narration offers one a potential means to “feel
differently” about oneself and about the world to which one belongs.
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